Sunday, January 25, 2009

Dear Santa (or, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009)

Dear Santa,

We have been very good. Please send us $825 Billion worth of free stuff.

Sincerely Yours,

Congress


Turn on C-SPAN today and you can see that the above is the level of considered debate and opinion being given to the 625 page American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.

Still, if we're about to encumber $825 Billion of my children's funds, I thought it would be nice to see what Cyber, CyberCrime, and CyberSecurity Goodies might be waiting under the Christmas Tree.

For starters, we have the "Wireless and Broadband Deployment Grant Programs", established in section 6002 of division B of this Act, which will receive $2,825,000,000, of which $1,000,000,000 shall be for Wireless Deployment Grants and $1,825,000,000 shall be for Broadband Deployment Grants. I'd love to see the project plan and budget spreadsheets that came out to that nice round $1 Billion. (So, how much do we need to provide wireless access for everyone? Hmmm...when we add it all up it comes up to exactly $1 Billion. How convenient!)

Other things under Commerce Justice and Science that touch on technology:

Commerce


$650,000,000 for the Digital-to-Analog Converter Box Program

$100,000,000 for the National Institute of Standards and Technology for Scientific and Technical Research and Services.

$100,000,000 for "Industrial Technology Services", of which $30,000,000 shall be for Hollings Manufacturing Partnership.

$300,000,000 for "Construction of Research Facilities

$400,000,000 for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration "for habitat restoration and mitigation activities"

$600,000,000 to NOAA for "accelerating satellite development and acquisition, acquiring climate sensors, and climate modeling capacity, and establishing climate data records."

Justice


$3,000,000,000 for the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program.

$1,000,000,000 for Community Oriented Policing Services

State


$98,527,000 shall be available to State under the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative,

Health


$50,000,000 for "Public Health and Social Service Emergency Fund", to include Pandemic influenza preparedness, biomedical advanced research, Project BioShield, and Cyber Security.


Science


$400,000,000 to NASA, of which $250,000,000 shall be solely for accelerating the development of the tier 1 set of Earth science climate research missions.

$2,500,000,000 to the National Science Foundation for "Research and relate activities", with $200,000,000 earmarked for research facilities modification,

$400,000,000 more to NSF for "Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction".

Energy


$18,500,000,000 for "Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy" programs.

Social Security Administration


$400,000,000 for the contruction of a new National Computer Center

Testing of Health Information Technology


Section 4201. NIST - several new programs to develop more advanced health care technology.

Not much analysis here today, just thought these were some aspects of the Stimulus package that might be of interest to the readers here.

Oh - One other Cyber thing - throughout the bill, there is a requirement to document how funds are used by giving updates to the Internet website, "recovery.gov". I have to say that's a nice touch in the first legislation of the year -- here is the website where you MUST INFORM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

Monday, January 19, 2009

Downadup / Conflicker Worm: 8? 9? 10 Million Infected?

Its been quite a while since we've had a true run-away worm on the Internet, but if the claims of F-Secure are accurate, we've certainly got one on our hands now. At the end of this article are a list of the domain names ACTUALLY USED by the worm on January 13-16. The headlines have been ticking the number of infected machines forward for five days now, all based on F-Secure's successful monitoring of the worm via calculated domain names:

Jan 14 - Researcher: Worm infects 1.1 Million Windows PCs in 24 hours
Jan 15 - 2.5 million PCs infected with Conficker worm
Jan 15 - The Downadup Worm Hits 3.5 Million

Jan 19 - Fast spreading Windows virus already compromised 9 million computers
Jan 19 - Virus affects 10 million computers worldwide

The source for nearly every one of the thousands of media pieces about this worm has been F-Secure. In Friday's blog, they answered the many challenges about their methodology that they have received in their article Calculating the Size of the Downadup Outbreak. Briefly, each worm-infected computer has the ability to calculate a seemingly random domain name where it can receive new updates of the malware. There are as many as 250 possible domain names each day being calculated by the worm. As long as ANY of those domains are still live, the worm will be able to update itself to perform new functions. F-Secure has registered some of these domain names itself, and counts the number of infected computers which contact the domains it controls looking for an update. Each of the infected computers will show its IP address, as well as the number of computers which it claims to have infected itself. In a single day as many as 350,000 unique computers hit the domains controlled by F-Secure. Adding up the number of computers each of these computers claims to have infected -- and some are claiming more than 100 infections each -- is how F-Secure reaches its estimate, which they are calling conservative, knowing that many of the computers are choosing domain names other than their own with which to check in for an update.

The underlying vulnerability used to spread the Conficker worm was addressed by Microsoft with the patch MS08-067 back on October 23, 2008, the malware has only recently started a true run-away spread.

According to SC Magazine's Dan Kaplan, in his article No end in sight for massive Windows worm outbreak we haven't seen a worm this big since Nimda back in 2001.

Malware researchers report that the vast majority of the infected computers are on corporate networks, not home computers. There are two reasons for this:

As counter-intuitive as this sounds, many corporate networks have disabled the "automatic patching" that many home users have set as their default machine behavior. Because of a need for greater testing in corporate environments, many corporations believe it is acceptable to delay weeks or even months before applying recommended security patches from vendors. Any IT organization that willingly chose NOT to install this patch, after it was issued as a rare "emergency out of cycle patch" seriously needs to investigate whether their security staff needs training in Risk Management. HINT: If Microsoft breaks its Second Tuesday rule to issue a patch, they have performed the risk formla (Risk = Threats x Vulnerabilities x Value of Assets) and determined the Risk Is Very High!

Secondly, this is because the worm scans for a direct connection to the computer, rather than relying on human interaction. Most firewalls will actually block the worm, so the best way of catching it is to have an infected computer ON THE SAME SIDE OF THE FIREWALL as your machine. Because the other primary infection vector is an infected USB drive, employees who shuttle data back and forth to the house on a USB drive are often the Patient Zero for a corporate network outbreak. Once the worm arrives into an organization on an infected thumb drive, if the organization has not patched their machines, EVERY MACHINE IN THE CORPORATION is now an open target.

Because the worm can also spread by learning or guessing the Administrative password on network drives, organization that allow administrators to connect to every workstation machine on the network using the same administrative password share are especially vulnerable. As soon as the worm either guesses or learns via observation the Administrator password, every machine on the network can execute the worm code EVEN IF IT IS PATCHED! The Patch prevents the machine from being hacked via the Windows Server RPC Vulnerability. It does not prevent an Administrator from logging in to the machine and executing code, which is what the worm does if it correctly attempts a password. The Worst Case Scenario? A Domain Administrator visits an infected machine to try to disinfect it, sits down at the keyboard and logs in using his Domain Administrator password. As soon as that occurs, every machine on the network can be quickly compromised.

Computerworld's Gregg Keizer reported on January 15th that 1 in 3 Windows PCs remained vulnerable.

On the second Tuesday in January, the Microsoft Software Removal Tool was updated to be able to remove Conficker. You can follow the exploits of this worm and efforts to remove it at the Microsoft Malware Protection Center Blog and the F-Secure Blog.

A new Support article containing removal tips was released by Microsoft on January 15th: Virus alert about the Win32/Conficker.B worm.

The primary means for the virus to restart itself on an infected machine is the registry key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost

That key contains many critical Network Services which should be allowed to execute. If infected, the last entry on the list will be a key that was named with a random name generator. The example in Microsoft's article is "axyczbfsetg", but yours will be something different. There are many more steps to manual removal which can be found in the Microsoft support document above (KB 962007).

F-Secure has been posting lists of domain names which are being calculated by DownAdUp, their most recent list, for domains which would have been used over the weekend, contained exactly 1,000 domain names. 250 each for Jan 13, 14, 15, and 16. Rather than list all 1,000, I took the approach of running a WHOIS against each of the 1,000 domains on their list, and recording which ones were actually registered. So, here are the domains which ACTUALLY HAVE BEEN REGISTERED, out of the list of 1,000 potential names.

In all there were 57 domain names which had been registered out of the 1,000.

A tip of the hat to our friends at Georgia Tech, F-Secure, and Shadow Server, for reasons each will understand.

In what could be horrible news for certain domain name owners, five of the domains being automatically calculated on this list belong to actual domain owners. Apparently the malware's random domain calculator can randomly calculate some actual domains. Fortunately, of the domains thus affected only one is an actual company, (a German company, whose logs I would REALLY like to get my hands on!) while the other four seem to have been registered speculatively by domain investors. I've excluded all five from my results.

apleprodr.com
bbflvxif.info
cdmusnla.info
dxfvdadx.net
eonud.com
ezgcs.com
ezivhnbt.com
ffbnpzthj.info
ffvkwzear.org
fripjt.com
frwaqecvqk.info
fwotu.net
ggjdty.info
gkmwym.org
hhnvxjdms.info
hrypbb.info
hxgtuopbf.org
hxvyowd.info
ilklkc.net
jjydznuzxu.info
jrxgtdigb.info
jtpigznr.info
ktfadsqo.info
kxxqz.net
mirxdkbat.com
mkdjqosakje.net
mkfugrbowb.info
mrrdzwsz.biz
nmftyate.com
nsuzsjrp.info
pitoy.net
pvczx.info
qowte.com
qpqhcz.net
qqncaz.com
rofxb.net
ruvyhtdzdkm.info
rzowqlvco.com
tqreftcjgzm.info
vggdbocd.biz
vwmwpcs.info
wfivi.com
whtex.com
wshazbuck.cn
wvmsa.info
xhuwvozd.info
ybgcjpnzts.info
yeeollvintx.org
yykad.net
yzdmh.net
zbiqa.com
zullc.com
zwedpmoa.info

If any of those sites are in your logs for the past four days, Congratulations, and welcome to Conflicker.

Thursday, January 08, 2009

US Army hacked as Gaza protest

Today the anti-Israeli hackers for the first time brought their Cyber Propaganda War to Washington DC in the form of their attack against the United States Army's Military District of Washington website, www.mdw.army.mil

The defaced website can still be seen via Google's cache:





What is MDW?

MDW encompasses Fort Myer, Fort McNair, Fort Belvoir, Fort A.P. Hill, Fort Meade, Fort Holabird, Fort Ritchie, 12th Aviation Battalion at Davison Army Airfield, and Arlington National Cemetery.Mission is to respond to crisis, disaster, or security requirements in the National Capital Region (NCR), provide base operations support for Army and DoD organizations throughout the NCR, conduct official ceremonies, locally and worldwide, on behalf on the nation's civilian and military leaders.

According to Zone-H, websites that were hit by the group included:

soa.mdw.army.mil
mdw.army.mil
mdwweb.mdw.army.mil

They also hit the Italian UNICEF website, and the website www.nato-pa.int, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly website in Brussels, Belgium.

In recent months the group also defaced websites belonging to anti-virus vendors Eset and Nod32, as well as Microsoft's websites in Canada, Ireland, and China; Mercedes Benz, Subaru, Mitsubishi, Fiat, Aston Martin, and Shell; Harvard University, Goodyear, the NBA, and other high profile targets.

Although the group is now calling themselves "Peace Crew", the same membership was calling itself "Terrorist Crew" as recently as December.

In addition to the army.mil sites above, Agd_Scorp also defaced the website www.jfhqncr.northcom.mil. On a Turkish language website, the attack is claimed to be an SQL Injection attack against an ASP page on a Microsoft IIS 6.0 webserver.

This is the "Joint Force Headquarters, National Capital Region, of the Northern Command. Prior to the website being taken offline as a result of the hacking, the page read like this:

On Sept. 11, 2001 no one believed the National Capital Region would be a target for those who wish to do us harm. As a nation, we found that to be false. In direct response to the events of that fateful day, JFHQ-NCR was established as the responsible headquarters for land-based homeland defense, defense support to civil authorities and incident management in the national capital region. We have unique skills and are prepared to defend people, territory, critical infrastructures and sovereignty in a supporting role to a lead federal agency.

On a 24/7 basis JFHQ-NCR monitors security requirements; coordinating with the military services, the Department of Homeland Security and local first responders in identifying capabilities the military can provide in case of an emergency or National Special Security Event (NSSE). Once an event is designated, the command becomes a Joint Task Force-National Capital Region (JTF-NCR). JTF-NCR then directs military assistance to federal and civil authorities in safeguarding the nation’s capital.

Gaza Conflict spam points to Fake CNN Infection site

Beginning at 7:30 this morning, the UAB Spam Data Mine began receiving emails claiming to have news about the Gaza conflict from CNN News.



(A typical email)

Each of the many emails we've received points to a website that looks like this:




(click for larger image)

All of the links on the website are functional, and all really resolve to the real CNN website, with two exceptions. Attempting to play the video will result in the download of malware, and following the Adobe Player button will also result in the download of malware.

During the summer of 2008, one of the most successful spam campaigns of the year also imitated a CNN news story, leading to many home and business computers being infected by a virus.

At this time, many major anti-virus products still do not detect this malware as a virus. According to this Virus Total report only 11 of 38 anti-virus products will trigger on this file as containing a virus. (Follow the link to see if your product does or does not.)

The spam messages refer visitors to one of five different domains, each of which was registered at BizCN.com, a Chinese domain registrar who has been abused by this particular group for many months. Analysis of the malware confirms that this incident has nothing at all to do with the CyberWar being waged by pro- and anti-Israeli hackers. This is instead pure social engineering.

Just as with the many "online banking videos", the "digital certificate malware", the "Fake Bank Merger malware, yesterday's "Classmates.com reunion video", and the fake "Obama acceptance speech, this is a piece of malware which is designed to steal your passwords and send the stolen information to the criminal's server in the Ukraine, which is currently 91.211.65.30.

UAB Student and Malware Analyst, Brian Tanner, examined the Adobe_Player10.exe malware and identified that it causes your computer to download a second piece of malware from http://powerpekin.com/servicepack1.exe. That malware, which has the MD5 of 1f337515a3e96fd317dfb24e9fe67448, was only detected by 2 of 38 products at Virus Total. He then unpacked the servicepack1.exe malware and examined it to determine the stolen data was being sent to 91.211.65.30.

The domains used by this spam include:

downloadplayersnews.com
installflashadobeplaye10.com
newsinstalls.com
startinstalladobe.com

As with yesterday's ClassMates.com incident, the websites are being hosted via Fast Flux hosting, and the same fast flux hosts are being used for phishing as well, currently against MBNA bank and Sparkasse of Germany.

The false registration information provided on the domains claims that an imaginary employee of the BBC (Monnie Moulhem) residing in Spring Hill Florida registered the domains.

The computer which is being used as the "Nameserver" for these malware distribution domains resides at 74.63.217.81 -- which is the same computer which served as the nameserver for yesterday's Classmates.com malware.

While we know that many other subject lines will be used as the campaign progresses, some that we have seen so far include the subject lines:

Gaza emergency - UNICEF
Gaza Groups Report on War
Gaza: Israeli War Crimes?
In what became known as Israel's War of Independence
Israel Assaults Hamas in Gaza
Israel At 'War to the Bitter End,' Strikes Key Hamas...
Israel launches deadly Gaza attacks
Israel Puts War Footage
Israel warns Gaza of impending invasion - Israel-Palestinians ...
Israel: Preparing for War
Israel-Gaza conflict: Tens of thousands in London protest Gaza ...
IsraelGaza Strip barrier
Israeli war strategy.IDF in urban combat.
Israel's War Crimes
Israels War on Hamas:A Dozen Thoughts
News from Israel,Ynetnews - Israel at War
Now Israel declares 'war to the bitter end' - Middle East, World ...
Religious war in Gaza - Israel Opinion, Ynetnews
The 20072008 Israel-Gaza conflict refers to a series of battles between Palestinian militants

Tuesday, January 06, 2009

A New Year and Anti-Virus Products Are Still Losing

One of our most popular blog posts in 2008 was back in August - Anti-Virus Products Still Fail on Fresh Viruses. I'm sad to report that in the New Year the situation is not just bad - its worse.

My students are back from the holidays, and I couldn't be happier! Tomorrow night I have 14 new graduate students who I'll be meeting in my Computer Security class where I teach at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. But this analysis was by one of my undergraduate research students who works on malware analysis for me.

Although the volume is greatly reduced from Christmas and New Years, we are continuing to see a regular flow of "eCards" into the UAB Spam Data Mine. Today's domain name of choice was "smartcardgreeting.com". The website hasn't changed since what I showed in the January 3rd post - Happy New Year! Here's a Virus! - but the malware is much less detectable.

How bad? Only ONE of thirty-nine products at VirusTotal.com was able to detect this malware as being a bad file:



The other malware he analyzed today was a fake ClassMates.com malware. ClassMates.com has been targeted on and off for most of the month of December with a spam message claiming to have a video for you to review. Of course the video doesn't actually play and instead prompts you to download a program which claims to be an AdobePlayer.

There were actually two separate groups of five domains involved in this attack.

adobflashplayer10.com
installadobereader.com
installcashion.com
newflasplayerforcm.com
newgoodclassmates.com


and

flashplayerforwindows.com
flashsiters.com
installationsflash.com
newsflashbbc.com
windowsflashplayer10.com

The latter group was registered on TodayNic.com, and used the Nameserver NS1.NEWHOSTINGFORUS.COM.

Each of which had a page called "reunion2009.htm" which contained the fake video, and the malware downloader and looked like this:



All of the sites were registered with the Chinese domain registrar, BizCN.com, and each used the same nameserver, NS1.AVAILABLEREG.COM.

The first piece of malware, Adobe_Player10.exe, actually has a mediocre detection rate of 16 out of 39 VirusTotal detections. Unfortunately, the only function of this malware is to drop the REAL malware, which is being downloaded from the site:

shangaicons.com/22.exe

22.exe is "double-packed", where the hacker takes his virus, packs it with a packer to avoid undetection, and then takes the results and packs them with a different packer as well. It resulted in a very hard to detect piece of malware, as evidenced by the fact that only ONE of 39 anti-virus products were able to detect this as well:



My student malware analyst was able to successfully unpack the 22.exe malware, and found that it is a root-kitted keylogger, in the same family we've been seeing. It steals passwords from your computer as you type them, and sends them with patterns like this:

C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe
http://%s%s?user_id=%.4u&version_id=%s&passphrase=%s&socks=%lu&version=%lu&crc=%.8x
URL: sniffer_ftp_%s
ftp_server=%s&ftp_login=%s&ftp_pass=%s&version=%lu
URL: sniffer_pop3_%s
pop3_server=%s&pop3_login=%s&pop3_pass=%s
URL: sniffer_imap_%s
imap_server=%s&imap_login=%s&imap_pass=%s
URL: sniffer_icq_%s
icq_user=%s&icq_pass=%s

to the Ukrainian IP address:

91.211.65.30

which we first reported seventeen days ago and asked for termination.

We saw about 375 copies of the ClassMates.com email today, with a wide assortment of subject lines, including:
  • Accomplishments by classmates and reunion information
  • Alumni Events: Classmates
  • An Invitation to Personal Classmates Day
  • Bringing Classmates Together January 2009
  • Classmates - ALUMNI Reunion Calendar
  • Classmates - Calendar 2009
  • Classmates - Custom Invitations
  • Classmates 2009 January - Invitation
  • Classmates Alumni Event Calendar
  • Classmates Day - January 2009.
  • Classmates Important Meeting Information
  • Classmates in January - Invitation to All Faculty to the Spring 2009 ...
  • Classmates in January...Invitation! - Page 1
  • Classmates Institutional Membership Invitation
  • Classmates International Honour Society Invitation Acceptance
  • Classmates invitation - Reunion party Greeting Card.
  • Classmates Membership Invitation
  • Classmates Membership Invitation from teachers
  • Classmates Message Boards
  • Classmates Organisation.Class Reunion Information
  • Classmates Organiser Warning - AN URGENT MESSAGE - Your Classmates Are Waiting
  • Classmates Organiser Warning - Classmates Organisation.Have any special memories from when we were in high school?
  • Classmates Organiser Warning - Don't Miss Tonight's Classmates Reunion !
  • Classmates Organiser Warning - How can someone miss a Classmates meeting?
  • Classmates Organiser Warning - How to Hold A Class Meeting And Promote Classmate Support
  • Classmates Organiser Warning - Meeting high school and junior college classmates
  • Classmates Organiser Warning - Webster meetings among former classmates
  • Classmates Party invitation...
  • Classmates Personal Invitation: Custom invitation
  • Classmates Preview, public invitation
  • Classmates Reunion - Invitation
  • Classmates Reunion - Are you ready to accept the invitation?
  • Classmates Reunion - Classmates Reunion - Special Preview Invitation
  • Classmates Reunion - Custom Invitations
  • Classmates Reunion - Invitation: Ready
  • Classmates Reunion - Personal Invitation Letter to visit Classmates Day
  • Classmates Reunion - Personalized Invitations
  • Classmates Reunion - Ready to view your Classmates Invitation?
  • Classmates Reunion - Your Classmates Invitation - He's Ready, Are You?
  • Classmates Reunion Calendar
  • Classmates Reunion Soon - [Class Reunion] Save the Date
  • Classmates Reunion Soon - All your classmates receiving invitations!
  • Classmates Reunion Soon - classmates meeting
  • Classmates Reunion Soon - Classmates Organisation.What Have You Been Up To
  • Classmates Reunion Soon - ClassMates.com about meeting classmates
  • Classmates Reunion Soon - Important Dates for Classmates Meeting
  • Classmates Reunion Soon - Mini-Reunion / Meeting with Classmates
  • Classmates Reunion Soon - UPDATE: Reunion Date Change
  • Classmates Reunion Soon - Video
  • Classmates Reunion Soon - You Have 1 Message Waiting for You. Classmates portal
  • Classmates Reunion Soon - Your Classmates Are Waiting to meet with you
  • Classmates Reunion Soon - Your classmates Day New Date.
  • Classmates Reunion Soon - Your classmates Day New Date..How can someone miss a Classmates meeting?
  • Classmates Reunion Soon - Your classmates Day New Date.Important Dates for Classmates Meeting
  • Classmates Video your personal invitation by John
  • Classmates/com: HappyScrappers January Invitation
  • Classmates/com: January is the time to learn at a low cost
  • Classmates: Be ready for Reunion Day.
  • Classmates: custom invitations 2009
  • Classmates: Display your invitations from your profile
  • Classmates: Invitation Design 2009
  • Classmates: Membership Invitation - American Studies Association
  • Classmates: Membership Invitation. 2009 season
  • Classmates: View Your Invitation - Click Here
  • Classmates: View your personal invitation video from Chris O'Malley
  • Classmates: Your complete invitation is viewable for 30 days after the event.
  • Classmates: Your Invitation Place
  • Classmates: your invitation to a private view
  • Do not miss the Classmates reunion
  • Do-Not-Miss Classmates reunion.
  • Events Calendar : Classmates
  • Friends waiting for your visit! Classmates
  • Get all of your classmates together Day - January 2009
  • Important Classmates Day's 2009
  • Invitation to the Classmates - January 12th | Earth ...
  • January - Classmates/com
  • January 16, 2009: Deadline for Classmates Invitation
  • January Invitation. Classmates
  • January Invitations, Classmates Invitations, Online ...
  • My Classmates news
  • Reconnect with your MBA classmates and favorite teachers
  • Search for Classmates
  • Spam Accomplishments by classmates and reunion information
  • The power of a personal invitation - Classmates
  • Traditional January Invitations, Classmates Party ...
  • Use Classmates.com to bring class together.
  • Welcome to Classmates Personal Invitation
  • Your Classmates Are Waiting. Classmates Invite all friends.
  • Your Classmates Are Waiting.Look an invitation.
  • Your classmates Day New Date.A Meeting with my HighSchool Classmates
  • Your classmates Day New Date.Important Meeting for Classmates
  • Your classmates Day!
  • Your classmates will be able to find your
  • Your High bring classmates together.



(The previous batch of domains, including "classmatersunion.com, indexguideclassmates.com, renewclassmates.com" all used the nameserver, NS1.GOODNEWYEARHOSTING.COM)

The Classmates malware domains are hosted by Fast Flux, and are using the same Fast Flux network as the current MBNA phishing sites, such as bankcardservices.mbna.co.uk.dlls-id01.eu.

Sunday, January 04, 2009

Whatever happened to Alan Ralsky?

One year ago, the indictment was unsealed against Alan M Ralsky, Scott K Bradley, Judy M Devenow, John S Brown, William C Neil, Anki K Neil, James E Bragg, James E Fite, Peter Severa, How Wai John Hui, Francis A Tribble.

As we review some of the biggest "wins" against spammers, phishers and cyber criminals in 2008, everyone's list starts with Ralsky. On January 3, 2008, the forty page indictment against Alan Ralsky was unsealed. We reported on the indictment in our January 3, 2008 blog entry: Ralsky: Going Down.

But what happened since?

After acknowledging his indictment, on January 9, 2008, Ralsky was released on $50,000 bail.

A notice to appear was issued on January 29, 2008, asking Ralsky and friends to appear before the Honorable Marianne O Battani on March 17, 2008 for a Pretrial Scheduling Conference.

On March 17, 2008 that conference was rescheduled until June 17, 2008.

On June 17, 2008 that conference was rescheduled until October 21, 2008.

Wait! What about the "Speedy Trial Act"? Well . . . there were ELEVEN people indicted originally. As of June 17th, two of the eleven had not appeared before the court to be arraigned. (Peter Severa had not appeared, because he lives in Russia and was never arrested, and for almost exactly the opposite reason, Francis Tribble had not appeared because he was in jail in Los Angeles County and they hadn't transported him yet.) Because of this, the parties involved decided "the 70-day
time period under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) has not yet commenced."

At the first conference, it was decided that the "lengthy electronic discovery" which had resulted in vast mountains of electronic evidence which had not yet been processed to the point of fully understanding what was at hand. At the second conference, it was "indicated that an additional 120 days would be needed to allow for the extraction and examination of the computer evidence by the defendants."

In other words, the defense was saying, because you have so much evidence against our client, we haven't had time to go through it all yet. (Which is either a stall tactic, or an indication of poor technology, which do you believe? I believe both are probably true.) Oh, and that means:

The parties do therefore agree and stipulate that the period of time from June 17, 2008 through October 28, 2008, shall be excluded from the time computation of the 70-day Speedy Trial period, due to the absence of defendant Tribble, and also due to the need for the parties to effectively manage the extensive electronic discovery presented in this unusual and complex case, because the ends of justice served in taking such action outweighs the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial, under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii).


The following lawyers, all representing the spammers, signed off on that statement:

For Alan Ralsky - Philip Kushner of Kushner & Hamed Co, Cleveland, Ohio
For Scott Bradley - Neil Fink of Birmingham, Michigan
For Judy Devenow - Richard Zuckerman of Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn, Detroit
For John Bown - Mark Kriger of LaRene & Kriger, Detroit
For William Neil - Michael Kemnitz, Detroit
For Anki Neil - John McManus, Birmingham, Michigan
For James Fite - Andrew Wise, Federal Defender Office, Detroit
(Peter Severa - not arraigned)
For How Wai John Hui - Avery Mehlman of Herrick, Feinstein, New York
For James Bragg - Robert Morgan of Detroit
For Francis Tribble - Marcia Morrisey

Lawyers for the prosecution:
Terrence Berg, Assistant US Attorney (my favorite AUSA in the whole system)
Thomas Dukes, DOJ Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section Trial Attorney
Mona Sedky Spivack, CCIPS Trial Attorney

On August 12, 2008 there was a hearing regarding joint representation for Ralsky and Bown (it was denied).

On September 18, 2008 Ralsky's bond conditions were altered to allow him to travel anywhere in the United States as long as he provides prior notification to Pre-Trial Services and the US Attorney's Office.

The October 12, 2008 Pre-Trial conference got rescheduled to November 10, 2008.

At that time, they got down to business, and released the Order to Continue on November 19, 2008. Here's the new gameplan:

Feb 27, 2009: All Discovery must be completed
March 31, 2009: All Pre-Trial Motions are due
April 21, 2009: All Responses to Motions are due
May 12, 2009: Motion Hearing scheduled for 2 PM
May 12, 2009: If no motions, pleas are due at this time

Sep 9, 2009: Jury Trial Begins

For some in the Anti-Spam Community, this seems like a LOOOOOONG time for Justice, especially given that Ralsky is traveling the US as a free man until then.

This concludes our "Whatever happened to Alan Ralsky" status report.

Saturday, January 03, 2009

Happy New Year! Here's a Virus! (New Year's Postcard malware)

I've been busy this week looking at the various defacements (see ComputerWorld, and ABC News) and other cyber attacks (see yesterday's blog) going on against Israel, so I hadn't had a chance to look at my New Years Cards yet!

Sadly, all of my New Years Cards were viruses (although I did get two real Christmas Cards by email.)

The most recent ones I looked at arrived this morning, pointing me to the websites:

bestyearcard.com
youryearcard.com

I decided to see what computers were currently hosting the website "youryearcard.com", because, sure enough, it was hosted with Fast Flux.

24.24.70.135
61.24.107.220
66.178.64.133
67.9.192.176
69.47.115.180
86.200.201.148
88.179.125.249
98.230.55.8
131.113.162.29
160.36.19.235
217.210.150.100
221.214.134.26

were some of the computers which recently hosted this domain name. Next we looked at some of those IPs to see what other domains they had also been hosting:

blackchristmascard.com
cardnewyear.com
decemberchristmas.com
directchristmasgift.com
freechristmasworld.com
freechristmassite.com
freedecember.com
funnychristmasguide.com
holidayxmas.com
itsfatherchristmas.com
livechristmascard.com
newlifeyearsite.com
newyearcardcompany.com
newyearcardfree.com
newyearcardonline.com
superyearcard.com
whitewhitechristmas.com
yourchristmaslights.com
youryearcard.com

All of those sites seem to have been distributing malware pretending to be a card. They are all related to each other (based on the fact they resolve to the same hacked computers.)

The New Years site that we visited just now looks like this:



Although that looks like a website, it turns out the entire thing is a single file called "img.jpg". Clicking anywhere on the image causes the same result - you are prompted to download "postcard.exe".

postcard.exe is of course a virus. We submitted the virus to Virus Total, and got this Virus Total Analysis indicating that only 16 of 38 anti-virus products knew this was malware. Most of them called it either a version of "ElDorado", or gave it a new name of "Waledac", the latter being the name used by McAfee, Microsoft, and Symantec.

McAfee has a Nice Technical Report on what Waledac does, but basically it harvests all of the email addresses from your computer, sends them to one of many different machines, downloads some spam templates, and begins sending spam.

McAfee's report is from December 26th, and includes subject lines such as:

Merry Christmas greetings for you
You have received an Ecard
A Christmas card from a friend
Happy Xmas !

The domain names listed in the McAfee report of December 26th are all still live and all still distributing the current version of the virus, which has been modified many times since that report to try to prevent detection. So, visting:

justchristmasgift.com
or
yourdecember.com

gives you the same virus that visiting the current New Years domains would give you.

I know you are probably getting tired of this advice, but it still applies:

DO NOT CLICK ON LINKS IN EMAIL MESSAGES!!!

My malware team is still enjoying their vacation. If this is still a threat on Monday, we'll dig deeper to determine if the malware performs other actions.

In the meantime, Happy New Year!

Gary Warner
Director of Research
UAB Computer Forensics
The University of Alabama at Birmingham

Friday, January 02, 2009

Morocco based "Team Evil" reroutes prominent Israeli websites

After more than 10,000 websites being defaced in protest of Israeli actions in Gaza, Morrocco-based defacement team "Team Evil" has raced the cyber attack to a new level. By logging in the Internet registration services provider, Domain The Net Technologies, using the real credentials of the domain owner, the hackers were able to redirect traffic for several prominent Israeli websites, including that of YnetNews.com, a major Israeli English-speaking news website, and the website "www.israirairlines.com". This blogger also found evidence that the site "terrorism-info.org.il" was also rerouted to the same location. Terrorism-info is a site showing the "Operation Cast Lead" from the Israeli point of view.

Anyone entering the actual address of YnetNews during this time would not be sent to the real webserver, but instead be redirected by the fake DNS server to another server, displaying the hacker's message.

The website read:

Hacked by JURM-TEAM & CYBER-TERRORIST & TEAM-Evil

Lpooxd@gmail.com & Cyb3rt@hotmail.com

The Bitter Truth History repeats itself all the victims were said to words such as "terrorists" and the only reason for those words and that the overwhelming offender and murderer was a stronger force, but will not last, and the criminals will be rotting in hell and can not escape the punishment of God

Holocaust :Victims (the Palestinians) - the offender (the Zionists) # are still ongoing #
Holocaust :Victims (the Iraqis) - the offender (U.S. military) # are still ongoing #

There are many images that continue to occur, but you learn from history?!
* * *
The only solution for peace for all peoples in Palestine, Jews and Muslims and Christians is the demise of the Zionist and that the treatment of malignant cancer tumor
Look at the result of X-Ray for tumor, and they will learn that they do not want the peace, it is a dirty game of global
..... Machine Closed....................
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

We Are : Jurm / Cyber-terrorist / Dr.Noursoft / Dr.Win / Sql_Master / J3ibi9a / Scritpx // Fatna Bant Hmida

" Greetz : All Muslims Hackers "


(Images are not included above. The images included covered bodies, a scene from Abu Grhaib prison, a protestor with a sign against Zionism, and a series of maps showing the loss of land by Palestinians)

During the attack, the YNetNews web address was being resolved by the nameserver "ns1.bestsecurity.jp". To its credit, YNetNews actually ran a story about the attack on its own website. Unfortunately both Lebanese and Israeli media sources have reported that the traffic was being rerouted to Japan. This is actually not correct. The IP address for ns1.bestsecurity.jp is 64.38.30.146, which is actually located on Fast Servers in Chicago, Illinois. The machine to which the traffic was being redirected, 64.38.30.147, was also at Fast Servers in Chicago, Illinois.

This is not the first time the YNetNews website has been hacked in response to Israeli actions. The website was also defaced back on July 5, 2008 by a hacker group calling itself "Jurm-Team". At that time the website showed a Syrian flag, and had a headline reading "Syria: End Israeli Aggression".

Although it has been speculated that the way such an attack would be performed is that the password used to login to the domain registration server would have been stolen. One common way to steal such information is to plant a trojan on a computer belonging to a target. The YNetNews story mentioned above actually interviewed Yoav Keren, CEO of DomainTheNet Technologies, who confirmed that Team Evil hackers had breached their server and was able to find the passwords used by various domain registration customers, allowing the hackers to then log in as the domain owner and re-route their DNS servers as described above. (The breach has since been closed).

Thursday, January 01, 2009

2008: Looking back on a Year of Spam and Malware

Happy New Year! As we get ready for the New Year, there are quite a few security folks making predictions for 2009. I think my friend Dan Clemens covered that pretty well in his PacketNinjas Yearly Security Predictions. I'm going to limit myself to saying the criminals will continue to innovate, data breaches will become even more commonplace, and corporate America will continue to TALK about security without making the necessary fundamental changes to actually BE secure.

I'd rather spend this morning looking back on 2008, and some of the highlights that we discovered at UAB Computer Forensics as I and my staff spent the year analyzing spam, phishing, and malware and sharing what we found with you.

Last year we shared 102 Blog entries with you. Rather than tell you what *I* thought was most interesting, I thought I'd share with you what *YOU* seemed to think was the most interesting, based on the visits to each blog entry.

We'll hit these Top Ten Style . . . which means we start with . . .

Number Ten


Internet Landfill McColo Corporation


November 12, 2008

Perhaps one of the top accomplishments by "the good guys" this year was the closing of McColo. This story coined the term "Internet Landfill" to describe those networks which exist only to host trash, filth, and crime on the Internet. Championing Journalist Brian Krebs lead the charge, and the Internet should send him a big Thank You. Perhaps more importantly than shutting down McColo, which resulted in a 2/3rds drop in Spam volumes world-wide, was the proof that we CAN do something about spam if we work together.

Number Nine


Demise of Index1.php PornTube Video malware






Number Eight


Enom Phishing Continues


October 29, 2008

Both Enom and Network Solutions, two major network domain registrars, had phishing campaigns against them back-to-back. We believe this lead to quite a few domain take overs later in the year, including financial services company Check Free. Using the stolen userids and passwords for the people who rightly control the domain name information, criminals logged in and redirected dozens of domains to a server they controlled.


Number Seven


CNN Lends Authenticity to News Spam


August 7, 2008

After several weeks of fake news headlines tricking readers into clicking on links which infected their computer, the spammers got a huge boost in their infection rates when they began to imitate CNN.


Number Six


Anti-Virus Products Still Fail on Fresh Malware


August 12, 2008

Three examples in this blog showed that current anti-virus products fail miserably when detecting fresh spam. Some of our examples, "in the wild" as evidenced by us finding them in our spam, were detected by as few as 5 out of 36 anti-virus products tested.


Number Five


Governor Palin's Email Security Questions in the Facebook Age


September 22, 2008

When 20-year-old David Kernell broke into Governor Palin's Yahoo account by Googling up the answers to her security questions, we took a minute to point out how foolish this security practice is in this time when everyone's personal information is online.



Number Four


More than 1 Million Ways to Infect Your Computer


December 23, 2008

A criminal uses malware to load thousands of websites with search terms to Open Redirector on many websites, including Microsoft.com and IRS.gov. This results in many search terms showing up in Google with the number one hit being a redirector that will infect the visitor with a fake anti-virus.

Number Three


Storm Worm: Amero to replace Dollar?


July 22, 2008

Remember the Storm Worm? In July it pretended to be a warning that the US Dollar was being replaced by a gold coin. The continued popularity of this page actually has nothing to do with security. Rumor after rumor has circulated that the "Amero" proves that Bush was planning to merge Canadanian, US, and Mexican currencies, and desparate tinfoil hat types keep Googling up my page.

Number Two


Computer Virus Masquerades as Obama Speech


November 5, 2008

A criminal who has been stealing userids and passwords since May gained perhaps his biggest collection yet as he creating a fake Obama acceptance speech which was widely spammed the morning after the election. If anyone visited the website to view the video, they would be trojaned and begin sending all of their login data to a computer in the Ukraine. This same criminal did dozens of spam and social engineering campaigns this year, primarily pretending to be a new "Digital Certificate" for your bank.

Number One


MSNBC "Breaking News" replaces CNN Spam Wave


August 13, 2008

One of the tricks the spammer's used to get people to infect themselves was to promise to show them videos. We later found malware which actually searched real news sites to select headlines which were then stuffed into the spam messages to give the spam timely relevance to the spam readers. When the spam began imitating MSNBC's Breaking News alerts, even more people found themselves infected, causing their own computers to begin sending spam as well.

What does a National Cyber Range do?

This week Aviation Week ran a story called DARPA Unveils Cyber Warfare Range. The article quotes Rance Walleston, the director of BAE Systems' Information Operations Initiative:

“It’s hard to know what you are actually going to get from a test in a laboratory against five computers when the capability you need has to function against five million computers,” he continues. “There’s nowhere to test that, so DARPA’s trying to put together a range with fidelity in many dimensions — such as the number and types of nodes and how they’re connected — so that you can accurately determine the effectiveness of some tool. The real trick will be how quickly you can upgrade the range to deal with changing threats.”


If you might be wondering, as I was, so "what will that really look like"? The media has been all over the place with this one. InfoWar Monitor calimed "The agency's National Cyber Range for cyberwar simulation would be similar to Star Trek's holodeck or a Snow Crash-style Metaverse". Noah Schiffman wrote in his Security Phreak blog that the project would cost "an estimated $30 billion", and got slash-dotted quite a bit calling the project "Doomed to Failure". (Interesting that one project could cost $30 billion, when their entire appropriation for FY09 was a little over THREE billion -- (see Department of Defense Appropriation FY09) -- "The fiscal year 2009 budget request for DARPA is $3,285,569,000, an increase of $326,493,000, more than 10 percent, over the fiscal year 2008".

I did a couple hundred pages of reading, so you, gentle reader, won't have to . . .

So how did this come about?



It started back in November 2007 with a call from DARPA's Michael VanPutte, who is the Program Manager of their Strategic Technology Office. They gave a two month comment period for people to describe what they thought a Cyber Range should do. (See: Request for Information on Cyber Network Range Capabilities (CNRC). Whatever responses they got were used to help decide what the requirement should be for a National Cyber Range, and the first pass of asking for proposals to build one was May 5, 2008. In that request, they asked for some quick responses (deadlined June 30, 2008) of people who might be able to build something like that. Theidea was that they would fund several competitive teams to see who could come up with something worthy of major long-term funding. A Proposers' Day Workshop was held on May 13-14, 2008 at the Hilton Washington Dulles, with a review of classified requirements the previous day at the Schafer Corporation for proposers.

The requirements that were shared that day boiled down to:

  • Conduct unbiased, quantitative and qualitative assessment of information assurance and survivability tools in a representative network environment.
  • Replicate complex, large-scale, heterogeneous networks and users in current and future Department of Defense (DoD) weapon systems and operations.
  • Enable multiple, independent, simultaneous experiments on the same infrastructure.
  • Enable realistic testing of Internet/Global-Information-Grid (GIG) scale research.
  • Develop and deploy revolutionary cyber testing capabilities.
  • Enable the use of the scientific method for rigorous cyber testing.


Proposer's Day gave a 2.5 hour briefing on the Project, with proposers able to fill out Q&A cards, which were then addressed during the afternoon session.

The following day was for people who were looking for Team members to pitch what they had to offer and what they were looking for to build a successful proposal team.


The solicitation gave a number of objectives, including the ability to replicate and operate large-scale military and government network enclaves, commercial and tactical wireless and control systems, and a method of being able to rapidly prototype, deploy, monitor, and evaluate tests, new research protocols

The Solicitation boiled down to three phases:

Phase I - Design Objectives: Proposers had at most six months to develop a Preliminary Design Review which would prove that they had an Initial Conceptual Design which might be able to be developed into Detailed Engineering Plans and a workable Concepts of Operation. Proposers who passed Phase I would receive funding to move into Phase II.

Phase II - Prototype Objectives: Proposers now have to do a few things:

Demonstration, to include:
- deploying two different host node recipes
- creating new recipes
- rapid testbed reconstruction
- test management
- time synch and auditing
- data collection tools, including packet captures, event log captures, malware event collection, and automated attacks
- a traffic generation system including incoming and outgoing email, automated port scanning, automated attacks, and simulated HTTP and other traffic
- human "replicants" who simulate the use of software products, browsers, media players and email clients
- replicated inter-enclave communication channels
- aggregating all sub-nodes into one large test bed
- dynamically freeing resources from one test and reassigning them to another

When its All Done, what will it be able to do?



Phase III: National Cyber Range Objectives:

One of the Phase II Demonstrators would be picked to fully deploy the National Cyber Range to meet the following objectives:

TASK 1 - INFRASTRUCTURE



Operational Resources - physical facilities, utilities, HVAC, security

Administration Resources - certification/accreditation, CONOP development, security management, test scheduling, operation of range processes

Demonstrations - facilities to demo for audiences of up to 30, with separate rooms for test control teams, Test Director, and OpFor (Oppositional Forces)

Node Replication - realistic replication of connections, hardware, and endpoints (firmware, hardware, software, apps)

Recipes - "a variety of node configurations" that would handle most potential operating environments

Network Technologies and Support - (make the network look like any network)

Protocols and Services - (allow the network to run any protocols)

Scalability - be able to deploy everything from single devices to tests incorporating several thousand nodes.

TASK 2 - RANGE MANAGEMENT



- Provide automated pre-test planning support
- Enable automated resource allocation based on needs and priorities
- Support both short (1 week) and long (6 month) research programs
- Provide a means to rapidly and securely de-obligate test resources after tests
- Enable free resources to be pooled and allocated to low priority, non-interactive, batch tests
- Provide a knowledge management suite for lessons learned (both within and across tests)
- Provide a means to incorporate additional technologies

TASK 3 - TEST MANAGEMENT



Facilitate the Test Director's activities by providing a palette of resources available, as well as products to assist in pre-test planning, test execution, data collection, post test analysis and closeout support.

Provide a knowledge management repository

Provide an automated means to configure, instrument, initialize, and verify assigned testbed resources

Provide means to execute, monitor, pause, continue, and stop tests.

Provide means to rapidly reset, modify and restart tests

Provide range validation with user-defined scripts

Support both interactive and batch testing paradigms

TASK 4 - TRANSPARENCY



Tests must be monitored for both quantitative and qualitative assessment, including instrumented monitoring and observer/controller evaluation and analysis

TASK 5 - QUALIFIED, ON-SITE SUPPORT TEAM



Provide a number of highly skilled, experienced network engineers, system administrators and domain administrators, with rapid response time and trouble ticketing system to track assistance requests.

TASK 6 - HUMAN INTERACTION AND REPLICATION



Allow players OR Automation, to fulfill the roles of:
- Oppositional Forces (OpFor), including both sophisticated cyber activity, defensive computing to protect national assets, and computer network attack, with facilities that can be controlled by OpFor isolated from Test Director's team.
- Team Integration
- Traffic Generators
- Human Actor Replicants and Program Activators (Host-based)



TASK 7 - EXTENSIBILITY



Deploy and/or replicate: LANs, WANs, Wireless of all softs, intermediate routing, C4 Systems (Military Command, Control, Communications, and Computers), US and Foreign military communications infrastructures, including satellite, satcom, maritime, tactical, and Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), US and foreign military net-centric assets (including Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Weapons, and Radar Systems)

TASK 8 - TIME DILATION/CONTRACTION



Develop technology to accelerate or decelerate test time to clock time

TASK 9 - ENCAPSULATION



Comply with all Security Classification Guidelines





WOW. OK, that sound very cool. Where are we right now?

Some folks are already hiring to help build out their phase II. For instance, CTC: Senior Systems Engineer, and L-3 Global Security and Engineering Solutions: Senior Systems Engineer, which was just posted yesterday. The latter wants someone with 17 years experience (14 if you have a PhD) to:

Participate in development of the Concept of Operations and prepare Preliminary Design Review (PDR) for large scale, multi-level secure, multi-floor National Cyber Range (NCR.) Apply Cyber Security engineering and Computer Forensics technology in design of a test bed (Range) capable of supporting multiple, simultaneous, segmented tests of emerging and future defensive and offensive Cyber technology. Plan, organize and structure operations of the Range. Specify staff roles, technical skills, training and certifications required to meet operational requirements.

Manage layout and physical design of facility and development of Test & Evaluation (T&E) processes. Coordinate pre-approval of Range physical and information security certifications and procedures during PDR development.


Do you believe? It might be a great time to get a great job!

Link: NCR Proposers' Day Briefing

Tuesday, December 30, 2008

Radical Muslim Hackers Declare CyberWar on Israel

This weekend more than 300 Israeli websites have been defaced in a period of 48 hours. In a website "defacement" a hacker violates the security of a web server and replaces the original content with his own message. In some defacements, the hacker places a fake banking website (called a phishing site). In others the hacker merely boasts about his prowess as a hacker, similar to a graffiti artist painting his name on the side of a train. The current round of defacements are instead part of a Propaganda War.

We've seen this type of Propaganda War before. The original cyber propaganda war was launched by Chinese hackers in May of 2001 after the collision of a Chinese fighter jet with a US Navy plane. Tens of thousands of US websites were defaced by Chinese hackers blaming the US for the incident. More recently the technique has been adopted by Muslim hackers, beginning with the defacement of thousands of Danish and American websites in February 2006 after the publication of cartoons about the prophet Muhammad, and against Israeli and US websites after the bombardment of Lebanon by Israel in August of 2006.

As soon as Israel started bombing Gaza we began to look for signs of a cyber response. And we've found it, in the form of more than 300 Israeli websites which have been defaced with anti-Israeli and anti-US messages.

One interesting aspect of a cyber propaganda war is that it doesn't matter what size the website is, or how important it is. It only matters WHERE the website is. "In the current situation, the hackers supporting Gaza clearly believe Israel AND the US are culpable. That means American webmasters may wish to be especially vigilant right now.

How do you prevent your webserver being used in the propaganda war?

Webmasters need to decide on a strategy. For many websites, its enough to have a daily review of your content to ensure that nothing has been changed. For more important websites, it would be worth investing in having your website professionally tested for weaknesses.

Some very common exploits can be avoided by applying security patches. If your website uses programs which you downloaded from a vendor, please be sure to check with that vendor's website regularly to determine if new versions are available. Many defacements occur when hackers scan for websites which are running vulnerable software, such as a common PHP program, image program, forum software, or other webmaster utilities, such as web statistics programs. One quick way to see if your software has a security vulnerability is to check the National Vulnerability Database, where you can search for the name of your product.

We have also seen many websites exploited recently because the password for the webmaster has been stolen. Just as with all passwords, its important to choose good passwords, and change them regularly. Its also important to use secure methods of uploading. "FTP" sends your userid and password in plain text when you upload your web pages. Using "Secure FTP", which is often packaged with SSH, will make sure your passwords are encrypted when uploading files to your website.

I originally posted images from the Propaganda War on this blog, but have been asked by more than a dozen individuals already, to remove them from my blog. While I don't condone censorship, I also don't want to shock anyone by seeing pictures of disfigured children and threats to destroy the United States.

Some of you WILL have a professional reason to need to see these images. If that is you, please email me, and I will provide you with a private weblink, not affiliated with any official source, only with me personally. Please email gar@askgar.com - and please use the email Subject: Propaganda War, and include why you need to see these images.

Tuesday, December 23, 2008

More than 1 Million Ways to Infect Your Computer

An unknown hacker has been on a Search Engine Optimization rampage to flood search engines with more than a million ways to infect yourself with his virus. This is the first major "Scareware" infection we've seen since writing about the Federal Trade Commission's action in our December 10th blog post, FTC Moves Against Fake Anti-Virus Scareware.

The current scam takes advantage of the thousands of websites which have a "URL redirect" on them. A URL redirection program allows the website owner to "send you" to another website, while keeping track of where you went. They are often used in conjunction with an exit page that says something like "You are now leaving our site and being redirected to a new location. We aren't responsible for the content there." The problem is that many of those sites actually allow other people to use their URL to redirect traffic as well. That's what's happening here. A hacker has managed to cause Google to "learn" many of these URLs by placing them on sites they control.

In the current example, the hacker is using the site "00119922.com", which they have just registered December 19th. More than a million Google hits show that he has injected redirectors all around the Internet pointing to this site.

CAUTION: THIS PORTION IS FOR PROFESSIONAL SECURITY FOLKS ONLY. IF YOU FOLLOW THESE LINKS YOU *WILL* INFECT YOURSELF! USE CAUTION!



Sites like Microsoft.com, IRS.gov, countless media outlets, magazines, universities, and other websites can be found in the search engines in this way. The hackers get these entries into Google by littering tens of thousands of blog comments, guestbook entries, and imaginary blog stories all around the Internet. So, to choose one of the non-pornography related search terms, a hacker has written a program to comment on people's blog entries with a link to:

http://www.microsoft.com/ie/ie40/download/?//00119922.com/in.php?&n=837&t=download+fruityloops+6+free

Now, if someone is searching for the phrase "download fruityloops 6 free", (fruityloops is apparently a music mixing software) because of Microsoft's popularity, their search term will take them to the number one position on Google.

The same technique has been used for many hundreds of phrases associated with pornography and software piracy. Some example search terms (and there are TENS OF THOUSANDS) all of which will give you the Microsoft open redirector as the #1 search result on Google:

"microsoft office 2002 download"
"hacking private myspace accounts"
"download runescape password hack"
"xxx rated joke"
"live free hardcore sex cams"

(Remember! DO NOT CLICK! YOU WILL BE INFECTED!!!!!)

Some of the other sites with open redirectors being targeted by this attacker include: dbrecovery.com, togshop.com, wnbc.com, mrm.mms.gov, countrycurtains.com, portugal-info.net, cyberswim.com, nbcsandiego.com, thebostonchannel.com, thepittsburghchannel.com, hermanstreet.com, viadeo.com, nationalgeographic.com, barronscatalog.com, click2houston.com, lucy.com, wgal.com, rexart.com, kitv.com, bookmatestore.com, attarbazaar.com, titlenine.com, vermontteddybear.com, readthehook.com, theessentials.com, martlmadidebeli-gristianoba.com

Visiting the website redirects the visitor to 00119922.com, which in turn currently redirects the user to the site: netisecurity.com/ws/index.php?affid=04800, which pops up a warning:



Clicking "OK" on the warning, SEEMS to start a scan of your system, but a closer look will indicate that you are actually only seeing an animation playing from the netisecurity.com website:



When the scan is completed, a "Windows Security Alert" seems to pop up, although in reality you are still on the netisecurity.com website:



Clicking the "Remove All" button, which seems to be the reasonable thing to do, actually prompts the download of "install.exe".



You can review the coverage on "install.exe" on VirusTotal.com. As of this writing, we were the first one to report this malware to VirusTotal, where only 5 of 37 antivirus products were able to identify the file as malware.

File size: 62505 bytes
MD5...: 2bd950fdb5770ce6a1567f162dfa2679

eSafe and Panda call it "Suspicious file" (they call most things a suspicious file)
Ikarus says its "Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Delf"
Prevx1 says its "Malicious software"
TrendMicro calls it "PAK_Generic.001"

The other 32 anti-virus products offered no protection or detection.

install.exe was actually installed from the URL:
securesoftwareretrieve.com/downloadsetupws.php?affid=04800



After "install.exe" runs, a more professional looking scanner executes. On our system the full product was installed under our logged in user's Documents and Settings in as: "1626125795\1300463089.exe". There were files in the directory indicating that a keylogger was in effect.

At the completion of the full scan, a new warning asked if we would like to "Remove all threats now" or "Continue unprotected".



Choosing "Remove all threats now" invites us to purchase the product for $51.45.



Refusing to purchase the software results in two types of annoyances constantly popping up. One warns that a worm is trying to steal my credit card with a full pop-up windows:



while the other is just a task bar reminder of the same thing:



Hopefully the FTC will take swift action to shut down this ring. In the meantime, there is a very real chance that your search engine results may contain links to this newest round of scareware. Surfers beware!

UPDATE!



Microsoft has closed the Open Redirector which was being abused by the pages above. Clicking one of the Microsoft pages indicated in the Google search above will now take you to a safe page stating that the page was not found, and then forwarding you to a Microsoft search page. Thanks to Microsoft for such a quick response once the problem was pointed out to them.

Monday, December 22, 2008

Trusted Internet Connections (TIC): Gated Communities and Ostriches

Various colleagues at InfraGard and elsewhere have been hitting my telephone and email inbox asking my thoughts on the "Security Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency" report, and the Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative (CNCI), established by National Security Presidential Directive 54 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23. I agree with my friend Joseph Concannon that these are things we should all be discussing and to which we should be reacting.

As one of the included initiatives that has been widely discussed, I'd like to start by asking some questions about the Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) initiative. The initiative was announced publicly in this Memo for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies from the Office of Management and Budget's Clay Johnson. The memo discusses the requirement for each agency to develop a "comprehensive plan of action and milestones" to reduce their number of Internet connections, with the goal of having the entire federal government using only fifty Internet points of presence. The plan is similar to another DHS initiative, which believes that building a fence across the US-Mexico border will make it easier to secure the border. TIC works in exactly the same way. By having only fifty points of access, it becomes easier to identify what goes in and out of the Internet.

In the physical world we have the same concept in the Gated Community. Many of the same advantages and disadvantages of Gated Communities can also be expected here. Some of the advantages are that we can better control who comes into our communities, and even those who are allowed access have left clear record of their action, in the form of video surveillance at the gate checkpoints, and often through a log of visitors maintained by security guards who man these gates. These are exactly the advantages intended by the DHS Einstein III program, currently being used by at least 13 Federal agencies.

For an excellent discussion on Gated Communities and their roles in Security and Crime Prevention, please see "Public Places, Urban Spaces" by Matthew Carmona. Carmona's book is not primarily about Gated Communities, but rather about the decisions that should be considered as urban spaces are planned or designed.

Carmona argues that the design or an Urban Space should be seen in the context of Local, Global, Market, and Regulatory considerations, and must then take into consideration issues in the categories of Morphological, Perceptual, Social, Visual, Functional, and Temporal considerations.

The disadvantages that are primarily brought up with regard to the creation of Gated Communities typical begins by speaking about class segregation, and the annexation of previously public property to be used for the advantage of a relatively small subsection of the society which paid to create it. Even when the now segregated resources are granted "public use" during the day, privacy concerns commonly expressed about "surveillance societies" may cause some citizens to hesitate to visit these resources.

It strikes me that very few of Carmona's design processes were taken into account as the Trusted Internet Connection program began. For example, Perceptual Considerations -- will my Internet visits to government provided web resources now be monitored in a more comprehensive way? Will Einstein be learning and recording my interactions with the government similar to the Gated Community security guard who asks the name of the person I am visiting before allowing my vehicle to enter the GC?

What message should the rest of the Internet take from the decision by the Federal government that the way to be safe on the Internet is to restrict public access to a few carefully monitored Internet points of presence? As a practicing designer of network security considerations, I have to agree that the theory is strong. One of the first exercises I engage in with a client is to identify all possible paths in and out of their network, and what methods of securing and monitoring each of those paths are currently in use.

But how should this message play with the responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security to protect our Nation's Critical Infrastructures? Prior to the creation of DHS, a multi-agency partnership administered by the FBI existed under the auspices of the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). The NIPC Watch & Warn desk was the fastest single place to check about the status of any threat to our Nation's Critical Infrastructures, including the Cyber infrastructure. Now for Cyber matters we have US-CERT.


The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) is a partnership between the Department of Homeland Security and the public and private sectors. Established in 2003 to protect the nation's Internet infrastructure, US-CERT coordinates defenses against and responses to cyber attacks across the nation.
Source: http://www.us-cert.gov/aboutus.html

Interestingly, the mission of US-CERT is *NOT* to protect Federal Agencies, but rather to protect "the nation's Internet infrastructure", the vast majority of which will be on the OUTSIDE of the wall being created by the Trusted Internet Connections initiative. The program is rolling forward, with the first contract being announced in December 18th's DHS Daily Report, which stated:

The General Services Administration announced on Monday that AT&T has been awarded the first contract to deliver secure Internet connections to federal agencies via the Networx Universal telecommunications program. AT&T will offer Managed Trusted Internet Protocol Services under the Office of Management and Budget’s Trusted Internet Connections initiative, announced in November 2007. The goal is to reduce the number of Internet connections in the federal government to fewer than 100 in 2009; the exact deadline has yet to be determined. “GSA has provided resources to assist the successful implementation of the TIC initiative and made information systems security a priority in their strategic plans,” said the OMB administrator for e-government and information technology. “Fewer external connections mean fewer vulnerabilities and better secured networks.” Networx Universal is an indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract vehicle with a ceiling of $48.1 billion over 10 years. Combined with Networx Enterprise, it is the federal government’s largest telecommunications program. AT&T’s latest offering will include a system to detect computer network intrusions as well as a security operations center to protect agencies’ networks. GSA still is evaluating secure Internet connection proposals from Verizon and Qwest Communications, the other two vendors on Networx Universal.

(the DHS report quotes: http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20081216_1938.php Gautham Nagesh)

What does this strategy mean for the rest of us? As with the Gated Communities, one of the disadvantages is the issue that those of us OUTSIDE the gates feel (or actually are!) disenfranchised. What does it mean for the Critical Infrastructures who are "outside the fence"? Should, for instance, the banking industry be looking into building their own Trusted Internet Connections program that only serves their industry? With price tags such as the one given above, it may be that only the government can afford to be secure. What does that say about the strategy as a means of protection ALL of us?

Wednesday, December 10, 2008

FTC Moves against Fake AntiVirus "ScareWare" companies

Microsoft may be getting all the press this month about Fake Antivirus products, but the Federal Trade Commission deserves some high praise as well. We'll get to the FTC stuff below, but first I wanted to mention that most of the press I've seen on the Microsoft announcement focused on Spectacular Big Numbers instead of focusing on the actual facts in their announcement.

Microsoft and Fake AV Products


During the first half of 2008, Microsoft removed almost 9 million copies of Win32/Zlob from infected computers - more than twice as many as any other threat. In their Security Intelligence Report 5 they described Zlob infections like this: "Once installed on the target computer, Zlob bombards the user with pop-up advertisements and fake 'spyware warnings' that are actually advertisements for rogue security software". An especially prevalent way to get Zlob during that times was to be prompted to install a missing Codec or Video player when visiting a site advertised by a spam message.

On November 19th, Microsoft announced that their Malicious Software Remove Tool could now remove the newest batch of fake antivirus products, and that in the first 9 days of the new release, they had removed 994,000 of these fake products, which they refer to collectively as Win32/FakeSecSen. The announcement came from the Microsoft Malware Protection Center's Threat Research & Response Blog, which revealed that 548,218 of those 944,061 machines were in the United States. For every 1,000 machines they scanned, five HAD BEEN infected with a fake Antivirus product.

Wait, HAD BEEN? Yes. The blog goes on to point out, that of those 944,061 machines which detected as infected, only 198,812 had an ACTIVE infection including the "main .exe". The other 700,000 or so had actually already had the infection declawed, either manually or by another anti-virus program, but residual files indicating the former infection were still present. In other words, the MILLION MACHINES CLEANED was really TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND MACHINES DISINFECTED, and EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND CLEANED UP A LITTLE BIT MORE THAN THEY ALREADY HAD BEEN. By comparison to that, the real danger may be Renos, where 565,000 machines were actually disinfected. But, what is Renos? Win32/Renos is another entire family of fake AV products. After the blog post was published, the Analysis section of the Win32/Renos entry was updated to say "On November 19th a signature for TrojanDropper:Win32/Renos.N started detected particular uninstall files. This incorrect detection affects users of all Microsoft Antivirus solutions." This was fixed in the December MSRT, but one has to wonder how many of the amazing number of Renos infections were due to this fake detection?

The most recent batch of fake products, covered by Win32/FakeSecSen, has a great collection of screen shots of the various fake products on the "Analysis" tab, including Micro Antivirus 2009, MS Antivirus, Spyware Preventer, Vista Antivirus 2008, Advanced Antivirus, System Antivirus 2008, Ultimate Antivirus 2008, Windows Antivirus, XPert Antivirus, and Power Antivirus.


Special Note:
Reports of rogue Antivirus programs have been more prevalent as of late. These are programs that generate misleading alerts and false detections in order to convince users to purchase illegitimate security software. Some of these programs, such as Trojan:Win32/Antivirusxp and Program:Win32/FakeRednefed may display product names or logos in an apparently unlawful attempt to impersonate Microsoft products. These products may represent themselves as “Antivirus XP”, “AntivirusXP 2008”, “WinDefender 2008”, “XP Antivirus”, or similar.

(from the Microsoft Malware Protection Center).

Earlier versions of MSRT also detected fake viruses, primarily under the names Win32/FakeXPA and Win32/SpySheriff, the former detecting mostly "Microsoft look-alike products" while the latter covered many of the first fake protection products, including BraveSentry, DiaRemover, MalwareAlarm, Mr. AntiSpy, PestTrap, PestWiper, SpyMarshal, SpySheriff, and SpyTrooper. An intermediary version was called Win32/FakeXPA.



The FTC and Fake AV



OK, with that as background, let's agree that millions of computers have been infected with various brands of fake security products and look at the FTC action.

On December 10th, the FTC released a Consumer Alert entitled:

"Free Security Scan" Could Cost Time and Money
Messages telling you to install and update security software for your computer seem to be everywhere. So you might be tempted by an offer of a “free security scan,” especially when faced with a pop-up, an email, or an ad that claims “malicious software” has already been found on your machine. Unfortunately, it’s likely that the scary message is a come-on for a rip-off.
The free scan claims to find a host of problems, and within seconds, you’re getting urgent pop-ups to buy security software. After you agree to spend $40 or more on the software, the program tells you that your problems are fixed. The reality: there was nothing to fix. And what’s worse, the program now installed on your computer could be harmful.
According to attorneys at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the nation’s consumer protection agency, scammers have found ways to create realistic but phony “security alerts.” Though the “alerts” look like they’re being generated by your computer, they actually are created by a con artist and sent through your Internet browser.

Click for the Full text of the FTC Consumer Alert as a PDF also available as an HTML version.

More importantly, they requested and received a temporary restraining order from the
U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. In this action, they have accused five people of running two companies that are responsible for most of these fake products, and a sixth of receiving funds from the scam.

Under the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), the Federal Trade Commission is in charge of enforcing the prohibition against "deceptive or unfair acts or practices in or affecting commerce. As part of that enforcement the FTC has the right to "secure such equitable relief as may be appropriate in each case, including restitution for injured consumers, consumer redress, and disgorgement" 15 U.S.c. § 53(b).

The companies being targeted here are:

"Innovative Marketing", a company incorporated in Belize, with offices in Kiev, Ukraine, who has done business as Billingnow, BillPlanet PTE Ltd., Globedat, Innovative Marketing Ukraine, Revenue Response, Sunwell, Synergy Software BV, Winpayment Consultancy SPC, Winsecure Solutions, and Winsolutions FZ-LLC.

and

"Bytehosting Internet Services", an LLC registered in Ohio with an office at 3864 McMann Road, Suite A, Cincinnati, Ohio.

The charge is that their business practice was "a massive Internet-based scheme that tricks consumers into purchasing computer security software" which exploited consumers' "legitimate concerns about Internet-based threats like spyware and viruses by issuing false security or privacy warnings to consumers for the sole purpose of selling software to fix the imagined problem". After running a simulated "Free scan", the software would claim to have detected "a host of malicious or otherwise dangerous files and programs, including viruses, spyware, or illegal pornography", and encourage the consumer to download their product to fix it. The downloaded products would run another scan, and then urge the consumer to spend $39.95 to solve the problem by buying "the full version".

"MORE THAN ONE MILLION CONSUMERS HAVE PURCHASED THE DEFENDANT'S SOFTWARE PRODUCTS TO CURE THEIR COMPUTERS OF THE NON-EXISTENT PROBLEMS "DETECTED" BY THE DEFENDANT'S FAKE SCANS!!!!!"
(emphasis, and all those nice "!!!!!" added by the blogger)

These guys are the ones who have been making the money, all the way back to 2003, selling products including but not limited to WinFixer, WinAntivirus, DriveCleaner, WinAntiSpyware, ErrorProtector, ErrorSafe, SystemDoctor, AdvancedCleaner, Antivirus XP, XP Antivirus 2008, etc.

While most of us know these products as they are delivered by viruses, the defendants actually paid for advertising as well. Just one of the defendants purchased $3.3 million in advertisments from the MyGeek network (now known as AdOn) between October 2004 and November 2006. The ads were displayed more than 680 million times!

After MyGeek began refusing to run their ads, the defendants created their own fake advertising groups, such as Burn Ads, Preved Marketing, AdTraff, NetMediaGroup, and Uniqads, which they sold to websites offering a share of the advertising revenue. These fake advertising companies began to approach sites, claiming they represented legitimate sites that wanted to place advertisements, including CareerBuilder.com, Frontgate, Travelocity.com, Priceline.com, and other sites. The ads which were displayed, when viewed from IP addresses belonging to their business partners, always showed ads for the legitimate companies, but when viewed by outside IP addresses, the ads for their fake scanners were displayed.

Believing themselves to be doing business with legitimate advertising companies, the ads found their way to places such as Major League Baseball and National Hockey League sites, the National Association of Realtors, the Economist magazine, and others.

The defendants are:

James Reno (Bytehosting), who ran "setupahost.net". Reno provided contracts with some of these ad-distribution vendors, ran Bytehosting, and provided the Call Center which supposedly took tech support calls about their products. Part of the call center's job was to obstruct and delay consumers from obtaining refunds by misleading them about the nature of the scan, or telling them a refund had already been issued to them, when it had not. Almost all of Bytehosting's revenue came from Innovative Marketing.

Sam Jain (Innovative Marketing), who resided in California. Jain is the CEO of Innovative Marketing, and co-founded the company in 2002. A large financial investor in the company, Jain handled much of the marketing and sales, and worked out the relationship with companies to take their credit card payments.

Daniel Sundin (Innovative Marketing), who resided in London, England. Sundin ran Vantage Software and Winsoftware, Ltd. He was also the COO and is now CTO of Innovative Marketing. He set up the company headquarters in Kiev, and also opened facilities in Argentina and India. His old company, Vantage Software, paid for many of the original domain names, such as Winfixer.com, DriveCleaner.com, WinAntivirus.com, and SystemDoctor.com. The foreign banking is handled by Sundin.

Marc D'Souza (Innovative Marketing), who resided in Toronto, Canada. D'Souza ran Web Integrated Net Solutions. D'Souza took over the role of working on the credit card payment processor relationships. He and his father Maurice established numerous merchant accounts with payment processors around the world to clear their cards, which was hard to maintain because of the very high level of chargebacks and complaints from consumers. Marc and his father each retained "millions of dollars in proceeds" in their bank accounts. They are no longer associated with Innovative Marketing and are the subject of a lawsuit in Canada where Innovative Marketing claims they have embezzled millions of their dollars.

Kristy Ross (Innovative Marketing), who resided in Maryland. Ross was the marketing person, responsible for placing millions of dollars worth of false and misleading advertisements. Despite warnings on multiple occasions that the ads were exploitive and deceitful, she continued to place these ads.

Maurice D'Souza, who resided in Ontario, Canada and received "ill-gotten funds" from his son Marc (see above).

The FTC action includes a "Prayer for Relief" which requests that the court award "such relife as necessary to redress injury to consumers resulting from the Defendants' violations of the FTC Act, including but not limited to, rescission or reformation of contracts, restitution, the refund of monies paid, and the disgorgement of ill-gotten monies." They also ask that they protect and return funds and property that the defendants have in their possession or have purchased as a result of their ill-gotten gains or proceeds.

For more details on the case, please see:

http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723137/index.shtm

which includes links to the:

Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order
and
Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relife

Tuesday, December 09, 2008

Securing Cyberspace in the 44th Presidency: Part Two

Yesterday I provided some context for the Center for Strategic and International Studies report which was published yesterday:

Security Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency

The co-chairs of the committee, which was directed by James Lewis, were:
Representative James R. Langevin
Representative Michael T. McCaul
Scott Charney, Microsoft
Lt. General Harry Raduege, USAF (Ret)

I'll leave the interested reader to read the full list of committee members from Appendix A, but I was pleased to see many active voices for Cybersecurity and Information Sharing among them, including many that I met through InfraGard! Just to name a few, Peter Allor (who was presenting at an InfraGard National Conference when I met him, the day ISS became IBM ISS), Jerry Dixon, former NCSD for DHS and now the VP of Government Relations for InfraGard, Greg Rattray, who was the Director for Cyber Security on the White House National Security Council staff before there even was a DHS (and an advisor to InfraGard's National Board), Tom Kellerman (a New York InfraGard member) who worked closely with the World Bank, Paul Kurtz, Marcus Sachs of SANS Internet Storm Center (and Verizon), Phyllis Schneck who has been active in InfraGard for more than my own seven years, Michael Vatis, who led the NIPC back when InfraGard was partnered with their National Infrastructure Protection Center efforts, Amit Yoran, who was the original NCSD, and spoke at the June 2004 InfraGard National Conference.

The report consists of seven major chapters, which are bookended by the concept that we are in a Hidden War, and that we need to WIN the Hidden War.

The Introduction compares our current status to "the invisible struggle" between Britain and Germany over Ultra and Enigma.

The United States is in a similar situation today, but we are not playing the role of the British. Foreign opponents, through a combination of skill, luck, and perseverance, have been able to penetrate poorly protected U.S. computer networks and collect immense quantities of valuable information. Although the most sensitive U.S. military communications remain safe, economic competitors and potential military opponents have easy access to military technology, intellectual property of leading companies, and government data. These potential opponents have not hesitated to avail themselves of the opportunities presented by poor cybersecurity.

America's failure to protect cyberspace is one of the most urgent national security problems facing the new administration that will take office in January 2009. It is, like Ultra and Enigma, a battle fought mainly in the shadows. It is a battle we are losing.


Summary of Recommendations




  • Create a Comprehensive National Security Strategy for Cyberspace
    • Presidential statement that cyberspace is a vital asset and that the United States will protect it
    • Create a National Office for Cyberspace (NOC) within the Executive Office of the President
    • Open discussion on how best to secure cyberspace


  • Organizing for Cybersecurity
    • Establish a Cybersecurity Directorate in the National Security Council
    • Support same from the new NOC, which should absort the National Cyber Security Center and Joint Inter-Agency Cyber Task Force
    • NOC assumes additional responsibilities, including FISMA
    • Three new Public-private advisory groups
    • Continue DHS US-CERT relationships with all federal agencies


  • Rebuilding Partnership with the Private Sector
    • creation of three new public-private agencies

  • Regulate for Cybersecurity
    • Task the NOC to work with appropriate regulatory agencies to secure critical cyber infrastructures


  • Secure Industrial Control Systems and SCADA
    • NOC should work with NIST to develop Industrial Control System standards
    • NOC should continue to to determine the extent of government-owned infrastructures security from cyber attack


  • Use Acquisitions Rules to Improve Security
    • NOC and CIO Council development and implement security guidelines for IT procurement
    • NSA and NIST should reform National Information Assurance Partnership
    • Secure Internet protocol use should be increased.


  • Manage Identities
    • US should make strong authentication, including "robust in-person proofing" mandatory for critical cyber infrastructures
    • US should allow use of strong goverment-issued credentials for online activities
    • FTC should protect consumers by requiring businesses to use strong credentials for online activities
    • government agencies not using HSPD-12 compliant credentials after one year should have bonuses or awards restricted

  • Modernize Authorities
    • DOJ should reexamine statutes governing online crime and investigations to increase clarity, speed investigations, and better protect privacy
    • the Attorney General should issue guidelines for cyber incident response by law enforcement, military, or intelligence authorities.

  • Revise FISMA
    • Congress should rewrite FISMA to use performance-based measurements of security

  • End the Division Between Civilian and National Security Systems
    • legislation should be proposed that adopts risk-based approach to all federal computer security

  • Conduct Training for Cyber Education and Workforce Development
    • NOC and OPM should create training programs and career paths to enhance the federal cyber workforce and work with NSF to develop national education programs

  • Conduct Research and Development for Cybersecurity
    • NOC and Office of Science and Technology Policy should provide overall consideration of cybersecurity R&D. The US should increase its investment in longer-term R&D designed to create a more secure cyber ecosystem.



A summary at the beginning of the report gives 25 recommendations.

One of the recommendations is DO NOT START OVER.

"Let us be clear on the Bush administration's Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI): It is good but not sufficient. The next administration should not start over; it should adopt the initial efforts of the initiative, but it should not consider it adequate."

Regarding DHS, the report states:

We had a long and impassioned debate within the Commission over DHS's roles and responsibilities. Many felt that leaving any cyber function at DHS would doom that function to failure. ... The nature of our opponents, the attacks we face in cyberspace, and the growing risk to national and economic security mean that comprehensive cybersecurity falls outside the scope of DHS's competencies. DHS is not the agency to lead in a conflict with foreign intelligence agencies or militaries or even well-organized international cyber criminals.

Security cyberspace is no longer an issue defined by homeland security or critical infrastructure protection. This is far too narrow a scope.


As a Computer Forensics Researcher, of course I appreciated the call in the section "Expand and Focus Research and Development for Cybersecurity"
The federal government plans to spend about $143 billion in 2009 on R&D. We estimate that two-tenths of 1 percent of that will go to cybersecurity. To put this in context, the president's fiscal year 2009 budget requests $29.3 billion for life science research, $4.4 billion for earth and space science, $3.2 billion for the Advanced Energy Initiative, $2.0 billion for the Climate Change Science Program, and $1.5 billion for nanotechnology. The National Information Technology R&D (NITRD) programs will receive $3.5 billion. Cybersecurity R&D will receive about $300 million.


The report recognizes that many others, including the new Comprehensive National Cyber Initiative, have called for an increase in Cyber Security Research funding, but points out that much of what we have at NITRD "exists largely as a passive compilation of R&D activities by the NSF and various funding agencies rather than a driver of an agreesive research agenda."