Monday, April 28, 2014

Multi-Brand French Phisher uses EDF Group for ID Theft

At the end of January last year, French power company EDF advised the public that they were seeing a significant rise in the number of phishing complaints they were receiving from their customers. An example story in English from The Connexion: EDF customers hit in 'phishing' scam, says that an EDF spokesperson said beginning in August of 2012 they were seeing 20,000 customers per month complaining about the phish and that in January 2013 it had risen to as many as 40,000 customers per month. As many as 200 to 300 new phishing sites per month were being created at that time.

This week Malcovery is noticing that the EDF phish are back, with a twist! The current EDF phish are asking for documents with an enormous value for identity theft and are targeting many different French banks with the information. Here's what a currently live phishing site looks like:

Zooming in on the data being requested, we see typical information.

Email, Password, Title, Name, Address, City, Postal Code, and Date of Birth.

While EDF has world-wide operations, a large number of their tens of millions of utility customers are in France.

The email they receive is likely to be the same one seen in France last year that advises:

Votre paîement a été refusée par votre établissement bancaire. […] Pour éviter la pénalités de retard, nous vous donnant la possibilité de payer en ligne en utilisant votre carte bancaire.

(or in English: "Your payment was declined by your bank ... To avoid late fees, we give you the option to pay online using your credit card.

After providing the basic information, they are prompted to choose which bank issued the credit card they will be using to pay their bill:

Choices are:

Axa Banque
Banque populaire
BNP
Bred
Caisse d’epargne
Credit agricole
Credit mutual
Credit du nord
CIC
HSBC
Societe generale
La banque postale
LCL
Autres

and then enter their Credit Card information:

The most interesting part of the phish, however, is what comes next! The Phishers then tell them that in order to prove they are really in charge of this account, they must upload at least two forms of proof of identity!

  • Identity Card
  • Credit Card
  • A copy of a Bank statement
  • An invoice proving the address
Whichever documents I attempted to upload, it kept insisting that I needed to upload additional documents.

Although this case is most accurately described as an EDF phish, there are actually thirteen targeted banks, and an unlimited number of forms of identity theft that could occur if some victim were to provide all of the requested information. Just another example of how the phishers use FEAR (an unpaid Utility bill that could result in Termination of Service) to steal our credit card information!

Saturday, April 12, 2014

Zeus Criminals charged in Omaha, Nebraska

Legal documents analayzed below are available at the bottom of this DOJ article: Nine Charged in Conspiracy to Steal Millions of Dollars using Zeus Malware

We've talked about Zeus in this blog for many years, including some good arrests, such as Major Zeus Bust in the UK: Nineteen Zbot Thieves Arrested. But we now have names for the ring leaders of the biggest Zeus case of all time, Operation Trident BreACH. We knew the aliases of the Ring Leaders publicly thanks to Microsoft's work back in 2012 (see Microsoft DCU, FS-ISAC and NACHA vs. Zeus) but who were these mystery men: tank and petr0vich?

Now we know ... more anyway ... Two Ukrainian members of the Jabber Zeus gang stood in federal court in Omaha, Nebraska last week to plead "Not Guilty" after being extradicted from the UK. Yuriy Konovalenko and Yevhen Kulibaba are among the nine people listed in the indictments that have been sealed since August of 2012. The list of defendents is:

  • Yvacheslav Igorevich Penchukov, AKA tank, AKA father
  • Ivan Viktorvich Klepikov, AKA petr0vich, AKA nowhere
  • Alexey Dmitrievich Bron, AKA thehead
  • Alexey Tikonov, AKA kusanagi
  • Yevhen Kulibaba, AKA jonni
  • Yuriy Konovalenko, AKA jtk0
  • John Doe #1, AKA lucky12345
  • John Doe #2, AKA aqua
  • John Doe #3, AKA mricq

DOJ is still seeking four of the named criminals, and still has not publicly acknowledged the names of the three John Does. If you have information on these, please reach out to the FBI!

Tank == Vyacheslav Igorevich Penchukov, 32, of Ukraine, who allegedly coordinated the exchange of stolen banking credentials and money mules and received alerts once a bank account had been compromised.

Petr0vich == Ivan Viktorvich Klepikov, 30, of Ukraine, the alleged systems administrator who handled the technical aspects of the criminal scheme and also received alerts once a bank account had been compromised.

TheHead == Alexey Dmitrievich Bron, 26, of Ukraine, the alleged financial manager of the criminal operations who managed the transfer of money through an online money system known as Webmoney.

Kusunagi== Alexey Tikonov, of Russia, an alleged coder or developer who assisted the criminal enterprise by developing new codes to compromise banking systems.

Although jonni is only now coming to trial in the United States, the Metropolitan Police of London arrested Kulibaba and his wife Karina Kostromina back in October of 2011, as we learned from KrebsOnSecurity in his article ZeuS Trojan Gang Faces Justice. Yuriy Konovalenko, AKA Pavel Klikov, was also in custody in the UK and was "due to be sentenced" according to Krebs' article.

Many of the crimes covered in this indictment are well known to us already, largely due to the work of journalist Brian Krebs. While Krebs was still at the Washington Post writing his Security Fix column, he made Zeus a household name.

Selected Victims:

  • Bank of America
  • Bullitt County Kentucky - Security Fix, Brian Krebs, July 2009. -- Bullitt County had $415,000 stolen from their accounts after being infected by Zeus.
  • Doll Distributing of Des Moines, Iowa
  • First Federal Savings Bank of Elizabeth Town, Kentucky
  • Franciscan Sisters of Chicago, (Homewood, Illinois)
  • Husker AG, LLC of Plainview, Nebraska
  • Key Bank of Sylvania, Ohio
  • ODAT LLC, d/b/a Air Treatment Company
  • Parago, Inc of Lewisville, TX
  • Salisbury Bank & Trust of Salisbury, MA
  • Town of Egremont, Mass
  • Union Bank and Trust of Lincoln, Nebraska
  • Union Bankshares of Ruther Glen, VA
  • United Dairy, Inc of Martins Ferry, OH
The version of Zeus at the heart of this investigation communicated stolen credentials to a server located on the IP address 66.199.248.195 at Ezzi.net in Brooklyn, NY. An FBI Agent interviewed Mohammed Salim in September 2009, who confirmed that the server in question, called the Incomeet server, was custom built for a Russian company "IP-Server Ltd" in Moscow, whose POC was "Alexey S." Extensive chat logs were recovered from the server with four separate search warrants - September 28, 2009, December 9, 2009, March 17, 2010, and May 21, 2010. Those web servers showed the criminals discussing their conspiracy, including many instances of the criminals trading login credentials for bank accounts.

Those chats also showed that the criminals closely follow Brian Krebs! Tank and Aqua are shown discussing his Bullitt County article linked above and saying "They laid out the entire scheme! I'm really pissed! They exposed the entire deal!"

Doll Distributing had $59,222 stolen from them in two occasions. One of those wire transfers went to "Pandora Service, LLC" and to "Kodash Consulting." FBI Agents interviewed Heidi Nelson and Renee Michelli, the proprietors of those organizations who had believed they were acting as "Financial agents" for a Russian software company. In other words, they were money mules.

All of the victims named above were discussed in the chat logs by the criminals charged in this case.

I especially enjoyed learning how TANK was identified by name. In the chat, on July 22, 2009, he announced that his daughter, Miloslava, had been born and gave her birth weight. A records search of Ukrainian birth records only showed one girl named Miloslava with that birth weight born on that day. Her father was Vyacheslav Igorevich Penchokov. This was enough to seize the computers from Tank's home, which confirmed it was the same person!

Petr0vich was discovered because of mentions of the email address "theklutch@gmail.com" in the chat logs. Gmail was subpoenaed to get records for this email account, which showed "92.242.127.198" had been used to log in to that email address at least 790 times. The secondary email for that account, "petr0vich@ua.fm", was given when the account was created November 24, 2004. Several other addresses were used to login to both the petr0vich jabber account on the Incomeet server and the Gmail address, including 209.160.22.135. Similar techniques were then used to find the computers located at those IP addresses. Ivan Viktorovich Klepikov was found to be living in Donetsk, Ukraine.

TheHead stated his real name in the chat, and gave his gmail account as "alexey.bron@gmail.com". He was telling the truth.

Kusunagi gave a phone number in the chat, and found that phone number on a public webpage where Alexey Tikonov's real name and contact information were given. He lived in Tomsk, Russia. He also used his Kusanagi identity to post videos where WHOIS information related to those videos location confirmed his location.

Jonni and Jtk0 were identified by Detective Sergeant Simon Williams of the Metropolitan Police of London.

We'll talk more about this case in another post soon . . .

Friday, April 11, 2014

Phishers, Framesets, and Grocery Surveys

Like most criminals, or let's face it, most programmers, Phishers are lazy. They like to be able to create one website and have it live for an extended period of time. Unfortunately for them, victim companies either smash new phishing sites as fast as they can, or they hire companies to do it for them. At Malcovery Security we concentrate on INTELLIGENCE rather than takedown, so our focus is in understanding what the sites can teach us about the criminal behind the attack, and how the many attacks against your brand are related to each other and to attacks against other brands.

A friend of ours shared a link to a website today that was imitating Centra, a convenience and grocery chain throughout Ireland.

The accompanying spam message promises that they will pay us 150 Euros just for taking their survey!

For the convenience of the consumer, rather than having to wait for a check (cheque) in the mail, you can just enter all of your Credit Card information, and your Date of Birth and some other personal details, and they'll deposit the money right into your credit account!

As we looked at the log files, we found an interesting fact. NONE of the more than 900 visitors to the website had visited the site DIRECTLY. They were all being referred from other URLs. This is our indicator that the spam messages did NOT contain a link to the domain shown above. Instead, they were pointing at websites with Chinese domain names!

...
[10/Apr/2014:01:06:08 GET /Centra/centra/ http://asp.sti.com.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:01:07:46 GET /Centra/centra/ http://asp.sti.com.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:01:07:52 GET /Centra/centra/ http://asp.sti.com.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:01:08:28 GET /Centra/centra/ http://asp.sti.com.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:01:08:51 GET /Centra/centra/ http://asp.sti.com.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:01:09:14 GET /Centra/centra/ http://asp.sti.com.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:01:09:24 GET /Centra/centra/ http://asp.sti.com.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:01:09:28 GET /Centra/centra/ http://asp.sti.com.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:01:09:42 GET /Centra/centra/ http://asp.sti.com.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:01:09:45 GET /Centra/centra/ http://asp.sti.com.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:01:09:55 GET /Centra/centra/ http://asp.sti.com.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:01:10:27 GET /Centra/centra/ http://asp.sti.com.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:01:10:31 GET /Centra/centra/ http://asp.sti.com.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html

...

[11/Apr/2014:00:46:22 GET /Centra/centra/ http://www.jctz.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[11/Apr/2014:00:58:02 GET /Centra/centra/ http://www.jctz.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[11/Apr/2014:01:06:46 GET /Centra/centra/ http://www.jctz.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[11/Apr/2014:01:16:22 GET /Centra/centra/ http://www.jctz.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[11/Apr/2014:01:18:38 GET /Centra/centra/ http://www.jctz.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[11/Apr/2014:01:18:48 GET /Centra/centra/ http://www.jctz.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[11/Apr/2014:01:23:23 GET /Centra/centra/ http://www.jctz.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[11/Apr/2014:01:25:27 GET /Centra/centra/ http://www.jctz.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[11/Apr/2014:01:25:49 GET /Centra/centra/ http://www.jctz.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
...

When we look at the websites on "asp.sti.com.cn" and "www.jctz.cn" we see that both of them actually consist ONLY of a "FrameSet" that sends us to the location of the CENTRA phish:

The logs ALSO reveal that another brand is being hosted on the same server!

...
[10/Apr/2014:05:19:16 GET /texc/ http://mnks.1039.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:05:20:03 GET /texc/ http://mnks.1039.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:05:20:09 GET /texc/ http://mnks.1039.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:05:28:47 GET /texc/ http://mnks.1039.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:05:30:31 GET /texc/ http://mnks.1039.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:05:37:56 GET /texc/ http://mnks.1039.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:05:48:45 GET /texc/ http://mnks.1039.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:05:50:27 GET /texc/ http://mnks.1039.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:05:53:44 GET /texc/ http://mnks.1039.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html
[10/Apr/2014:05:57:39 GET /texc/ http://mnks.1039.cn/Bonibon/HausSurvey.html

Since most of the time when I'm in the UK I am running dawn to dusk in meetings, Tesco is the only store I've actually ever shopped in, since there is one on every street corner in London. The phishers have correctly updated their currency to use Pounds instead of Euros: "TESCO Supermarkets will add £150 credit to your account just for taking part in our quick survey." but other than that, this is the same phish!

And, as with the other, the actual advertised URL from the spam campaign is hosted in China, and simply updates the content with a Frame SRC = .

Remnants in the logs make it seem likely that this phisher has also targeted Woolworths (many 404 messages in the very early part of the phish for paths with /wps/woolworths/ in the path. Very likely that this is a throw-back to the Woolworths phish from 2012. (Woolworths is a food chain in Australia - they got so many of these scams that they did television news announcements warning about it - see for example: Scam Alert (a Current Affair November 2012). Those spam messages looked like this:

Subject: Customer Satisfaction Survey! Win 150$

Congratulations!

You have been selected by Woolworths Online Department to take part in our quick and easy reward survey. In return we will credit $150 to your account - Just for your time!

Helping us better understand how our members feel, benefits everyone.

With the information collected we can decide to direct a number of changes to improve and expand our services. The information you provide us is all non-sensitive and anonymous. No part of it is handed down to any third party groups. It will be stored in our secure database for maximum of 3 days while we process the results of this nationwide survey.

To access the form, please click on the link below :

Thursday, April 10, 2014

The Carder.su indictment: United States v. Kilobit et. al.

Today the U.S. government unsealed its indictment against Fifty-Five members of the Carder.su carding forum. We wrote about Carder.su before on this blog, back in March 2009 when a rival gang was trying to call attention to Carder.su by sending out spam advertising the site. (See: Carders do battle through spam - carder.su. No wonder they were jealous! Today's indictment shows the Carder.su guys performed over $50 Million in fraudulent charges!

Named in the indictment were 39 individuals, all charged with "General Allegations" called:

Count One (Participate in a Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization [RICO])
and
Count Two (Conspiracy to Engage in a Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization).

The whole group are described in the indictment like this:

"The defendants herein, and others known and unknown, are members of, employed by, and associates of a criminal organization, hereafter referred to as "the Carder.su organization," whose members engage in acts of identity theft and financial fraud, including, but not limited to, acts involving trafficking in stolen means of identification; trafficking in, production and use of couterfeit identification documents; identity theft; trafficking in, production and use of unauthorized and counterfeit access devices; and bank fraud; and whose members interfere with interstate and foreign commerce through acts of identity theft and financial fraud. Members and associates of the Carder.su organization operate principally in Las Vegas, Nevada, and elsewhere.

Here's the list:

NAMEAKA ListCounts Charged
Roman ZolotarevAdmin, Support1-2, 19
Konstantin LopatinGraf1-2, 33, 44, 47
Alexander Kostyukov *Temp, KLBS1-2, 3-17
Maceo Boozer IIIXXXSimone, G4, El Padrino, Mr. Right, MRDC871-2, 3-17
Tin-Yueng WongRay Wong, Ray1-2, 3-17
Edward Montecalvo *N1ghtmare, Tenure441-2, 3-17, 22-55
Yu Feng Wang Ibatistuta1-2
Mohamed Amr Mahmoud Amr Mahmoud, CC--Trader, Kengza1-2, 20, 22-55
Jermaine Smith SirCharlie57, FairBusinessman 1-2, 61-62
Makyl Haggerty Wave 1-2
Aladelola Teslim Ajayi Bank Manager, Document Manager, Corey 1-2, 61-62
Alexandru Ion AbagnaleFrank 1-2
Jordan Georgievski Devica 1-2
Roman Seleznev Track2, Bulba, NCUX 1-2, 22-55
Qasir Mukhtar Caliber 1-2, 56-60
Roy Ayad Rabie Ayad, Patistota 1-2, 22-55
Mina MorrisSource 1-2, 22-55
Rachid Idaali C4rd3r 1-2, 22-55
Liridon Musliu Bowl 1-2, 22-55
Sergei Litvinenko Dorbik, Matad0r 2
Michael Lofton Killit, Lofeazy 1-2, 3-17
Shiyang GouCDER 1-2, 3-17
David Ray CamezBadman, DoctorSex 1-2, 3-17
Cameron Harrison Kilobit1-2, 3-17
Aleksandar BesarovicQiller 1-2, 3-17
Duvaughn Butler Mackmann 1-2, 21, 61-62
Fredrick Thomas 1Stunna 1-2
John Doe 1 Senna0711-2, 3-17
John Doe 2 Morfiy 1-2, 3-17
John Doe 3 Gruber 1-2, 18
John Doe 4 Maxxtro 1-2
John Doe 5 Elit3 1-2
John Doe 6 Fozzy 1-2, 22-55
John Doe 7 Vitrum, Lermentov 1-2, 22-55
Andrei BolovanPanther, Euphoric, Darkmth 1-2, 22-55
John Doe 8 TM 1-2, 22-55
John Doe 9 Zo0mer, Deputat 1-2, 22-55
John Doe 10 Centurion 1-2, 22-55
John Doe 11 Consigliori 1-2, 61-62
While it is true that many carders are Russian, several folks on this list reside in the United States. This case, which DHS ICE calls "Operation: Open Market", has already seen 19 arrested in the United States, primarily in Las Vegas, where LOFTON, CAMEZ, BUTLER, LAMB, and VERGNETTI were arrested. (Some of those arrested are indicted separately and do not appear above.

KOSTYUKOV was arrested in Miami from his home at 1100 Washington Avenue, Miami Beach. (He sent a letter to the judge asking for his property back, including his Hookah pipe and his Dr. Dre Beats headphones.

KOSTYUKOV, 27, was arrested in Miami, Florida.
Boozer, 23, was arrested in Detroit, Michigan.
Montecalvo, 20, was arrested in Morgantown, WV.
Jermaine Smith, 31, was arrested in Newark, NJ
Makyl Haggerty, 22, lived in San Francisco,
Qasir Mukhtar, 27, in New York
Shiyang Gou, 27, in New York
Cameron Harrison, 25, in Augusta, GA
Fredrick Thomas, 31, in Orlando, FL
Omar Butt, 28, in New York
Bill Steffey, 33, in Sacramento,
Jason Maclaskey, 32, (at large?)
Derek Carder, 38, Sacramento
Robert Kephart, 38, Sacramento
Heather Dale, 21, Springfield, Orlando
Herbert Morrell, 50, Orlando
Roger Grodesky, 49, Warren, Ohio
John Holsheimer, 53, San Diego

David Ray Camez, a Nevada resident, for example, was convicted and was due to be sentenced today. (You may enjoy reading his Forfeiture document which includes ATM machines, PVC Card Embossers, dozens of phones and computers as well as printers, cameras, and video games. Camez was already serving a seven year sentence in the State of Arizona for fraud charges he was convicted of there.

Back in 2012, ICE agents announced that they had arrested 19 in the US in an operation called "Operation: Open Market."


The full Fifty-one page indictment, originally introduced in court on January 10, 2012, and finally unsealed April 10, 2014, goes on to describe additional charges and activities, sometimes in great detail. The case against "Defendant 24, Cameron Harrison, AKA Kilobit" is being tried in Las Vegas, Nevada as CASE #: 2:12-cr-00004-APG-GWF-24.

The event that triggered the unsealing of the indictment was that Cameron Harrison pleaded guilty, WITHOUT BENEFIT OF A PLEA AGREEMENT! His nineteen page guilty plea. In addition to Count One and Count Two above, Cameron plead guilty to:

Count Sixteen: Trafficking in and Production of False Identification Documents and Aiding and Abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii), and (c)(3) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

The Sentencing Guidelines that the prosecution is asking for are HUGE because they are describing the "Total amount of actual loss involved in the offense as $50,893,166.35" which gives a +24 to the Sentencing guidelines just for the financial losses!

Base Offense Level = 7
+ 24 (offense involved more than $50 Million of actual loss)
+6 (offense involved more than 250 victims)
+2 (offense involved receiving stolen property and the defendant was a person in the business of receiving and selling stolen property)
+2 (fraud committed from outside the US, involving a sophisticated means)
+2 (fraud involving possession of device-making equipment and trafficking in unauthorized and counterfeit access devices)
-3 (Acceptance of Responsibility)

Total Offense Level = 40

Restitutions that are declared in the Plea include:

American Express = $3,299,210.90

Discover Financial Services = $2,202,429.00

Master Card = $15,496,221.00

Visa Inc. = $29,895,305.45

Total = $50,895,305.45

Because this is a RICO case, EACH member of the Conspiracy can be found responsible for the full restitution. The Indictment requests that each have $20 million of their assets seized to help cover the costs. (Most have nowhere near that amount, of course...).

Roles of the Defendants

Despite the news headlines being about Kilobit (Cameron Harrison) today, Harrison was only a "Member" of the board. Far more important members are listed below by their roles on the various Carder.su websites.

Administrator = "Roman ZOLOTAREV was the head of Carder.su.

As the head of the governing council, the administrator handles day to day management decisions of the organizatoin, as well as long-term strategic planning for its continued viability. Zolotarev was the leader of the enterprise, appointing moderators, and directing other members and associates of the enterprise in carrying out unlawful and other activities in futherance of the conduct of the enterprise's affiars. In addition, ZOLOTAREV:

  • determines which individuals can become and remain members of the Carder.su organization.
  • regulates the functions, responsibilities, and levels of access to information accorded to each member.
  • bestows the rewards accorded members for their loyalty to the Carder.su organization, and sets the punishments to be meted out to members evidencing disloyalty to the organization.
  • decides when, how, and under what circumstances to attack and to retaliate against members of rival criminal organizations and their associated Internet website forums.
  • has full access to, and privileges on, the computer servers hosting the Carder.su organization's websites.
  • has ultimate responsibility for the administration, maintenance, anonymity and security of ther Carder.su organization's computer servers
Moderators = Konstantin LOPATIN and MAXXTRO

These defendants act as leaders of the enterprise, directing other members and associates in carrying out unlawful and other activities in furtherance of the conduct of the enterprise's affairs. Moderators are members of the Carder.su organization's governing counsel. They oversee and manage one or more subject matter specific areas on the Carder.su organization's websites. Their jobs included assisting Zolotarev by:

  • monitoring and policing websites by editing and deleting members' posts and mediating disputes among members.
  • serve as Reviewers for products or services through the enterprise with which they have expertise.
  • Both LOPATIN and MAXXTRO possessed at least 15 counterfeit or unauthorized access devices.
Reviewers

Members are allowed to sell contraband, including counterfeit documents, stolen bank accounts, and credit card information. Reviewers examine and test products and services that members wish to advertise and sell on the websites. A favorable review is a prerequisite to to selling contraband. Any member can be appointed to do a review, although they are usually done by Moderators or the Administrator.

Vendors

Vendors advertise and sell products, services, and other contraband after receiving a favorable review.

Vendors among the defendants included:

Alexander KOSTYUKOV (Temp/Klbs) - a vendor of Cashout services. Cashout vendors remove funds from bank and credit card accounts and receive a fee between 45% and 62% of the funds received.

Maceo BOOZER (XXXSimone / G4 / El Padrino / Mr. Right / mrdc87) is a vendor of dumps. "Dumps" are stolen credit and debit card account data. They sold for between $15 and $150 per card, depending on the quantity purchased and the geographic location. United States cards are least expensive, and European cards are most expensive.

Ray WONG is a vendor of counterfeit plastic. A device-making implement used to produce counterfeit credit cards. WONG sold blank counterfeit plastic cards for $20 to $25 each, with a minimum order of 50 cards. Embossed counterfeit cards were $65 to $75 each with a minimum order of ten. Wong was also a vendor of dumps.

MONTECALVO (N1ghtmare / Tenure44) is a vendor or dumps, but also offered a dump checking service. He had the ability to validate a card against a real financial institution.

Yu Feng WANG (Ibatistuta) is a vendor of counterfeit cards, counterfeit holograms, and signature panels used to manufacture counterfeit credit cards. He sold blanks for $10-$15 each.

Mohamed Amr Mahmoud (AMR Mahmoud / CC--Trader / Kengza) is a vendor of CVV. While dumps are magnetic card stripe reads, CVVs are all of the account holder information - such as Name, DOB, SSN, address, telephone number, mother's maiden name, and the CVV2 code from the back of the card. MAHMOUD also sold Paypal accounts, Fullz (all of the above plus expiration date and PIN), and Enroll/COBs. The latter included all of the previous data, as well as username and password for the account's online access. Depending on the online balance, he would charge $140 to $200 per account.

Jermaine SMITH (Sircharlie57 / Fairbusinessman) is a vendor of plastic and counterfeit cards.

Makyl HAGGERTY (Wave) is a vendor of counterfeit identification documents and counterfeit cards. He sold counterfeit drivers license for between $100 and $200 each, depending on state, including CA, TX, WI, OH, RI, NV, PA, IL, FL, LA, AZ, HA, SC, GA, NJ, as well as BC Canada. He also sold blank counterfeit plastics and embossed cards.

Aladelola Teslim AJAYI is a vendor of counterfeit identification documents, stolen corporate account information, dumps, and counterfeit credit cards.

ALEXANDRUION (Abagnalefrank) is a vendor of dumps. He sells 100 mixed Visa and Master Card accounts for $1,500 or 100 AmEx cards for $1,000.

Jordan GEORGIEVSKI is a vendor of counterfeit credit cards and blank plastic, as well as embossed cards for $75 each.

Roman SELEZNEV (Track2 / Bulba / Neux ) is a vendor of dumps. He sold very large volume product through an automated website where members could load their desired cards into a shopping cart. Accounts sold for $20 each.

Qasir MUKHTAR (Caliber) is a vendor of counterfeit plastics, holograms, and signature panels.

Roy AYAD (Rabie Ayad / Patistota) is a vendor of CVVs, selling through an automated website.

Mina MORRIS (Source) is a vendor of dumps. Morris had an automated website to sell dumps.

Rachid IDAALI (C4rd3r) is a vendor of Fullz.

Liridon MUSLIU (Bowl) is a vendor of CVVs.

Sergei Litvinenko (Dorbik / Matad0r ) is a vendor of Bullet Proof Hosting services and infrastructure for criminal websites. These are ISPs that allow criminals to run illegal websites used for phishing, carding forums, or dump sites.

GRUBER is a vendor of counterfeit identification documents including drivers licenses ranging from $150 to $200 each.

ELIT3 is a vendor of Fullz. He also sells Enroll/COBs.

FOZZY is a vendor of dumps ranging from $12 to $100 each, depending on quantity and location.

VITRUM (Lermentov) is a vendor of dumps.

Andrei BOLOVAN (Panther / Euphoric / Darkmth) is a vendor of dumps.

TM is a vendor of dumps and CVVs, which he sells to members through an automated website.

Zo0mer (Deputat) is a vendor of stolen PayPal accounts, Proxies, Fullz, Credit Card Checking and Information Lookups.

CENTURION is a vendor of dumps.

CONSIGLIORI is a vendor of dumps and blank plastic.

Members

Members must successfully complete a number of security features intended to keep out law enforcement and rival criminal organizations. Teams use a number of Carder.su websites as "virtual clubhouses" to gather with other members in order to share information, solicit and recruit other members and to achieve the common objectives of the enterprise.

Members charged in this conspiracy include:

Michael LOFTON (Killit / Lofeazy

Shiyang GOU (Cder)

David Ray CAMEZ (Bad Man / DoctorSex )

Cameron HARRISON (Kilobit)

Alexsandar BESAROVIC (Qiller)

Duvaughn BUTLER (Mackmann)

Fredrick THOMAS (1STunna )

SENNa071

MORFIY


The Charges

Count One and Two given above deal with Racketeering:

COUNT ONE:

Acts 1 through 15 - Unlawful Trafficking In and Production of False Identification Documents

Acts 16, 17, 19 - Attempt to Unlawfully Produce False Identification Documents

Acts 18, 20, 21 - Conspiracy to Unlawfully Produce False Identification Documents

Act 22 - Conspiracy to Unlawfully Transfer False Identification Documents

Act 23 - Possession of Document-Making Implements

Act 24 - Conspiracy to Unlawfully Transfer, Possess, and Use a Means of Identification

RACKETEERING ACTS 25 through 36

Acts of Wirefraud by MAXXTRO, MAHMOUD, HARRISON, ELIT3, LOFTON, THOMAS, MAHMOUD, ION, AYAD

RACKETEERING ACTS INVOLVING COUNTERFEIT AND UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS DEVICES

Act 37 - Using and Trafficking in Unauthorized Access Devices

Acts 38 through 97 - Possession of 15 or more Unauthorized Access Devices

Acts 98 through 103 - Trafficking In and Possessing Access Device-Making Equipment

Acts 104 through 109 - Conspiracy to Trafficking In and Possess Access Device-Making Equipment

COUNT TWO

Dealing with General Allegations from November 22, 2005 through June 2011. Counts Three Through Seventeen - Trafficking in and Production of False Identification Documents

Count Eighteen - Attempting to Unlawfully Produce False Identification Documents, Aiding and Abetting

Count Nineteen - Conspiracy to Unlawfully Transfer False Identification Documents

Count Twenty - Unlawful Transfer, Possession and Use of a Means of Identification, Aiding and Abetting

Count Twenty-One - Trafficking in and Use of Counterfeit and Unauthorized Access Devices, Aiding and Abetting

Counts Twenty-Two through Fifty-Five - Possession of Fifteen or More Counterfeit and Unauthorized Access Devices, Aiding and Abetting

Counts Fifty-Six through Sixty - Trafficking In and Possessing Access Device-Making Equipment; Aiding and Abetting

Counts Sixty-One and Sixty-Two - Conspiracy to Traffick In and Possess Access Device-Making Equipment


Thursday, March 20, 2014

American Express's new Phishing Criminal Brings Game!

Every time I start to think that I've seen everything with regards to phishing the criminals shake things up and get me excited again. Today I have to say the American Express phishers are bringing their A Game to the table again. While there are several different groups of phishers attacking most financial institutions, the criminals behind this particular attack are at least showing some creativity. Let's take a look at the spam message first.

We had two primary spam subject lines for this campaign. On March 17, 2014 the Malcovery Spam Data Mine gathered:

468 copies = Subject: Important: Personal Security Key
290 copies = Irregular card activity

The messages were BEAUTIFUL! Here's one:

Isn't that gorgeous? Every single link in that email is actually just another copy of the phishing URL. No matter what you click on, the phishing process starts. And what a process it is! Just in the samples that we had at Malcovery Security, we saw 574 distinct URLs on 77 different web hosts! (the full list is available as amex.urls.txt.

The AmEx Phishing Payload

Why am I writing about this three days later? BECAUSE THE PHISH IS STILL LIVE!

Just a few minutes ago, I revisited one URL per webhost and found that 40 of the 77 servers were still delivering payload.

What was the payload?

Here's a sample from one of those 40 sites:

A small box containing the words "Connecting to server..." appears, but in the background, the machine is trying to pull content from these scripts (defanged below):

(script) src equals http://theblazingfiddles.com/responsive/rhone.js
(script) src equals http://haus-an-der-treene.de/irrigated/bewaring.js
(script) src equals http://qualifyformedi-cal.com/mortician/amicably.js
(script) src equals http://ufofurniture.com.au/curries/searchlights.js

But actually between the 40 sites I was able to access this morning (March 20, 2014) there were a total of 38 redirectors!

hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  nebucom.com (slash) instanced (slash) inconsolable.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  e-translation.pl (slash) ditty (slash) appetizing.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  grupovordcab.com (slash) expiration (slash) eddies.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  user22809.vs.easily.co.uk (slash) healed (slash) pulsation.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  cescconstructionsupply.com (slash) diminished (slash) somalian.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  majstri.net (slash) donning (slash) slaved.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  ohsspiritwear.com (slash) nike (slash) robbing.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  songingeternally.com (slash) maracaibo (slash) your.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  03629e3.netsolhost.com (slash) altaic (slash) scarify.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  mobifone-sy.com (slash) inflated (slash) minstrels.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  shashwathomes.com (slash) pleader (slash) socialized.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  www.netpolis.gr (slash) emulate (slash) loved.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  theblazingfiddles.com (slash) responsive (slash) rhone.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  haus-an-der-treene.de (slash) irrigated (slash) bewaring.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  qualifyformedi-cal.com (slash) mortician (slash) amicably.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  ufofurniture.com.au (slash) curries (slash) searchlights.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  amerapremier.com (slash) cesar (slash) viewers.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  www.deacomunicazione.it (slash) doyen (slash) undermining.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  orbitek.hosting24.com.au (slash) trespasses (slash) earthly.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  www.mypafamilylawyer.com (slash) desultory (slash) interrelated.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  blog.myragold.com (slash) hastening (slash) contemporaries.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  loveworks365.com (slash) howe (slash) corsets.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  SNC.NO-IP.ORG (slash) drywalls (slash) liquefy.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  conseguidomaquinaria.com (slash) hollyhocks (slash) propels.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  034ED86.NETSOLHOST.COM (slash) lodestone (slash) shilled.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  almesa.gr (slash) furious (slash) zygotes.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  hosted.proaal.com (slash) enchanted (slash) handel.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  hnuaaa.org (slash) spitfires (slash) winks.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  www.tstn.org (slash) churchyard (slash) wealthy.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  filtron.gr (slash) skited (slash) menages.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  3914f5c7a46c5f05.lolipop.jp (slash) andre (slash) fastidiously.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  geeologee.com (slash) bawls (slash) cubbyholes.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  ghs.boehmenkirch.de (slash) executrix (slash) straps.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  besttrainer.co.nz (slash) phrasings (slash) vehicle.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  ftp.fasady-zateplovani.eu (slash) conduces (slash) garrote.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  sewhot.ca (slash) househusbands (slash) piing.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  animalspirits-lva.de (slash) instruction (slash) propounds.js
hxxp:  (slash)   (slash)  wildtrackpictures.com (slash) dracula (slash) archenemy.js
Each of those actually does a "document location" to forward you to the actual phishing page, which was hosted on five different URLS: hxxp: (slash) (slash) e4business.net (slash) americanexpress (slash)
hxxp: (slash) (slash) paitoanderson.com:8080 (slash) americanexpress (slash)
hxxp: (slash) (slash) advisorbuysell.com (slash) americanexpress (slash)
hxxp: (slash) (slash) advisor-connect.info (slash) americanexpress (slash)
hxxp: (slash) (slash) 173.246.103.84 (slash) americanexpress (slash)

The Phish Itself

Here's a walk-through of the five page phish.

(Each of those three pages actually had this footer on the bottom! Good to see they included a link to the Fraud page at AmEx!)

When you were finished, you got a friendly thank you . . . letting you know your certificate was all set up . . .

and then got forwarded to the real AmEx page:

Thursday, February 27, 2014

2013 FTC Consumer Sentinel Report - Identity Theft By U.S. City

Each year the Federal Trade Commission publishes a detailed report on the Fraud and Identity Theft complaints they received during the previous year, not just at the FTC, but throughout their Consumer Sentintel Network.

Some of the leading members of that network include the Better Business Bureau and the FBI's Internet Crime and Complaint Center (IC3.gov).

You can review the entire 2013 Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book on your own if you want to look up more about your state.

Just like last year, fraud that began by telephone/telemarketing was the top category, but 33% of all Fraud complaints started with an email!

Complaints by category were:

14% - Identity Theft
10% - Debt Collection Fraud
7% - Banks and Lenders
6% - Imposter Scams
6% - Telephone and Mobile Service Scams
4% - Prizes, Sweepstakes and Lottery Scams
4% - Auto-related Fraud
3% - Shop-at-home and Catalog Sales fraud
3% - Television and Electronic Media fraud
2% - Advanced Payment for Credit Services fraud

In the Fraud categories, over 1 million complaints were filed including $1.6 billion in fraud, where the median reported amount paid was $400. (Only 61% of those alleging fraud stated a loss amount.)

Within the category of Identity Theft, the top categories were:

34% - government documents/benefits fraud
17% - Credit Card Fraud
14% - Phone/Utilities Fraud
8% - Bank Fraud
6% - Employment-related Fraud
4% - Loan Fraud

In 2012, there were 369,145 Identity Theft Complaints registered by Consumer Sentinel.
In 2013, there were 290,056 Identity Theft Complaints.

That's a 21.5% reduction in Identity Theft Complaints! Does this indicate that Identity Theft improved from 2012 to 2013? Or does it indicate that Identity Theft has become so common place that people don't get irate and call the Better Business Bureau or the FTC when it occurs?

Wire Transfer Tops the Fraud Losses List

American consumers are just DESPARATE to throw their money away in Wire Transfers. Even though every wire transfer place I've visited in the last two years has big warning signs about the various forms of fraud involving sending your money away in a wire transfer, it continues to be the top way in which fraudsters separate their victims from their money.

YEARComplaintsMoney Wired Out
2011115,901$438,343,577
2012109,138$456,541,454
2013104,984$507,713,984
Western Union and MoneyGram both have warning pages to help protect consumers! Follow their advice to not lose the average $4836 that more than 100,000 complained about last year!

Western Union has Eight Tips at their Knowledge Center:

  1. Never send money to people you haven't met in-person
  2. Never send money to pay for taxes or fees on lottery or prize winnings
  3. Never use a test question as an additional security measure to protect your transaction
  4. Never provide your banking information to people you don't know
  5. Never send money in advance to obtain a loan or credit card
  6. never send money for an emergency situation without verifying that it's a real emergency. (Gee - like a London Traveler Scam?)
  7. Never send funds from a check in your account until it officially clears - which can take weeks
  8. Never send a money transfer for an online purchase

MoneyGram has a great page called The 11 Most Common Wire Transfer Frauds that include:

  1. The Vehicle Purchase Scam
  2. The Fake Loan Scam
  3. The Lottery or Sweepstakes Scam
  4. The Internet Romance Scam
  5. The Mystery Shopper Scam
  6. The Charity Scam
  7. The Relative in Need Scam
  8. The Internet Purchase Scam
  9. The Newspaper Ads Scam
  10. The Check or Money Order Scam
  11. The Elder Abuse Scam
They even have a nice Dodge the Scams Game to help you get it down pat!

Green Dot MoneyPak

In the most significant change in fraud payment behavior, this year 28% of fraud losses occurred via Prepaid cards, which was almost exclusively Green Dot Money cards. Two years ago this category of fraud losses didn't even exist! From 2012 to 2013 the number of victims went up 500% and the amount of money lost went up 600%!!

YEARComplaintsPrepaid Card Fraud Losses
201110$9,054
201216,914$6,946,619
201384,671$42,858,396

(image from DotFab.com, click to visit)

How much of this fraud was due to the CryptoLocker and PoliceLock Ransomware? We can't be sure, but this is a PROFOUND shift in fraud loss behavior and a great deal of it is certain to be based on those two malware campaigns. We blogged about CryptoLocker using Greendot late in the year in our story Tracking CryptoLocker with Malcovery and IID, but the FBI's Donna Gregory reported on the malware as far back as this August 2012 FBI Ransomware Story where she said "We’re getting inundated with complaints!" referring to the complaints coming in to the FBI's IC3.gov complaint form, which is one source of Consumer Sentinel Data.

2013 - Top Cities for Identity Theft

Last year, 16 of the top 25 Identity Theft Metropolitan area were in Florida. This year it has fallen to 13.

13 of top 25 in Florida (16 in 2012)
4 of top 25 in California (0 in 2012)
3 of top 25 in Georgia (6 in 2012)
1 each in Alabama, Arkansas, Michigan, Tenessee, and West Virginia

RankMetro/Micropolitan AreaPer 100,000
1Miami-FortLauderdale-WestPalmBeach, FL340.4
2Columbus, GA-AL214.7
3Naples-Immokalee-MarcoIsland, FL214
4Jonesboro, AR190.9
5Tallahassee, FL179.4
6CapeCoral-FortMyers, FL174.9
7Atlanta-SandySprings-Roswell, GA170.7
8PortSt.Lucie, FL163.9
9Beckley, WV160.9
10Tampa-St.Petersburg-Clearwater, FL155.5
11Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL149.6
12Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI142.9
13Lakeland-WinterHaven, FL140.2
14Stockton-Lodi, CA133.1
15Montgomery, AL132.2
16Vallejo-Fairfield, CA128.2
17Jacksonville, FL125.7
18Memphis, TN-MS-AR125.5
19Valdosta, GA125.4
20Ocala, FL125
21Gainesville, FL122.6
22Sebastian-VeroBeach, FL122.4
23LosAngeles-LongBeach-Anaheim, CA119.1
24Deltona-DaytonaBeach-OrmondBeach, FL118.9
25Fresno, CA118.2
26Albany, GA117.6
27SanFrancisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA116.8
28NorthPort-Sarasota-Bradenton, FL116.6
29Bakersfield, CA116.5
30Macon, GA116.2
31Riverside-SanBernardino-Ontario, CA115.2
32Savannah, GA115.1
33PuntaGorda, FL115
34Dallas-FortWorth-Arlington, TX114.8
35Crestview-FortWaltonBeach-Destin, FL112.4
36PalmBay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL111.3
37Flint, MI109.7
38Lynchburg, VA108.1
39Jackson, MS107.4
40Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV106.3
41HomosassaSprings, FL105.5
42Niles-BentonHarbor, MI105.2
43Houston-TheWoodlands-SugarLand, TX104.7
44Fayetteville, NC102.9
45Sacramento--Roseville--Arden-Arcade, CA101.3
46Modesto, CA101.1
47Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ101.1
48LasVegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV100.8
49Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI100.4
50Killeen-Temple, TX99.4
51Auburn-Opelika, AL98.4
52NewYork-Newark-JerseyCity, NY-NJ-PA97.7
53SanJose-Sunnyvale-SantaClara, CA96.4
54Reno, NV96.1
55Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD95.5
56Chico, CA95.5
57Napa, CA94.5
58Pueblo, CO94.3
59Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD93.4
60SanDiego-Carlsbad, CA93.4
61Milwaukee-Waukesha-WestAllis, WI92.8
62Madera, CA92.8
63RockyMount, NC92.5
64Laredo, TX92.3
65Beaumont-PortArthur, TX92
66Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO92
67Cleveland-Elyria, OH91.7
68SantaCruz-Watsonville, CA89.6
69Brownsville-Harlingen, TX89.4
70Goldsboro, NC88.9
71Mobile, AL88.6
72Merced, CA88.4
73SantaMaria-SantaBarbara, CA88.2
74AnnArbor, MI88.2
75Tucson, AZ87.9
76Augusta-RichmondCounty, GA-SC87.8
77AtlanticCity-Hammonton, NJ87.4
78Redding, CA86.9
79Greenville-Anderson-Mauldin, SC86.6
80Athens-ClarkeCounty, GA86.2
81McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX85.6
82CorpusChristi, TX85.5
83BatonRouge, LA85.4
84SierraVista-Douglas, AZ85.3
85Austin-RoundRock, TX85.2
86Florence, SC85.1
87Albuquerque, NM85
88Boulder, CO84.9
89Pensacola-FerryPass-Brent, FL84.9
90ColoradoSprings, CO84
91California-LexingtonPark, MD83.7
92Dalton, GA83.7
93Hattiesburg, MS83.3
94SanAntonio-NewBraunfels, TX83.2
95WarnerRobins, GA83
96Oxnard-ThousandOaks-Ventura, CA82.8
97Trenton, NJ82.7
98Houma-Thibodaux, LA82.6
99Dover, DE82.6
100St.Louis, MO-IL82.1

Alabama Identity Theft: 2012 compared to 2013

Forgive me, dear reader, for focusing on my own state just this once . . .

In 2012, Alabama's top cities for Identity Theft, and their Per Capita complaints received, were:

#15 - Columbus, GA/AL (205.9 per 100,000)
#16 - Montgomery, AL (203.7 per 100,000)
#42 - Auburn-Opelika, AL (124.1 per 100,000)
#62 - Birmingham-Hoover, AL (111 per 100,000)
#91 - Enterprise-Ozark, AL (97.8 per 100,000)
#97 - Huntsville, AL (95.5 per 100,000)
#100 - Mobile, AL (93.5 per 100,000)
#118 - Anniston-Oxford, AL (90.2 per 100,000)
#125 - Tuscaloosa, AL (88.4 per 100,000)
#132 - Dothan, AL (87.2 per 100,000)
#145 - Gadsden, AL (84.3 per 100,000)
#195 - Decatur, AL (72.8 per 100,000)
#198 - Daphne-Fairhope-Foley, AL (72.4 per 100,000)
#303 - Florence-Muscle Shoals, AL (56.4 per 100,000)

How does that compare to 2013's numbers?

The Columbus, Georgia/Alabama Metro area rose 13 places in the national rank to be the second worst city in America for Identity Theft.
Montgomery, Alabama had a very slight rise in rank (from #16 to #15), although the number of complaints per capita fell, it is still one of the worst cities in America for Identity Theft.
Mobile, Alabama rose in rank by 29 places, moving from #100 to #71.

All other cities in Alabama FELL in their national rank for Identity Theft -- but one must ask, as above, is that because crime is declining? or is apathy increasing? Have we become so desensitized to Identity Theft that we no longer feel the need to complain?

#2 +13 - Columbus, GA-AL (214.7 per 100,000) = +8.8 per 100,000
#15 +1 - Montgomery, AL (132.2) = -71.5 per 100,000
#51 -9 - Auburn-Opelika, AL (98.4) = -25.7 per 100,000
#71 +29 - Mobile, AL (88.6) = -4.9. per 100,000
#117 -55 - Birmingham-Hoover, AL (77.7) = -33.3 per 100,000
#131 +1 - Dothan, AL (74.8) = -12.4 per 100,000
#152 -55 - Huntsville, AL (68.5) = -27 per 100,000
#167 -42! - Tuscaloosa, AL (65.2) = -23.2 per 100,000
#226 -81! - Gadsden, AL (57.5)
#234 -116! - Anniston-Oxford-Jacksonville, AL(56.5)
#268 -70! - Daphne-Fairhope-Foley, AL (52.1)
#316 -121! - Decatur, AL (44.2)
#357 -54! - Florence-MuscleShoals, AL (36.7) -

Do YOU Know How to File an Identity Theft, Fraud, or Phishing Complaint?

If someone scammed you out of your money or stole your identity, that is a CRIME! What should you do? CALL THE POLICE!

But there are some other guidelines as well.

The Federal Trade Commission has two web pages that help you understand what to do if you have been the victim of identity theft:

FTC: What to do if you have been a victim of Identity Theft
FTC: How to file an Identity Theft Complaint with the FTC

FTC: March 2-8 is National Consumer Protection Week - tips and videos you can share with your friends are on this site!

You STILL want to call your local Police to let them know about the crimes against you. If someone stole YOUR identity or scammed you, they are likely targeting others as well! Besides your local law enforcement, it would be helpful if you could take the time to share what happened to you with the FBI Internet Crime & Complaint Center (ic3.gov). This unique center in West Virginia gathers hundreds of thousands of cybercrime complaints per year into a database that can be accessed by law enforcement across the country. Perhaps you will only be another drop in the bucket, but you MAY provide the missing link that ties many smaller losses together into a major investigation!

For PHISHING EMAILS, be sure to report that phish to Malcovery's PhishIQ system! By sending us the address of that suspicious or fake bank website, our automated systems will preserve forensic evidence about the phishing website and work on linking it to other websites that may have been created by the same criminal!

Appendix: The rest of the list (Top Identity Theft Cities by Rank)

101NewOrleans-Metairie, LA82
102Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC81.7
103Prescott, AZ81.5
104SantaFe, NM81.2
105Tyler, TX80.6
106VirginiaBeach-Norfolk-NewportNews, VA-NC80.4
107Monroe, MI80.3
108LittleRock-NorthLittleRock-Conway, AR80.2
109Gainesville, GA80.1
110Hammond, LA80.1
111Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT80.1
112LakeHavasuCity-Kingman, AZ78.9
113Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA78.4
114OklahomaCity, OK77.9
115Columbia, SC77.8
116Vineland-Bridgeton, NJ77.8
117Birmingham-Hoover, AL77.7
118ElPaso, TX77.4
119Muskegon, MI77.2
120NewHaven-Milford, CT77.2
121Midland, TX76.9
122Burlington, NC76.8
123Spokane-SpokaneValley, WA76.7
124Odessa, TX76.6
125HiltonHeadIsland-Bluffton-Beaufort, SC75.9
126Indianapolis-Carmel-Anderson, IN75.3
127Yakima, WA75.2
128Concord, NH75.1
129SanLuisObispo-PasoRobles-ArroyoGrande, CA74.9
130Reading, PA74.9
131Dothan, AL74.8
132Brunswick, GA74.8
133Lumberton, NC74.5
134Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ74.3
135Wichita, KS74.2
136Charleston-NorthCharleston, SC73.7
137Richmond, VA73.1
138Akron, OH72.4
139KansasCity, MO-KS71.9
140Racine, WI71.6
141Rockford, IL71.5
142Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton, PA71.5
143SantaRosa, CA70.9
144Topeka, KS70.6
145Dayton, OH70.4
146Spartanburg, SC69.9
147Salinas, CA69.9
148Shreveport-BossierCity, LA69.8
149Show Low, AZ69.8
150YubaCity, CA69.5
151PanamaCity, FL68.8
152Huntsville, AL68.5
153FortCollins, CO68.4
154Raleigh, NC68.4
155Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA68.1
156Durham-ChapelHill, NC67.8
157Charleston, WV67.4
158Greeley, CO66.8
159Medford, OR66.4
160Yuma, AZ66.4
161Gulfport-Biloxi-Pascagoula, MS66.4
162Wilmington, NC66.3
163Springfield, MA65.8
164Columbus, OH65.7
165NewBern, NC65.5
166Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH65.4
167Tuscaloosa, AL65.2
168Flagstaff, AZ64.7
169Lawton, OK64.5
170Saginaw, MI64.4
171Hartford-WestHartford-EastHartford, CT64.4
172Minneapolis-St.Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI64.2
173Wausau, WI64.1
174Duluth, MN-WI64
175Amarillo, TX63.9
176Olympia-Tumwater, WA63.8
177Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA63.8
178Asheville, NC63.8
179Toledo, OH63.8
180Bremerton-Silverdale, WA63.7
181Kankakee, IL63.5
182Chattanooga, TN-GA63.4
183Madison, WI63.4
184Bend-Redmond, OR63.4
185Greensboro-HighPoint, NC63.1
186Greenville, NC63
187Rochester, NY62.7
188MyrtleBeach-Conway-NorthMyrtleBeach, SC-NC62.6
189Pittsfield, MA62.5
190BattleCreek, MI62.4
191Visalia-Porterville, CA62.4
192EastStroudsburg, PA62.4
193Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol, TN-VA62.3
194Winston-Salem, NC62.3
195Sherman-Denison, TX62
196Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN61.9
197ElCentro, CA61.9
198Jacksonville, NC61.9
199Alexandria, LA61.7
200FortWayne, IN61.3
201Kalamazoo-Portage, MI61.2
202SouthBend-Mishawaka, IN-MI61.1
203Tulsa, OK60.8
204Sumter, SC60.5
205LasCruces, NM60.2
206Ashtabula, OH60.1
207York-Hanover, PA60
208Albany, OR60
209Champaign-Urbana, IL59.9
210Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN59.6
211BoiseCity, ID59.5
212Missoula, MT59.5
213Wooster, OH59.4
214Dunn, NC59.3
215Salisbury, MD-DE59.1
216Omaha-CouncilBluffs, NE-IA59.1
217Eureka-Arcata-Fortuna, CA58.7
218Elizabethtown-FortKnox, KY58.6
219Anchorage, AK58.3
220Elkhart-Goshen, IN58.2
221Jackson, MI58
222Hagerstown-Martinsburg, MD-WV58
223Pittsburgh, PA58
224PineBluff, AR57.9
225Providence-Warwick, RI-MA57.8
226Gadsden, AL57.5
227Lafayette, LA57.4
228IowaCity, IA57
229BarnstableTown, MA57
230Waco, TX57
231Springfield, MO56.8
232Springfield, IL56.6
233Worcester, MA-CT56.6
234Anniston-Oxford-Jacksonville, AL56.5
235Kingston, NY56.4
236CollegeStation-Bryan, TX56.4
237Lubbock, TX56.4
238Hanford-Corcoran, CA56.2
239Cleveland, TN56.1
240Monroe, LA56.1
241Longview, TX56
242SaltLakeCity, UT55.9
243Canton-Massillon, OH55.9
244Louisville/JeffersonCounty, KY-IN55.8
245Lexington-Fayette, KY55.5
246Lima, OH55.5
247Lansing-EastLansing, MI55.4
248Peoria, IL55.1
249Decatur, IL55.1
250Erie, PA54.9
251Clarksville, TN-KY54.9
252GrandRapids-Wyoming, MI54.8
253Bloomington, IL54.8
254Weirton-Steubenville, WV-OH54.6
255Kennewick-Richland, WA54.5
256Roanoke, VA54.1
257Buffalo-Cheektowaga-NiagaraFalls, NY54.1
258DesMoines-WestDesMoines, IA54.1
259Lebanon, PA53.9
260Williamsport, PA53.4
261Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA53.3
262Bellingham, WA53.2
263FortSmith, AR-OK53.1
264Norwich-NewLondon, CT52.9
265Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY52.8
266Morristown, TN52.7
267Winchester, VA-WV52.2
268Daphne-Fairhope-Foley, AL52.1
269BayCity, MI52
270Longview, WA51.8
271Salem, OR51.4
272Lawrence, KS51.4
273Meridian, MS51.2
274St.Joseph, MO-KS51
275Texarkana, TX-AR50.9
276WichitaFalls, TX50.9
277London, KY50.6
278Ogden-Clearfield, UT50.1
279Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton, NC50.1
280Billings, MT49.7
281Lincoln, NE49.6
282Manchester-Nashua, NH49.4
283Coeurd'Alene, ID49.1
284Charlottesville, VA48.9
285MountVernon-Anacortes, WA48.8
286JeffersonCity, MO48.7
287Jackson, TN48.5
288MichiganCity-LaPorte, IN48.4
289Syracuse, NY48.3
290Chambersburg-Waynesboro, PA48.1
291Cookeville, TNMicropolitan48.1
292Lafayette-WestLafayette, IN48.1
293Janesville-Beloit, WI48
294Logan, UT-ID47.8
295Evansville, IN-KY47.8
296Bluefield, WV-VA47.5
297Knoxville, TN47.3
298Whitewater-Elkhorn, WI47
299Rochester, MN46.9
300Torrington, CT46.9
301Sheboygan, WI46.8
302Claremont-Lebanon, NH-VT46.7
303Davenport-Moline-RockIsland, IA-IL46.6
304LakeCharles, LA46.6
305Lancaster, PA46.6
306Pottsville, PAMicropolitan46.5
307JohnsonCity, TN46.3
308Danville, VA46
309Carbondale-Marion, IL45.8
310Tupelo, MS45.5
311Springfield, OH44.8
312Provo-Orem, UT44.8
313Roseburg, OR44.6
314Joplin, MO44.4
315Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO44.3
316Decatur, AL44.2
317Abilene, TX44.2
318Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH44.1
319Morgantown, WV43.9
320SiouxCity, IA-NE-SD43.9
321Johnstown, PA43.8
322CedarRapids, IA43.8
323Eugene, OR43.8
324GrandJunction, CO43.6
325Salem, OH43.6
326Mansfield, OH43.4
327Blacksburg-Christiansburg-Radford, VA43.2
328Jamestown-Dunkirk-Fredonia, NY43
329Portland-SouthPortland, ME42.8
330IdahoFalls, ID42.8
331Kahului-Wailuku-Lahaina, HI42.6
332Cumberland, MD-WV42.6
333FondduLac, WI42.3
334Wheeling, WV-OH41.9
335GlensFalls, NY41.9
336Wenatchee, WA41.5
337Gettysburg, PA41.4
338TraverseCity, MI41.2
339LaCrosse-Onalaska, WI-MN41.1
340SiouxFalls, SD40.7
341Columbia, MO40.6
342Watertown-FortDrum, NY40.4
343SanAngelo, TX40.2
344RapidCity, SD40.1
345Owensboro, KY40.1
346St.George, UT39.1
347Binghamton, NY38.9
348Tullahoma-Manchester, TN38.9
349Bloomington, IN38.9
350GreenBay, WI38.9
351TerreHaute, IN38.9
352UrbanHonolulu, HI38.8
353Utica-Rome, NY38.7
354Ithaca, NY38.4
355Muncie, IN38.2
356Burlington-SouthBurlington, VT37.9
357Florence-MuscleShoals, AL36.7
358EauClaire, WI36.6
359Ottawa-Peru, IL36.2
360BowlingGreen, KY35.9
361Holland, MI35.9
362Appleton, WI35.9
363Hilo, HI35.7
364Lewiston-Auburn, ME34.4
365Oshkosh-Neenah, WI33.5
366Staunton-Waynesboro, VA32.9
367Waterloo-CedarFalls, IA32.8
368Ogdensburg-Massena, NY32.2
369Fargo, ND-MN32.1
370St.Cloud, MN31.7
371Bangor, ME31.2
372Farmington, NM30.8
373Altoona, PA30.7
374Harrisonburg, VA29.5
375StateCollege, PA29.2
376Augusta-Waterville, ME28.7
377Bismarck, ND27.9

Monday, February 24, 2014

WhatsApp Spam: a malware distribution scam

On February 19, 2014, Facebook Announced the purchase of WhatsApp for $4 billion in cash and 183,865,778 shares of Facebook stock ($12 Billion in current value) plus an additional $3 billion in shares to the founders that will vest over four years, for a total purchase price of $19 Billion. Within 24 hours, spammers were using WhatsApp lures to attract traffic to counterfeit pharmaceutical websites! Journalists in the United States were scurrying trying to figure out what WhatsApp even is, let alone why it should be worth $19 Billion.

Apparently WhatsApp has been growing in popularity in other parts of the world, as documented by a survey released in November by OnDevice Research which was headlined as Messenger Wars: How Facebook lost its lead which talked about the top Social Message Apps for mobile devices in five major markets: US, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and China. While Facebook still lead in the US, and WeChat clearly dominates China, WhatsApp was the leading app in Brazil 72%, South Africa (68%), and Indonesia (43%).

But those of us who keep track of spam and email-based threats have been hearing about WhatsUp for several months. As the popularity of WhatsApp grows due to the new acquisition, we believe we will see it become an even more popular spam lure. At least three distinct spamming groups have already used WhatsApp as a lure for their scams.

According to Malcovery Security's Brendan Griffin, WhatsApp was being used as a malware lure since at least September 19, 2013. I asked Brendan to give me a list of days when a WhatsApp spam/malware campaign made Malcovery's "Today's Top Threats" list. This campaign has been solidly in the top ten on:

SEPTEMBER 19, 23, 24, 25, 26
OCTOBER 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25
NOVEMBER 14
JANUARY 9, 13, 15, 20, 28

As Steve Ragan mentioned in his ComputerWorld article on November 8, 2013, WhatsApp was one of our Top Five Imitated Brands for the delivery of malware via spam for the quarter. (See ComputerWorld - Senior executives blamed for a majority of undisclosed security incidents.) Curiously, when I asked Brendan about the email I saw THIS WEEK imitating WhatsApp he said that was an example of spammers using the WhatsApp notoriety to drive traffic to counterfeit pharmaceutical websites!

WhatsApp spam used by ASProx Botnet to Deliver Kuluoz Malware

We've seen tremendous variety in both the malware being delivered and in the method of delivery over the course of so many spam runs. The first day we made note of the WhatsApp malware, September 19, 2013, we observed 52 different websites being advertised in the emails. Each of these websites had a file called "info.php" that was being called with a very long unique "message" parameter, such as:

/info.php?message=47lvQ31P1Nip+SkTsbYeAVNH+2aJDFeJ9djfprCHGa4=
(a couple digits have been tweaked for privacy)

Websites used for malware delivery,September 19, 2013

aki-kowalstwo.plkoshergiftsuk.comsamedaystationery.co.uk
amicidelcuore.infolichtenauer-fv.deschweitzers.com
arsenalyar.rulocweld.comsentabilisim.com
art52.rumbuhgalter.rusewretro.com
bhaktapurtravel.com.npmdou321.ruspentec.ca
bluereefwatersports.commikemetcalfe.castructuredsettlementsannuities.com
cateringjaipur.commirvshkatulke.ruthaiecom.net
clockcards.iemrsergio.comtiarahlds.com
dj220w.rumuzikosfabrikas.lttk-galaktika.ru
djvakcina.commywebby.rutowi69.de
easywebmexico.comorbitmotion.comtrivenidigital.com
etarlo.ruorderschering.comveerbootkobus.nl
everyday24h.depaternocalabro.itvenetamalaysia.com
globalpeat.compaulhughestransport.comverfassungsschutz-bw.de
gourmetschlitten.compax-sancta.devitapool.ru
idollighting.compennerimperium.dezdrowieonly.ovh.org
juhatanninen.complaneta-avtomat.ru
kasutin.rurkbtservice.ru

Visiting the link from any of of those websites resulted in code on the server resolving your IP address and creating a customer malware name based on your geographic location. For example, when we visited from Birmingham, Alabama IP addresses, we received a file called "VoiceMail_Birmingham_(205)4581400.zip" - 205 is the Area code for Birmingham, Alabama, so both the city name and the telephone number provided were intended to enhance the believability that this was a "real" VoiceMail message that we should open and listen to!

At the time we received this file, VirusTotal was showing a 7 of 48 detection rate. (When the file was last checked, December 4, 2013, the detection rate had improved to 36 of 48 AV products.)

This malware delivery mechanism, with the geographically labeled secondary malware, is a signature of the ASPROX => Kuluoz malware. Kuluoz, which is also known as DoFoil, is delivered as the second phase of a malware delivery scheme that begins by having computers that are part of the ASProx botnet sending spam. This is the same campaign that delivered Walmart/BestBuy/CostCo delivery messages around the Christmas holiday, and that delivered Courthouse, Eviction, and Energy bill spam. In the more recent VirusTotal report, AntiVir, DrWeb, and Microsoft label this sample as Kuluoz, while Agnitum, CAT-QuickHeal, Kaspersky, NANO-Antivirus, VBA32, and VIPRE call it DoFoil. Zortob is another popular label seen for this malware, and Symantec calls it "FakeAVLock" while Ikarus and Sophos calls it Weelsof. Weelsof is a Ransomware family and this label, as well as the FakeAV label, are likely due to tertiary malware. When secondary malware "drops" (a term that just means that ADDITIONAL malware is downloaded from the Internet after the initial infection) it is common for AntiVirus vendors to apply the label for the "ultimate intention" to all of the malware samples seen in that particular infection chain.

An excellent student paper by Shaked Bar from August 15, 2013, describes Kuluoz's role in dropping additional malware. This diagram is from his paper, Kuluoz: Malware and botnet analysis which was submitted as Mr. Bar's Dissertation for his Masters of Science in Computer Science.

At the time of Shaked Bar's paper, the prominent delivery mechanisms were spam messages imitating UPS and DHL. He also notes an earlier spam campaign from April 2013 imitating American Airlines. Bar's paper is well worth reading as he explains how C&C traffic is XOR'ed with the byte 0x2B to test the ability of the bot to send spam as well as other potential uses. Mr. Bar documents more fully the possible tertiary malware including Zeus (Zbot), ZeroAccess, and FakeAV. The malware uses the commercial geolocation service from MaxMind to identify its location, and the location may be instrumental in determining what additional malware should be installed.

Malcovery Security analysts also called attention in our September 19, 2013 report that the WhatsApp spam, when visited from an Android device, detected the OS and dropped a file called "WhatsApp.apk". .apk files are Android's "application package file" which is used to distribute and install Android apps. Examination of the .APK file confirmed thta this was Fake antivirus for your Android phone, containing descriptions of each supposedly detected malware in both English and Russian, as exhibited by this snip from the .APK file:

The URLs used to drop the infection shifted constantly. For example, these are the URLs from September 24th, each using "app.php" instead of "info.php":

abslmm.infoeasychurchsoftware.compsmagic.co.uk
animestyles.comeffectivewithpeople.comreggiegallery.com
arcesubastas.comeuropainthewilderness.comscholarsbangladesh.com
azagom16.comgigp01.comtcfurniture.com
bluereefwatersports.comkillmanheatingandair.comtrivenidigital.com
bodfish.netladuenails.comwfbsusa.com
bptca.comlisapetrilli.comwpsverige.com
chester94.comlunchesruslawncare.comwww.jigsawpuzzlesnow.com
claytonhistorysociety.orglyallfamily.comwww.mindful-way.com
clearthoughtfarm.commypowerlines.comwww.minimesa.net
columbialivingmag.comnotedls.comwww.opalubka-spb.ru
crumptonplats.comonline-kent.co.ukwww.scholarsbangladesh.com
cvhi.caorbitmotion.com

And these were the sites for September 25th:

162.144.3.50gonzomarketing.ustejedoresdearte.com
aandekleiput.beindianhotpeppers.comtheconservativeactivist.com
abslmm.infointerbanc-me.comuhlit.com
academicgames.orgintercom-group.neturokshof.be
acomputertech.comjsmengineering.co.nzuwes-futterkiste.de
allworldhearing.comkepsballs.comvelomotoban.ru
angelomasotti.itmaxmuscleraleigh.comvisibus.ru
animestyles.commiketrig.comwhatshisface.org
arcesubastas.commiwera.dewww.besttechmfg.com
asca-info.commosobladvokatura.ruwww.bonnevilledrivingschool.com
barkersofwindsor.co.ukneonett.netwww.citadelyachts.com
belliottjr.comnight55.comwww.coaching-pattaya.com
bmitraining.co.idnotedls.comwww.dasluae.com
brothermartin.comoysterbaytaxi.comwww.dmdservice.com
buntingarchitecturalmetals.compeakkickboxing.comwww.doanevent.com
caseybarnett.compersonalcarephysio.cawww.gestiondutemps.be
cityofmossyrock.competerscreekauto.netwww.horseamour.com
cvhi.caphoto2canvasdirect.comwww.kyhydropower.com
dasluae.compts.kovrov.ruwww.mhbchurch.qwestoffice.net
debsownbusiness.comrevoltadvertising.cawww.mtnhwybaptistchurch.com
demaravillamassage.comrsme.co.ukwww.musango.ca
dnsprattcanada.comscholarsbangladesh.comwww.rhinocerose.fr
earnquick.coshahmaulik.comwww.wholepersonsoftware.com
ecuavantransportation.comsolardynamicsinc.comwww.zhelezno.ru
finlandiasf.orgsumedacellular.comzhinengqigongworldwide.org

WhatsApp Spam Used by Cutwail Botnet to deliver Upatre => Zeus Malware

More recently, the WhatsApp malware has been used by an entirely different spam sending malware team. This group, which favors the Cutwail spam botnet, uses spam messages to deliver a malware family known as UPATRE. UPATRE is a tiny malware file that is repacked constantly to ensure deliverability and that has little malicious behavior itself. The only function of UPATRE is to drop additional malware. In this case, the malware is attached as a .zip file that, when executed by the recipient in order to "play their missed message" will cause Zeus to be downloaded as the secondary malware.

Here is what the Cutwail-delivered version of the WhatsApp spam looked like on January 28, 2014:

This version of Upatre connects to the Internet to download an encoded version of GameOver Zeus to allow safe passage through any blocking and detecting methods. This model of downloading an undetectable version that is then decoded into a fully functional Zeus malware by the Upatre module was documented in this blog in our story GameOver Zeus now uses Encryption to bypass Perimeter Security. In the case of the January 28th WhatsApp malware, the Zeus .enc file came from either:

zubayen . com / up / wav.enc
or from inspireplus . org . uk / images / banners / wav.enc
(spaces added for your safety)

WhatsApp Spam Delivering Canadian Health & Care Mall links?

As WhatsApp reaches the pinnacle of awareness among American spam recipients, it is only natural that the Pharmaceutical spammers would get in on the game. On February 20, 2014, the spammers sent out "Missed Voice Message" spam with a huge number of random URLs belonging to compromised webservers. Each of the compromised webservers, usually the spammer has harvested Userids and passwords for their FTP credentials in previous malware runs, has a newly created .php or .pl file that contains an encoded redirector to a pharmaceutical website.

On February 20th, the advertised spam all redirected to one of more than fifty compromised webservers, each of which then redirected to a Canada Health & Care Mall websites. The advertised URLs have a simple Javascript obfuscation to try to hide the true destination, such as this page:

gjhqv1="\x30";qnnt2="\x68\x74\x74\x70\x3A\x2F\x2F\x74\x68\x65\x64\x69\x65\x74\x70\x68\x61\x72\x6D\x61\x63\x79\x2E\x63\x6F\x6D";setTimeout("\x77\x69\x6E\x64\x6F\x77\x2E\x74\x6F\x70\x2E\x6C\x6F\x63\x61\x74\x69\x6F\x6E\x2E\x68\x72\x65\x66\x3D\x71\x6E\x6E\x74\x32\x3B",gjhqv1);

When interpreted as Javascript, the "setTimeout" portion says "make the "window.top.location.href" equal to "gjhqv1". The top portion says "set gjhqv1" equal to thedietpharmacy.com, and do it in "0" milliseconds.

Reviewing 50 URLs of this type, with names such as "reactivates.php" or "bombarding.pl" or "gaelicizes.php", there were only the four redirections: canadavasomax.com
lossdietpharmacy.com
thedietpharmacy.com
wellnessasaletraining.com

each of which looked like this:

Monday, February 17, 2014

Interac Phishers try their hand at IRS

Last week Malcovery Security had an interesting phish show up claiming to be related to the IRS. This one turns out to be a great example of the (activate 1940 horror movie narrator voice) The POWER OF CROSS BRAND INTELLIGENCE (/activate). Here's what the website looked like:


Phish from: bursafotograf.com / profiles / interac / RP.do.htm

In this phish, the "big idea" is that you can escalate your IRS Tax Refund if you specify which bank you would like the refund to be deposited into. When you click the bank's logo, you are taken to a phishing site for that brand and asked to provide your Userid and Password, which are then emailed to the phisher. Here's an example of the page you would see if you clicked on the Regions Bank logo (graphic courtesy of PhishTank submission 2254700.)

Things get quite fascinating though when we hide the graphics:

Why would an IRS phish have ALT TEXT including for four of the largest Canadian banks? By looking at the source code for the phishing page, we see that this is a very lightly rebranded Interac phish: First, the website Title is "INTERAC e-Transfer" ...

INTERAC is a very interesting money transfer system used in Canada that allows anyone to send money to anyone else simply by using either their email address or cell phone text messaging service. A Transaction code is texted/emailed from the payer to the recipient, allowing the recipient to login to the Interac service and choose what account, and what bank, they would like to receive the funds into.

The phish has some Javascript at the top that includes variables like "var provinceList = new Array ("Alberta", "British Columbia", "New Brunswick", "Newfoundland and Labrador", "Nova Scotia", "Ontario", "Prince Edward Island", "Saskatchewan");" and a pull down menu with options "Select Institution", "Select Province or Territory" and "Select Credit Union."

As we continue into the table of graphics, we see that the phisher has changed his graphics and links to refer to the American banks, with code such as:

href = chasecustomerprofile
img src = chasecustomerprofile/css/images/chaseNew.gif .... but with "alt=CIBC"

href = navy/index.htm
img src = imgs/nfculogo.png  .... but with "alt=President's Choice Financial"

href = suntrust
img src = imgs/suntrust.png  .... but iwth "alt = RBC Royal Bank"

etc . . . 

Phishing Cross-Brand Intelligence

It seems fairly clear that we should be able to find more phishing sites that used the original Interac code, and of course we can in the Malcovery PhishIQ system.

Here is a phish that was seen on June 21, 2013 on the website freevalwritings.com / wp / interacsessions / RP.do.htm

And another first seen on May 28, 2013 on the website anglaisacote.com / interac / RP.do.htm (note the common path on both of these that matches the current IRS phish = "interac/RP.do.htm" RP.do.htm is used on the REAL Interac website.

Phishing & Spam Cross-Brand Intelligence

An interesting thing about phishing emails that differentiates them from standard spam. While normal spam is often sent via botnets, phishing emails tend to be sent from the same IP address over a period of time. When we use Malcovery PhishIQ to examine the IRS version of the Interac phish, which attempts to steal money from Bank of America, Chase Bank, Navy Federal Credit Union, SunTrust, Regions Bank, Wells Fargo, USAA, and Citi, we see that the originally advertised URL was actually "130.13.122.25 / irsjspmessageKey-IG09210358i /". That URL forwarded visitors to the website "ernursusleme.com / Connections / irsonlinedeposit /" which then forwarded the visitors to "bursafotograf.com / profiles / interac / RP.do.htm" which is where the screenshot at the top of this article was captured.

So, to find spam messages related to this phish, it seems reasonable to search the Malcovery Spam Data Mine for emails that advertised URLs on 130.13.122.25.

We found two sets of spam messages that advertised URLs on that host in our spam collection. One batch from January 8, 2014 and the other batch from January 28th and January 29th, 2014.

The January 28th and January 29th emails claimed to be from "From: USAA (USAA.Web.Services@customer.usaa.com)" with an email subject of "New Insurance Document Online".

Two of the emails were sent from 122.3.92.116 (Philippines) and one email was sent from 70.166.118.54 (Cox). What other emails were sent from those IP addresses?

Here are the emails from 122.3.92.116

Date: Subject: From NameFrom Email
Dec 13, 2013Your account has been limited until we hear from youservice@ intl.paypal.comsurvey.research-3086@ satisfactionsurvey.com
Dec 13, 2013Your account has been limited until we hear from youservice@ intl.paypal.comsurvey.research-3086@ satisfactionsurvey.com
Dec 14, 2013Your account has been limited until we hear from youservice@ intl.paypal.comsurvey.research-3086@ satisfactionsurvey.com
Dec 16, 2013Confirmation - personal information updateUSAAUSAA.Web.Services@ customermail.usaa.com
Dec 18, 2013INTERAC e-Transfer Receivednotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Dec 18, 2013INTERAC e-Transfer Receivednotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Dec 18, 2013INTERAC e-Transfer Receivednotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Dec 23, 2013INTERAC e-Transfer Receivednotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Dec 30, 2013INTERAC e-Transfer Receivednotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Dec 31, 2013INTERAC e-Transfer Receivednotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Dec 31, 2013INTERAC e-Transfer Receivednotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Dec 31, 2013INTERAC e-Transfer Receivednotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Jan 5, 2014Notification of Limited Account AccessPayPalPayPal@ abuse.epayments.com
Jan 7, 2014Canada Tax send you an INTERAC e-Transfernotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Jan 7, 2014Canada Tax send you an INTERAC e-Transfernotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Jan 7, 2014Canada Tax send you an INTERAC e-Transfernotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Jan 8, 2014View Your USAA Document OnlineUSAAUSAA.Web.Services@ customermail.usaa.com
Jan 8, 2014View Your USAA Document OnlineUSAAUSAA.Web.Services@ customermail.usaa.com
Jan 8, 2014View Your USAA Document OnlineUSAAUSAA.Web.Services@ customermail.usaa.com
Jan 8, 2014View Your USAA Document OnlineUSAAUSAA.Web.Services@ customermail.usaa.com
Jan 8, 2014View Your USAA Document OnlineUSAAUSAA.Web.Services@ customermail.usaa.com
Jan 8, 2014View Your USAA Document OnlineUSAAUSAA.Web.Services@ customermail.usaa.com
Jan 8, 2014View Your USAA Document OnlineUSAAUSAA.Web.Services@ customermail.usaa.com
Jan 17, 2014Canada Tax send you an INTERAC e-Transfernotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Jan 17, 2014Canada Tax send you an INTERAC e-Transfernotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Jan 17, 2014Canada Tax send you an INTERAC e-Transfernotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Jan 17, 2014Canada Tax send you an INTERAC e-Transfernotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Jan 17, 2014Canada Tax send you an INTERAC e-Transfernotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Jan 17, 2014Canada Tax send you an INTERAC e-Transfernotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Jan 17, 2014Canada Tax send you an INTERAC e-Transfernotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Jan 17, 2014Canada Tax send you an INTERAC e-Transfernotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Jan 17, 2014Canada Tax send you an INTERAC e-Transfernotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Jan 19, 2014Your dispute has been ended 01/20/2014: Get your money backPayPalpaypal.feedback@ email.com
Jan 19, 2014Your dispute has been ended 01/20/2014: Get your money backPayPalpaypal.feedback@ email.com
Jan 20, 2014View and Sign Your USAA Insurance PolicyUSAAUSAA.Web.Services@ customermail.usaa.com
Jan 20, 2014View and Sign Your USAA Insurance PolicyUSAAUSAA.Web.Services@ customermail.usaa.com
Jan 20, 2014View and Sign Your USAA Insurance PolicyUSAAUSAA.Web.Services@ customermail.usaa.com
Jan 20, 2014View and Sign Your USAA Insurance PolicyUSAAUSAA.Web.Services@ customermail.usaa.com
Jan 20, 2014View and Sign Your USAA Insurance PolicyUSAAUSAA.Web.Services@ customermail.usaa.com
Jan 21, 2014View and Sign Your USAA Insurance PolicyUSAAUSAA.Web.Services@ customermail.usaa.com
Jan 21, 2014View and Sign Your USAA Insurance PolicyUSAAUSAA.Web.Services@ customermail.usaa.com
Jan 21, 2014View and Sign Your USAA Insurance PolicyUSAAUSAA.Web.Services@ customermail.usaa.com
Jan 21, 2014View and Sign Your USAA Insurance PolicyUSAAUSAA.Web.Services@ customermail.usaa.com
Jan 21, 2014Your dispute has been ended 01/20/2014: Get your money backPayPalpaypal.feedback@ email.com
Jan 28, 2014New Insurance Document OnlineUSAAUSAA.Web.Services@ customermail.usaa.com
Jan 28, 2014New Insurance Document OnlineUSAAUSAA.Web.Services@ customermail.usaa.com
Feb 8, 2014Canada Revenue send you an INTERAC e-TransferTD Canada Trustnotify@ payments.interac.ca
And here are the emails from 70.166.118.54

Date: Subject: From NameFrom Email
Jan 29, 2014New Insurance Document OnlineUSAAUSAA.Web.Services@customermail.usaa.com
Feb 3, 2014INTERAC e-Transfer Receivednotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Feb 3, 2014INTERAC e-Transfer Receivednotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Feb 3, 2014INTERAC e-Transfer Receivednotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Feb 3, 2014INTERAC e-Transfer Receivednotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Feb 3, 2014INTERAC e-Transfer Receivednotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Feb 3, 2014INTERAC e-Transfer Receivednotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Feb 4, 2014INTERAC e-Transfer Receivednotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Feb 4, 2014INTERAC e-Transfer Receivednotify@ payments.interac.canotify@ payments.interac.ca
Feb 8, 2014Canada Revenue send you an INTERAC e-TransferRBC Royal Banknotify@ payments.interac.ca
Feb 9, 2014Canada Revenue send you an INTERAC e-TransferRBC Royal Banknotify@ payments.interac.ca
Feb 11, 2014Wells Fargo ATM/Debit Card Expires SoonWells Fargo Onlinealerts@ notify.wellsfargo.com
Feb 11, 2014Wells Fargo ATM/Debit Card Expires SoonWells Fargo Onlinealerts@ notify.wellsfargo.com

The Power of Cross-Brand Intelligence

To summarize, we started with a new IRS phish, and through some comparisons in the Phishing and Spam Data Mines, ended with phish for USAA, PayPal, Wells Fargo, and Interac all being linked together. Investigators interested in learning more are encouraged to reach out!