Showing posts with label Europol. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Europol. Show all posts

Friday, October 16, 2020

Trickbot on the Ropes Part 2: The QQAAZZ Money Laundering Ring

While shutting down the technical aspects of malware is critical (see Trickbot on the Ropes Part 1), the real disincentive to the criminals is when you hit them hard in the money.  That was the objective of Europol's Operation 2BaGoldMule case against QQAAZZ.   Working with partners in 16 countries, including Latvia, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy, Europol helped to coordinate search warrants being executed at 40 different residences in support of criminal proceedings in the United States, Portugal, and the UK, and Spain.

Europol put out a two-part InfoGraphic as part of their story on the arrests, "20 Arrests in QQAAZZ Multi-Million Money Laundering Case":

 


Infographic: https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/operation-2bagoldmule

The criminals behind the QQAAZZ money laundering ring received funds from botnet operators, and "tumbled" the funds through a variety of shell companies and crypto-currencies to produce "clean money" keeping a 40% to 50% cut of the funds for themselves.

The U.S. Department of Justice says that QQAAZZ-controlled bank accounts received funds stolen via banking trojans including Dridex, Trickbot, and GozNym malware.  The DOJ action came in two rounds, with the first indictment being unsealed back in October 2019 naming these individuals: 

Aleksejs Trofimovics
a/k/a Aleksejs Trofimovich, Alexey Trofimovich, Aleko Stoyanov Angelov 
Ruslans Nikitenko 
a/k/a Krzysztof Wojciech Lewko, Milen Nikolchev Nikolov, Rafal Zimnoch 
Arturs Zaharevics
a/k/a Piotr Ginelli, Arkadiusz Szuberski 
Deniss Ruseckis
a/k/a Denis Rusetsky, Sevdelin Sevdalinov Atanasov 

These individuals used a collection of shell companies to open a large number of bank accounts in Portugal.  In 2018, I sat in a meeting in London with a handful of the largest banks in the UK and heard for the first time as they shared information with one another that it was a "common" thing that when someone had their bank account hit by Trickbot, a wire transfer would be sent to Portugal!

According to the indictment, Ruslans Nikitenko used his shell company Selbevulte LDA to open accounts at eleven banks in Portugal.  He used the company Colossal Devotion LDA to open accounts at nine additional banks.  Arturs Zaharevics created the shell company Cardinal Gradual Real Estate Unipessoal LDA and used it to open accounts at ten banks in Portugal.  Dennis Ruseckis created Flamingocloud LDA and used it to open accounts at thirteen banks in Portugal!

According to the October 2019 Indictment, more than $1.1 Million USD in wire attempts were made just for the transactions shown below, although in more than half of the cases, the funds were able to be blocked or recovered.

DateVictim BankWire AttemptBeneficiary
07MAR2017Schwab  $75000Aktrofi Services
20SEP2017BOA  $84900Aktrofi Services
26OCT2017JPMorgan Chase  $98780Privelegioasis
29NOV2017American Express $121360Selbevulte
30NOV2017BB&T $72000Privelegioasis
08MAR2018USAA $29500Flamingocloud
08MAR2018USAA $29500Colossal Devotion
21MAR2018BOA $49000Colossal Devotion
10APR2018JPMorgan Chase $59426Cardinal Gradual
10APR2018JPMorgan Chase $59426Cardinal Gradual
10APR2018JPMorgan Chase $59426Cardinal Gradual
30AUG2018PNC $99693Selbevulte
14NOV2018BOA $56202Aktrofi Services
14NOV2018BOA $112921Deinis Gorenko
14NOV2018BOA $45830Deinis Gorenko
06DEC2018    JPMorgan Chase $114652Flamingocloud












In between that indictment and the current one, there was a bit more publicity back in May 2020 when "Plinofficial", a Russian scam-rapper, whose real name was Maksim Boiko, was arrested by the FBI when he landed at the Miami airport, as was covered by the BBC and others at the time. 

In the more recent action, the indictment of the US Western District of Pennsylvania was just unsealed, having been filed on 29SEP2020.  This indictment names an additional group of money launderers:

  • Nika Nazarovi - of Georgia - aka Nika Utiashvili, Mihail Atanasov, Stefan Trifonov Zhelyazkov
  • Martins Ignatjevs - of Latvia - aka Yodan Angelov Stoyanov, Aleksander Tihomirov Yanev, Svetlin Iliyanov Asenov 
  • Aleksandre Kobiashvili - of Georgia - aka Antonios Nastas, Ognyan Krasimirov Trifonov
  • Dmitrijs Kuzminovs - of Latvia - aka Parush Gospodinov
  • Valentins Sevecs - of Latvia - aka Marek Jaswilko, Rafal Szczytko
  • Dmitrijs Slapins - of Latvia 
  • Armens Vecels - of Latvia 
  • Artiom Capacli - of Bulgaria
  • Ion Cebanu  - of Romania
  • TOmass Trescinkas - of Latvia 
  • Ruslans Sarapovs - of Latvia 
  • Silvestrs Tamenieks - of Latvia 
  • Abdelhak Hamdaoui  - of Latvia 
  • Petar Iliev - of Belgium 

it says that "in total, cybercriminals attempted to transfer tens of millions of dollars to QQAAZZ-controlled accounts, and QQAAZZ successfully laundered millions of dollars stolen from victims around the world."

The indictment breaks the criminals into three tiers: 

Leaders 
Mid-level Managers 
and Money Mules 

In the September 2020 indictment, some of the victim companies, whose bank accounts were used to wire money to European shell companies created by those named above, included: 

  1. a technology company in Windsor, CT 
  2. an Orthodox Jewish Synagogue in Brooklyn, NY 
  3. a medical device manufacturer in York, Pennsylvania
  4. an individual in Montclair, NJ 
  5. an architecture firm in Miami, FL 
  6. an individual in Acworth, GA
  7. an automative parts manufacturer in Livonia, MI 
  8. a homebuilder in Skokie, IL 
  9. an individual in Carollton, TX 
  10. an individual in Villa Park, CA.  
Dozens of additional US victims are identified, but it is unknown the total number of victims whose funds were stolen, or attempted to be stolen through these schemes. 

Those named in the two indictments received funds to shell company bank accounts including at least 147 accounts opened at banks in Portugal, as well as Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 

The indictment provides a partial list of the funds transfers which occurred between US-based victims and accounts controlled by these criminals. 




In order to accomplish this, members of the QQAAZZ cash-out system advertised their services on "exclusive, underground, Russian-speaking, online cybercriminal forums."   Some of these advertisements on a single forum cost as much as $10,000 per year!  

Some of the online monikers used by QQAAZZ members in these forums included: 

qqaazz            globalqqaazz            markdevido 
richrich          donaldtrump55         manuel           krakadil                     
kalilinux         ritchie                      totala              totala22 

These forum exchanges helped to establish relationships between the malware gangs and the money launderers.  For example, QQAAZZ members using the name "richrich" chatted with members of the GozNym malware crime group about being a "drop handler" in the UK and Europe and having many accounts that could be used for money laundering, including an account in the name "Yaromu Gida" at a bank in Turkey.  That account received $176,500 in funds stolen from the medical device manufactuer in the Western District of Pennsylvania. 

"DonaldTrump55" provided bank account information for a drop belonging to Ruslans Nikitentko at a bank in Portugal opened using a counterfeit Polish identity card in the name Krzysztof Wojciech Lewko.  The account later received $121,360 from a US victim. 





Saturday, May 20, 2017

Europol Announces 27 ATM Black Box arrests

On 18MAY2017 Europol announced that 27 thieves have been arrested across Europe for participating in a ring that conducts ATM Black Box attacks.  The arrests were conducted in France (11), Estonia (4), Czech Republic (3), Norway (3), the Netherlands (2), Romania (2), and Spain (2) over the course of 2016 and 2017.  Much of the data about how the attacks are conducted is being shared between member countries and the institutions within those countries by a little-known group called E.A.S.T. and their Expert Group on ATM Fraud (EGAF).  When EAST holds their Financial Crime & Security Forum next month members will want to also attend the Expert Group on ATM Physical Attacks (EGAP).

What is an ATM Black Box attack?

In an ATM Black Box attack, criminals have identified access points in the physical architecture of the ATM that would grant them access to cables or ports allowing them to attach a laptop to the internal computer of the ATM.  Once attached, the laptop can issue commands to the ATM resulting in the ultimate payout, a full distribution of all of the cash in the machine!   

The technique of causing an ATM machine to dump all of its cash is called "Jackpotting."  Most of us first heard about jackpotting as a result of the Barnaby Jack presentation at BlackHat 2010 and repeated on two models of ATMs for DEF CON 18 (video link below):

Barnaby Jack at DEF CON 18
Last September, Kaspersky demonstrated an ATM Black Box, however in their proof of concept approach, the criminals physically open the computer using a maintenance workers key, and flip a physical switch in the ATM to cause it to enter Supervisor mode.   The Black Box is connected to the ATM through a simple USB port that was at that time available in most ATM machines.

Black box demo video from Kaspersky


The new Europol arrest report shows that the current evolution on ATM Black Box attacks is to physically cut in to the ATM with drills, saws, or acetylene torches, and gain physical access to cables to which the laptop or black box will be attached.  In the current round of Black Box attacks, the target is not the ATM Computer, but rather the cables that connect the ATM computer to the Banknote Dispenser.  By directly connecting to the Dispenser, the connected laptop's malware simply issues commands to the Dispenser that normally would come from the ATM Computer and gives the order to dispense bills.
Image from Europol


Image from Europol

Information shared in the EAST working groups has produced some uncharacteristic good news in this space!  Although the number of ATM Black Box attacks went up considerably, with 15 attacks in 2015 and 58 attacks in 2016, many of these attacks were unsuccessful.  In their 11APR2017 report, EAST explained:

[In 2016] a total of 58 such attacks were reported by ten countries, up from 15 attacks during 2015.  ‘Black Box’ is the connection of an unauthorised device which sends dispense commands directly to the ATM cash dispenser in order to ‘cash-out’ the ATM.  Related losses were down 39%, from €0.74 million to €0.45 million.

 and illustrated this information with the following chart:

from EAST Report on ATM Fraud



The mitigation guidelines issued by EAST should be significantly updated at the upcoming meeting with guidance on Logical Attacks, Black Box Attacks, and Explosive Attacks, as well as Regional ATM Crime trend reports from Europol, Russia, the US Secret Service, Latin America,and ASEANAPOL.

Other ATM Attacks Still Dominate 

While ATM Black Box attacks are interesting, as the chart above shows they aren't where most of the money is being stolen.  Traditional skimming and white-carding is still stealing over 300 Million Euros per year, while physical attacks of other sorts are claimed nearly 50 Million Euros in 2016 alone!

One other trend that is sweeping Europe is the technique of pumping an ATM full of an explosive gas to blow the front off the machine giving the criminals access to the full contents of the dispenser.   The Italian police shared this interesting video of the technique:

Italian police shared this video from Feb 2013
This technique was recently used by two British men to blow up at least thirteen ATMs along the Costa del Sol in Southern Spain.  In the first half of 2016, 492 ATM Explosive attacks occurred across Europe, yielding the criminals an average of $18,300 per attack!  For the full year-over-year comparison, in 2015 there were 673 ATM Explosive attacks in Europe, and in 2016 there were 988 such attacks.  This accounts for roughly 1/3rd of the Physical attacks on ATMs in the EAST reporting.

Skimming dominates arrests to date

While we aren't sure exactly which attacks are included in the statistics above, several major ATM attacking gangs have been previously arrested and disclosed. While jackpotting arrests are rare, there must be a hundred reports of arrests for implanting skimming devices and creating counterfeit ATM cards based on the results.

One rare Jackpotting arrest was in January 2016 when a Romanian ATM attack gang was arrested for attacks in Germany, France, Norway, Sweden, Poland, and Romania.  In that case, the Tyupkin trojan, targeting a particular model of NCR ATMs, was inserted by gaining physical access to the ATM and booting a malicious CD in the ATM computer.  (See www.zdnet.com/article/atm-malware-gang-behind-euro-attacks-targeted-in-police-swoops/ ).

In April 2016, the Italian police arrested 16 Romanians for running a large ATM skimming ring who stole at least €1.2 million. 

In May 2016, the French Gendarmerie of Pau, in cooperation with the Italian State Police and Europol, arrested nine for running an ATM Skimming Ring that stole more than 500,000 Euros.

In March 2017, a group of five Romanians were arrested for skimming in York County, Pennsylvania as well.