Tuesday, May 02, 2023

Mirror Trading International's Cornelius Johannes Steynberg and his $3.4 Billion USD Default Judgement

Some of you may have heard that students in UAB's Investigating Online Crimes class have been researching Crypto Investment Scam websites.  You can find a list of some of the sites we've identified so far on URLScan.io using our tag "CryptoScam" (as of this writing we have 3600+ sites on the list -- hosting companies and registrars, please take action!) 

Mirror Trading International and a $3.4 Billion Fine

You may have never heard of the U.S. Government agency, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, but that doesn't mean they don't have power.  Last week the CFTC announced an order of default judgment against Cornelius Johannes Steynberg of Stellenbosch, Western Cape, South Africa. The order states that Steynberg must pay $1,733,838,372 USD in restitution and an additional $1,733,838,372 as a civil monetary penalty for defrauding 23,000 Americans of 29,421 Bitcoin.  (That's $3.4 Billion USD, or R63.6 Billion South African Rand.)

I'm proud to say that this action was brought in part by the Alabama Securities Commission, who joined Texas, North Carolina, and Mississippi in taking action.  I've met their director (who just retired this week! Thank you Joe Borg for 30 years of service!) and some of their investigators and they fight hard to protect the citizens of Alabama from fraud. 

Mirror Trading International claimed that their members could earn 10% per month in interest on their investments.  A typical ad of theirs boasted of this advantage over traditional bank accounts and other investment vehicles: 




Ponzi Scam or Affiliate Program: Tomato / Tomato

Like many other Crypto Investment Scams, MTI was an affiliate program.  MTI encouraged members to create an account, after which they would be granted an affiliate code. By sharing a link to the main MTI website using their affiliate code, anyone who clicked the link and made an investment would begin generating "passive weekly income" to the member. 

Dozens of webpages, Telegram channels, and Facebook pages were filled with ads claiming how easy it was to earn money.  Here's one that was shared on a Facebook page operated by affiliate "Themba2000." 


This affiliate regularly posted updates supposedly showing how much money they were earning, as well as testimonials where the people they had recruited supposedly thanked them for their newfound financial freedom:



Like many other Crypto Investment Scams, the affiliates were encouraged to share videos claiming that Artificial Intelligence-based training was part of the secret of their success: 


South Africa's Court Order Outlines a Problem: Greed

While the terms of the South African court order against MTI may seem like victim-shaming, Greed is truly one of the factors involved in many of these Crypto Investment Scams.




"People all over the world, and South Africans are no exception, are bewitched and fascinated by any idea or scheme promising, in most cases, instant wealth, new homes, new cars, holidays abroad and all material possessions that can be acquired with an abundance of money. A further attraction of these schemes is the perception that the money will keep rolling in with little or no effort by the participants, the hardest part being to count one's money." 

The conclusion of that case summarized their findings as follows: 

[137] MTI's business clearly amounted to an unlawful ponzi-scheme, i.e. a fraudulent investing scam promising high rates of return to investors and generating returns for earlier investors with investments taken from later investors. 

[138] It would appear that there is no pool of member bitcoin, Trade 300 does not exist, the artificial intelligence bot never existed or traded and the remarkable trading results presented to investors were prima facie false. 

(ordered by A De Wet, Acting Judge of the High Court) 

What?  The AI Magic Bitcoin Genie isn't real?  I'm shocked!

Scammers or Victims:  Why Not Both? 

Unfortunately, many of the people who became involved in the scam are innocent victims while others made fake Facebook accounts in order to scam others into signing up.  As long as they signed up others, they had a good chance of making money, until the whole scheme collapsed.  It took about five minutes to find fifty affiliates with a simple Facebook search:


So will everyone get their money back?  Highly unlikely. 

Steynberg Arrested in Brazil

Mr. Steynberg was arrested in 2022 by the Brazilian Military Police of the state of Goias: 

Assurances from MTI CEO Steynberg: I am not a Ponzi Scheme!

When Mirror Trading was first accused of being a Ponzi Scheme by the Texas Securities Commission, their CEO replied to queries using a form letter like this one, shared by Global Crypto in a story called "MTI Announces It Is Working With the FSCA": 

Dear Kratika,

I unfortunately only received your email this morning, Tuesday 14 July 2020.

As I have declared to the Texas Commissioner in writing, I wish to state and declare from the outset that Mirror Trading International (Pty) Ltd (hereinafter referred to as “MTI”), a privately held company registered in the Republic of South Africa, is not a Ponzi scheme (new money feeding old) or a scam, with which a holder of funds suddenly disappears.

It is also most unfortunate that because MTI is operating in the online passive income building industry, which has a notorious and demonstrated reputation for scams and Ponzi schemes, and, due to the nature and Modus-Operandi of the robust MTI referral-based business model, that MTI is automatically by default behaviour of the media and some regulators, and maybe the behaviours of some members, is being perceived by associative conclusion that MTI is but another of these.

This unfortunate and misinformed perception is far from the reality of what MTI is as a newly formed (15 month old) highly innovative referral-business and brand that the founders would like to see growing over many years into a global, iconic and heritage brand in the market trading sector.

For instance, the Texas Commissions states that …The actual value of the commissions depends on their success in recruiting new investors and multilevel marketers. … While this may apply to Ponzi schemes, this is not correct for MTI.

Daily trading returns using top regulated trading brokers determine the quantum of rewards, which can vary and if there is a negative trading day, there are no rewards. The point is that with MTI, that the funding of MTI referral payments is derived from daily trading profits and not from the funds of new members.

Another important point which differentiates MTI from Ponzi’s and scams is that members have full control over their funds (Bitcoin) at all times. Members are able to add or withdraw their funds (Bitcoin) at any time, with no complications and no fees. If you do research, you will find not a single member of the 75,000+ MTI members worldwide has ever complained or not been able to withdraw their BTC whenever they have opted to.  

It is the aim of MTI and its innovative, unique referral-based business model and MTI’s operating Modus Operandi of trading on world markets to generate real growth and returns on a daily basis, to work with and co-operate with regulators in every regard, in the process of taking MTI along a path that will see MTI fully and properly regulated.
There are three reasons for this.

1. My Founding Vision for MTI: Build a preferred iconic and heritage global brand in the financial services sector that delivers sustainable growth and value creation for all stakeholders, including for the little man in the street:
2. Professional and Compliant:  Ensure that MTI is a professionally managed business and brand that is regulatory compliant and which delivers sustainable growth and value creation for all stakeholders. My team and I are committed to this.
3. Change the reputation of the on-line passive income generating industry: We and myself personally, are extremely tired of this industry having a negative and darkly clouded reputation. And yes, some 99.9% of online passive income building services are scams and  / or Ponzi’s. I am personally very driven to be part of changing this perception once and for all, by showing and demonstrating to regulators, to the media and to consumers that such a business model can on a Bona Fida basis, exist, successfully operate and grow on an organic and sustainable basis, which is what MTI is doing.

To this end, MTI will in the coming period be placing great emphasis on engaging with and working with any regulator with a clear purpose at all times;  be fully compliant as a professionally managed company and brand that delivers sustainable growth and value creation to its stakeholders, and which intends to be around for many years to come.

MTI is already in discussion with the South Africa Financial Services Conduct Authority (FSCA) and will be meeting with the FSCA in a week’s time. MTI is also fully committed to co-operating with the Texas State Securities board and is in correspondence with them on this matter.

We trust that the above gives you some insight into MTI.

Should you wish to correspond further, please use my private email address: [REDACTED]
Your sincerely,

Johann Steynberg
Chief Executive Officer
Mirror Trading International (Pty) Ltd
South Africa












Saturday, February 18, 2023

Watching a Crypto Investment Scam WhatsApp Group

If your online accounts are like mine, almost every day I'm "force joined" to a new Telegram group where a crypto investment scammer tries to tell everyone how great their scam investment site is. This week, I started getting added to WhatsApp Crypto Investment Scams. 

I thought I'd share the experience with you, in case you were curious. 

When you are Force-joined to a WhatsApp group, the first thing that is displayed is information about who added you to the group.


In my case, +856 20 29 725 893 created the group, and then I was added to the group by +856 20 29 728 289.  The +856 should be a clue to whether these are the advisors they claim to be, as +856 is the international calling code for Laos. A third Laos number then removes the group creator, another Laos administrator, and a South African adminstrator (+27 is South Africa).  They must have added a US-numbered administrator, (we don't see other people being added), because the +1 (346) number then changed the "Subject" of the group to be "BTC Nuggets 02th Team."   02th.  As in, the Second team created by a non-English speaker.  1st ... 02th ... 3rd? 

Then we get our first message from "Tricia Storti" our second theoretically American admin +1 (530), American.  See? (530 is the Area Code for extreme NorthEastern California.) 

Tricia's first post introduces our Crypto Investment Scam website name and begins the process of helping us all lose our money to "FileCoin" (or is it FILcoin? they can't seem to decide.)



But wait ... I didn't want to get a hundred WhatsApp messages a day from a new scammer.  That's ok ... all of Tricia's bot-controlled fake Americans are here to make you realize how special it is that you got added to the group.  They blather on non-stop about how great it is ... just so you might wonder (if you were a complete idiot), "Is it possible that I've been accidentally added to a WhatsApp Group that will teach me how to get rich trading Crypto Currency?" 


Seriously.  I can't believe they think anyone is stupid enough to fall for this ... but then I look at the BILLIONS OF DOLLARS being stolen in Crypto Investment Scams and realize they wouldn't spend all of this time and money doing this if somewhere it wasn't making them a profit. 

Just as you might be wondering, "But how will being in this group make me rich?" none other than the FOUNDER HIMSELF, the one and only BERNIE McTERNAN jumps into the conversation to explain how!


(In case you wondering if these were totally made up names, yes, they are. But they are based in reality.  McTernan occurs at a rate of 1 in every 519,000 people in the USA.  Storti is Italian.  1 in every 12,000 or so people there is named Storti.  1 in every 365,000 people in the USA.) 

But does it really work?  Well, our straight man "~ FKK" is going to ask the burning questions that are on every potential victim's mind ... and receive honest, trustworthy answers from current investor LOLO!


See?  LOLO has been in the game for 3 months "without finding anything wrong" and he can "withdraw money successfully every time!"  He's made $70,000 thanks to Bernie Analyst! 

You might still have doubts ... just like FKK!   "Wow is this true?"  But it isn't just totally real LOLO who has had great success.  Totally real totally unsolicited testimonial person Josh Perreault ALSO has made withdrawals successfully!  

Now we KNOW that it's real, right? Not you! You are too smart for that!  You're probably thinking "But I've never heard of these people!  What company is this?  Are they reputable?"  Funny that you are thinking this, because Totally Real Person Andrew Woolley is having those same doubts ... 


There you have it! Filecoin Foundation has been around since 2019, they are headquartered in London and have branches in the US, Vanuatu and Australia.  And look!  They even have an ID Number!  OOOOOOH!  Who could possibly doubt now??!?!?!

Totally Real Person JIJIT assures us that this is an American Company, and then FKK, our favorite Straight Man, asks for a website.  Conveniently, Tricia is there to demonstrate her excellent customer service by replying within two minutes!


FileCoinProtocol[.]com 

Oops!  Did NameSilo actually kill a fraud domain?  No, the scammers use "m.filecoinprotocol[.]com" as their primary site, so that if you try the domain name, or the "www" it will look like the site is unavailable. 


The Amazing Tricia-the-Scammer is right there with the answer! 

"BTC seconds contract is a two-way financial investment product. No matter which direction you buy, as long as you buy in the right direction, you can make a profit. The bitcoin second contract investment we currently trade is suitable for all types of investors, whether you are a novice or an experienced investor. Each transaction lasts 180seconds. After 180 seconds, if the analyst's investment forecast is correct, you can make an immediate profit." 

But why would they do that?  For a commission ... nothing suspicious here ... these Totally Real People explain it to each other:

And eventually, after much more banter, the TRADING starts!  Tricia gives our first instruction, and our Totally Real Veteran Trader Josh jumps right in!  (Perhaps not realizing we've already killed the website.) 


All of the Totally Real People quickly share their successful profits!

 


But, there is one little problem ... 



If ONLY ADMINS can send messages, then, NONE OF THE TOTALLY REAL PEOPLE CAN BE REAL PEOPLE!  

But that doesn't stop us having more imaginary conversations to demonstrate how trustworthy things are.  Tricia had some exciting news today ... VIP Traders don't have to pay the 20% commission!  They keep ALL OF THE MONEY!  (But there is a $10,000 minimum investment, of course) 



How big is the group?  In addition to the 237 current members, there are also (if you choose Group Info and scroll ALL THE WAY DOWN), over 550 "Past Participants" (with all of their telephone numbers exposed as well.)


Those are the people who were Force-Joined to the group and then LEFT the group.  Hopefully they remember to hit "REPORT AND EXIT" so that WhatsApp's team knows these guys are scammers!

For our "Actors" in the play above, none of their telephone numbers correspond to a real phone carrier, except Bernie, who uses T-Mobile. 


Bernie = 346.971.2587 = T-Mobile 
Tricia = 530.435.9207 = Peerless-NSR-ATLC
Josh = 903.636.6515 = Sinch Voice-NSR-10X
Shannon = 438.577-5300 = IXICA Communications 
JIJIT = 873.920.8211 = IXICA Communications
LOLO = 403.694.7067 = ISP Telecom 
Zachary Brook = 343578.0586 = ISP Telecom 
FKK = 985.775.6255 = Sinch Voice NSR 
Andrew = 716.502.2145 = Sinch Voice NSR 
Kevin = 937.966.2921 = Sinch Voice NSR 

Sure would be sad if all of those telephone numbers and WhatsApp numbers were terminated ... 











Thursday, January 05, 2023

SIM Swapping, Crypto Theft, and Sentencing in the United States

As you know from the title of my blog, "CyberCrime & Doing Time," I'm very interested in cybercrime and the criminal justice system. This week I've been looking at SIM Swapping cases and wanted to share what I learned from reading the sentencing memos sentencing transcript for Ricky Handschumacher.

Ricky was one of the members of "The Community" - a group of six OGUsers/HackForums punks who decided to go into the crypto theft business. They haunted crypto community forums gathering data on people who over-shared about their crypto earnings and then did the social media intelligence (SOCMINT) work to id their target, assess their holdings, get their online credentials, and then pay a phone company contractor or employee to SIM Swap their device and steal their crypto.

They stole over $50 Million dollars.

Ricky was the last guy to get sentenced.  The other members of the group (not their phone store patsies, but the core group) were: 

  • Conor Freeman, 20, of Dublin, Ireland.  Conor was sentenced to three years in Ireland.
  • Colton Jurisic, 20, of Dubuque, Iowa. He was sentenced to 42 months and restitution in the amount of $9,517,129.
  • Reyad Gafar Abbas, 19, of Rochester, New York.  He was sentenced to 24 months and restitution in the amount of $310,791.
  • Garrett Endicott, 21, of Warrensburg, Missouri.  He was sentenced to 10 months and restitution in the amount of $121,549.
  • Ryan Stevenson, 26, of West Haven, Connecticut.  He got two years probation.  Minor player.

Ricky pleads guilty to a single count of "18 USC § 1349 - Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud" and in exchange the court agrees to drop several additional charges of: 
18 USC §§ 1343 and 2 - Wire Fraud, Aiding and Abetting 
18 USC §§ 1028A(a)(1) and 2 - Aggravated Identity Theft, Aiding and Abetting

Anyway, Guilty plea is received, family all lines up to say what a good boy Ricky is, blah blah blah, and how he was such a good boy while he was out on bond.

Sentencing Guidelines 

Here's how our sentencing Guidelines work ...

The base crimes each have a number of "sentencing points" that they are assigned.  Then there are a whole host of modifications that can be applied based on other factors.  This score is then further modified by how many prior criminal convictions the individuals have.

Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud has a base score of 7.  With no criminal history, that would give a sentence of 0-6 months. But that would be a crime with no victims, no losses, and the most basic conspiracy.  All of the other factors add points. 

The following modifications are then applied.

+2 - the number of victims matter.  In this case, they are charging "ten or more victims." 

Ricky's score is now a 9.  Sentencing guideline: 4-10 months.

+2 - sophisticated means. Because this was a high-tech crime with a lot of technology and a lot of moving parts.

Ricky's score is now an 11.  Sentencing guideline: 8-14 months. 

+2 illicit authentication.  To curb identity theft and the flippant use of stolen credentials, crimes that involve stolen identities get an automatic +2. 

Ricky's score is now a 13.  Sentencing guideline: 12-18 months.

+18 - Theft of between $3.5 million and $9.5 million.  The two greatest "adjustments" in the sentencing world are Number of Victims, and Amount Stolen. This is a huge modification, however, they stole a lot of money!  Many victims lined up to say they lost 100% of their life savings.  One of them even appeared at the Sentencing hearing and said so.  He told the court he had lost everything, and had been waiting FOUR YEARS for justice to be served.  It definitely needs consideration.  

Ricky's score is suddenly a 31.  108-135 months.  That's 9 to 11 years.

-3 - Because Ricky was cooperative and accepted responsibility for his crimes, apologizing to the court and to the victims, his sentencing guideline score is dropped by three points.  That's huge, actually.

Ricky's score is now 28.  78-97 months. 

In their sentencing memo, the prosecution says they would be happy to accept the "mid-point" of that range and asks for an 88 month sentence.

The Judge Speaks

The judge in this case is The Honorable Denise Page Hood in the Eastern District of Michigan.  I appreciate that she puts a great deal of explanation in before rendering her verdict.  She shares with us each of the things she is charged with considering as she builds her decision on what sentence to impose.  All of the following is quoted from the Sentencing Transcript available on PACER, although the emphasis added is mine.  

1. "The factors I'm supposed to consider are these: The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the Defendant, and I'm satisfied that, while I don't think that -- well, I think the age of the other individuals involved really didn't have anything to do with you. What it really has to do with is whether or not you were a more mature person and maybe should have had some other indication of this wrongdoing and made a better judgment than someone who perhaps is still young and a bit naive might be. Like I know one of the people, I was convinced that person was much more naive than other individuals involved in this. You, however, aren't one of those.


"I have here also that I think that the nature and circumstances the offense are serious, because there's a lot of money stolen, and it's stolen from individuals who, number one, are unsuspecting, and, number two, some of them are like Mr. S.S., who is here in court today, that this was not, you know, some organization or anything. It was an individual and their personal money, their, as he describes it, his life savings that were involved, and I think that makes it a little bit different than stealing from a company that might have some other means of recovering that than an individual. I'm also satisfied that it seemed like kind of a we're going to go out there and just do these things. We're just going to hack. We don't have any sense of caring very much, until it's over, about people who might be involved in this and where the money might be coming from and where it might go, and so, to some extent, on the part of everybody involved, it seemed like it was kind of a relaxed look at what you were doing and just kind of like a greed thing. I mean it wasn't -- particularly in your case, it wasn't that you were destitute or anything. You had some education, and you had the ability to have a job. So it wasn't that you couldn't go out and make money on your own, and that is kind of the nature of these kind of things, but I think it's a very serious offense in this particular scheme of things.

2. I'm also to look at the history and characteristics of the Defendant, and, for that, I would note that in the scheme of people who come into court,  you're on the young end of that. You may not think you are, but you really are on the young end of those people who commit crimes within our system.

I'm satisfied that you had a decent childhood. I had some notes here that you were and athlete and well-integrated into your experiences as a youth, and, also, that, unlike some other people, you did not seem to be someone who was just, you know, isolating themselves and unliked by others and, therefore, kind of a person who might reach out to do something like this because of a bad situation that they were in. Not that that excuses that behavior, which is exactly what I told them, that it doesn't excuse that behavior.

I'm also satisfied that -- I don't know whether it's better or worse that there are hackers out there that don't know one another, and maybe that adds a little bit to the frivolousness and the unaccountability of it relative to one another. Otherwise, I don't think there's anything in your history or characteristics that is a negative to you. I had one thing I wanted to note here. Okay, I wanted to note that it does not appear that you have any physical problems or that you have any mental health diagnosis or received any mental health treatment. It does not appear that you have any substance abuse problems.

It appears that you graduated from high school and that you were able to have some employment, including an employment from July of 2019, on Paragraph 44, until – at least at the time that this report was written, and that prior to that, that you have worked -- you had been unemployed for a time but that you were also employed by the city of Port Richey, and, prior to that, in a grocery store, and for the short period of time that you've been an adult, that's a significant amount, as far as I'm concerned, of employment.

The other thing I want to say is thatI'm to consider whether or not the sentence that I'm going to craft will reflect the seriousness of the offense. I've already spoken to that. Promotes respect for the law and provides just punishment, and I'm sure that you're aware now of the seriousness of the offense. That may be enough to promote respect for the law. I don't know that. You know, I don't know that in these particular kind of instances whether people look at it and say, you know, I've been involved in this. It was easy. I just happened to get caught. I'm never going to get caught again because of the nature of how this is done and how hard it is to investigate and to find out what each person involved in it is doing. So I don't know that my sentence will promote respect for the law, but at least I have taken it into consideration.

I'm also to fashion a sentence that provides just punishment, and I know that in all of the cases during the pandemic, where people have been on bond, they have noted I've been, you know, really good, in quotes, on pretrial release, and that shows that I am rehabilitated, and, to some extent, that may be true. To the other extent, the opportunity was that you would not be on pretrial release and you would be in custody where everyone else is attempting to get out of custody because of Covid-19. So I see that people would be, to a very great extent, well-behaved on pretrial release at this time, especially when they don't want to be incarcerated. So I don't give that a lot of weight. I know it's a long time to wait, but I'm sure it is far less onerous conditions than if you were waiting in jail to be able to proceed.

5. I'm also to consider whether or not I will afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and I recognize that this may have been an opportunistic crime, but it's still illegal. You still have to answer for it, and some of it, the deterrence, I think, is not only deterring yourself, meaning that something happens to you that makes you not want to do this ever again even if you think the opportunity to be caught is very small, and it's going to become less small. The Government is going to get better at uncovering this type of crime and uncovering it earlier, but I also think that we deter others by letting them know that we're not going to just let this kind of crime go unaddressed


6. I'm also to fashion a sentence that protects the public from the further crimes of the  Defendant, and I will do that in this case by requiring, since it's your first contact with law enforcement, and to some extent the presentence report indicates it's a deviation from your otherwise law-abiding life, that you will have to participate in the Computer Internet Monitoring Program for the entire time that you're connected to the Court by being incarcerated, if you're put in a halfway house, or while you're on supervised release, and you'll have to abide by that agreement, which addresses all of the computers to which you would have any contact, okay, and it allows them to not only search but at reasonable times and places, but to also be for you to provide other people using the computers with the understanding if you're using their computer, it's subject to search as well.

 
7. I'm to fashion a sentence that provides you with needed education and vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner, and it does not appear that you're unhealthy, or, as I said, have any mental health or substance abuse concerns. I know you have a high school diploma, and you have had some employment that's consistent with that, and so I would note that you should have the opportunity to engage in any programs that you think are beneficial to you to enhance that, but I don't have any that I'm going to particularly point out.

8. I also have to consider the kinds of sentences available, and that is the 78 to 97 months of incarceration, and that it will be followed by a term of supervised release, and I'm also to consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records having been found guilty of similar kinds of conduct, and I have these other codefendants, all of whom seem to have various roles in conducting this conspiracy, and I think that my sentence will reflect how I think the various roles and the history and characteristics and other factors have impacted those people, all of whom, so far, have received a sentence that is below the guideline range. 

9. I'm also to consider the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense, and I am going to order a restitution against you relative to this. I will also recommend that the amount that you're forfeiting go against the restitution, but, you know, part of it is that, you know, the amount of restitution is really high, and I think it's really difficult for anybody, although you're a young person and so are the others, to pay back seven-and-a-half-million dollars. That's a tremendous amount of money, and the amount that it is apparent that you're forfeiting doesn't really approach that. It doesn't approach $7 million, and so, you know, the Court is always wondering what happened to the money that was stolen away from people and whether or not people have spent it or they hid it away, especially if there's nothing really apparent. There is, in some cases, something apparent to show for it, but I have considered that as well.

I've said in the other sentences, because in the other instances, people also ask for  noncustodial sentences, that I don't think that a noncustodial sentence is appropriate in these cases. I mean we think, kind of like we do in other kinds of cyber crimes, that you don't see what's happening. It's not done with some -- it's not like you went in and robbed a place where some people were standing there and you had to deal with the actual people that you might be stealing the money from, or had to confront an actual bank teller who might be afraid or anything like this. This is kind of done on your own on the computer. You don't really have any real people in front of you. It's not maybe very -- it does not seem very personal to the people committing the crime, but it's really personal against the people that the crime is committed, and so I don't think that a noncustodial sentence is appropriate.  Even with the halfway house and the like, I don't think it's appropriate, and I think you can tell that from the other sentences that I've imposed.

The Sentence

And, therefore -- but I should also say that I think the 78 to 97 months is driven, as many as of these monetary crimes are, by the amounts of loss, and I think, in this particular instance, where I have people before me and you who don't have prior serious offenses or any offenses at all, that I give credit for that in most other instances of fashioning a sentence, and the credit for it actually goes to the amount of time that you have to be incarcerated usually, and I don't see any reason why I shouldn't do that in this particular instance. In all of these instances, I think I have before me people who have the ability to do one of two things. They can grow and become productive members of society and attempt to pay back the victims the money that was, you know, secretly stolen from them and computers used to do that, and, therefore, I think that a sentence within the guideline range is too much for the charges that I'm presented with here for the reasons that I've stated.

 
And, therefore, with respect to Count 1 of the indictment, pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the Court, having considered the advisory guidelines and the factors contained in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a), commits the Defendant to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a term of 48 months. And, upon release from imprisonment, the Defendant will be placed on supervised release for a term of three years. 


... I'm ordering that you pay that restitution to the clerk of the court for disbursement to the victims identified below in the amounts below for a combined restitution order of $7,681,570.03, which is due immediately. While on supervised release, payments must be made at a rate and schedule determined by the probation department, approved by the Court, and they are going to these victims:
Victim with initials D.M. in the amount of $116,387.12;
Mr. S.S. in the amount of $1,967,146.57;
And S.B. in the amount of $5,598,036.34.

Thoughts on Sentencing 

I am always frustrated when judges choose to depart from the recommended sentence, especially in a way that I feel does not take cybercrime seriously.  As we look at the rationale behind the sentence though, I think it boils down to this:


In the world of Big Crypto and with the pathetic security in place that means a kid in a phone shop can facilitate a $5.5 Million theft, how do we balance the trivial means of stealing that money with the fact that someone's life savings have been destroyed?

In this case, restitution will start with the fact that Ricky is giving up 38 BTC and 900 Ethereum from what he stole.  At the time of this writing that is about $1.8 Million.  How is a kid with a high school degree and a criminal record going to pay back the other $5.8 Million?  He's not.  The parole board will come up with a garnishment of future wages, but if he ends up in a minimum wage job, that is likely to be repaid at a rate of $100 per month, so the victims will get the rest of their money slowly over the next four thousand eight hundred years or so.

I would really like to hear your thoughts on this.  Feel free to comment below.  Thank you!

Monday, September 19, 2022

The new DOJ Law Enforcement Crypto Reports (TL;DR)

TL;DR? Good news!  I read them for you! 

 On 15SEP2022, the Department of Justice released their report "The Role of Law Enforcement in Detecting, Investigating, and Prosecuting Criminal Activity Related to Digital Assets" (66 pages).  The first of the nine reports ordered by President Biden's Executive Order 14067 "Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital Assets" was also released by the DOJ back on 06JUN2022, "How To Strengthen International Law Enforcement Cooperation for Detecting, Investigating, and Prosecuting Criminal Activity Related to Digital Assets" (58 pages). 


Since then, we have seen the Department of Treasury release three reports:

Treasury also provided to the White House in July a "Framework for International Engagement on Digital Assets" which is described in their press release, but not provided to the public. 

Earlier this month, the Department of Commerce released their report:
 "Responsible Advancement of US Competitiveness in Digital Assets" (19 pages). 

The Office of Science & Technology Policy also released three reports:
In this blog post, we'll focus on the two DOJ reports, which we will address in the reverse order of  their release, as it seems that it is required to define the role of law enforcement in digital assets before discussing the international cooperation one would seek in this area.

The Role of Law Enforcement in Digital Assets


Despite the Executive Order, it is important to note that the Department of Justice did not need the urging of the White House to establish procedures for addressing Cryptocurrency.  The department created the Attorney General's Cyber-Digital Task Force in 2018, which produced their original report, published in October 2020, titled the CryptoCurrency Enforcement Framework (83 pages).  That original report characterized the illicit uses of cryptocurrency into three broad categories of criminality: 
  1. financial transactions associated with the commission of crimes, such as buying and selling drugs or weapons, leasing servers used in the commission of cybercrime, soliciting funds to support terrorist activity, or ransom, blackmail and extortion. 
  2. money laundering and the shielding of legitimate activity from tax, reporting, sanctions, or other legal requirements, including operating unlicensed, unregistered, or non-compliant exchanges. 
  3. crimes, such as theft, directly implicating the cryptocurrency marketplace itself, such as stealing cryptocurrency from exchanges or defrauding unwitting investors. 
The original report listed many case studies involving indictments, seizures, and arrests in the scenarios above, including SamSam ransomware, Welcome to Video and DarkScandals child sexual abuse services, terrorist funding both through direct donation and via sales of fake medical equipment (PPE during COVID), the Bitcoin Maven case (Theresa Tetley), BTC-e, Operation DisrupTOR (Wall Street Market), DeepDotWeb, DreamMarket, the Lazarus group hacks, HeroCoin ATMs, the Helix mixer, and others. 

The new report points out something that I've recently been mentioning as well.  Bitcoin and other block-chain-based crypto currencies are neither the first digital currency, nor the first one that has facilitated a great deal of criminal trade.  The report mentions E-Gold (1996) and Liberty Reserve (2006) as "pre-crypto" examples of digital currencies, but could have as easily mentioned Webmoney (1998) or PerfectMoney (2007). Many of the points of the new report echo of those of the prior, although the cases have been updated, such as  Bitfinex, Helix, and Hydra Market, estimated at one point to perform 80% of all darknet market-place transactions, and Garantex, the Estonia-based Exchange that laundered more than $100 million of the funds associated with darknet markets. The Colonial Pipeline ransomware and the use by indicted GRU agents of bitcoin, the theft of $600 Million by Lazarus Group hackers in March 2022 are all used to update the original report. 

Two significant additions are the section on the Growth of Decentralized Finance (DeFi) and Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs). In this area, the discussion of "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations" as opposed to a traditional corporate structure, and the insider trading, money laundering, and tax evasion aspects of NFT trading are discussed.  (Examples of Nathaniel Chastain of OpenSea and Ishan Wahi of Coinbase are provided as insider examples.) 

Section II of the report discusses DOJ efforts such as the National Crypto Enforcement Team (NCET) and its predecessors such as the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section's Digital Currency Initiative, and the Internation Virtual Currency Initiative. A few interesting statistics from the FBI, including that as of July 2022, the FBI had worked 1,100 separate investigations across 100 investigative program categories that involved a digital assets nexus. Since their first digital assets seizure in 2014, the FBI has seized $427 million in virtual assets (as valued at time of seizure.)  In February 2022, the FBI created the Virtual Assets Unit.  The Department of Justice has also created a Digital Asset Coordinators Network which is composed of designated prosecutors in U.S. Attorney's Offices across the country who work closely with CCIPS, MLARS, and NCET.  The program is based on the successful CHIP Network (Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property) and the National Security Cyber Specialist (NSCS) Network which each designate prosecutors in every field office to be specially trained and equipped to handle the relevant case types for their office. 

Cryptocurrency fraud investigations are listed as well, including the Baller Ape Club NFT rug pull case, the EmpiresX crypto Ponzi case, the Circle Society crypto commodities case, and the Titanium Blockchain Infrastructure Services Initial Coin Offering case. The Bitqyck case and the $2.4 Billion BitConnect Ponzi scheme case serve as an example of an IRS Cyber tax evasion cases, with the latter also being charged civilly by the SEC. 

The DEA's Cyber Support Section is described as performing cryptocurrency analysis related to the use of cryptocurrency to facilite drug trafficking, while the US Marshals Service is the group manages and liquidates seized crypto funds. HSI has been a key player in many crypto cases, with at least 500 currently active investigations, especially via their Financial Crimes Unit, Cyber Crimes Center, and Asset Forfeiture Unit. The US Secret Service is also involved, with 302 cases involving digital assets and at least 535 seizures of digital assets valued at more than $113 Million at time of seizure.  The US Secret Service is also a top trainer of state and local law enforcement via the National Computer Forensics Institute (NCFI) headquartered here in Hoover, Alabama! They also operate a Digital Assets Awareness Hub to educate the public on crypto risks. 

Regulatory Agencies also play their part, with FinCEN working to enforce Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) guidelines and regulations related to Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) requirements. Treasury manages the OFAC office, which includes sanctioning mixer and state-sponsored crypto hackers. The SEC regulates crypto scams that are structured as "investment contracts, such as BlockFi Lending LLC or the DeFi Money Market. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) regulates the trade of commodities in interstate commerce. They have brought 50+ enforcement actions against organizations such as Coinbase, Payward Ventures (Kraken), Blockratize (Polymarket).  BitMEX is one cryptocurrency derivatives exchange targeted for CFTC enforcement, after $209 Million in darknet market transactions were cashed out via BitMEX, who paid a $100 Million fine, with three co-founders pleading guilty to criminal charges and paying a $10 million fine. 

One last organization of note is IVAN, the Illicit Virtual Asset Notification platform, being built by FinCEN and the FBI's National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force. The goal of IVAN is to be a public-private information exchange to allow industry to collaborate on timely detection and disruption of the use of virtual assets in furtherance of illicit activity. 

Requests for Legislation 

The Justice report does make several requests for additional legislation, in five categories: 

  1. extend the prohibition against disclosing subpoenas (currently in effect for financial institutions) to VASPs (Virtual Asset Service Providers), strengthen the laws against operating an unlicensed money transmitting business, and extend the statutes of limitations from 5 to 10 years for certain crimes. 
  2. support for initiatives that would aid investigators in gathering evidence
  3. strengthening sentencing guidelines for certain BSA violations
  4. extend BSA record keeping rules to VASPs 
  5. ensuring that law enforcement has resources to conduct and staff sophisticated digital asset-related investigations. 
The details for this legislative proposals are in section IV of the report, LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY ACTIONS THAT COULD ENHANCE EFFORTS TO DISRUPT, INVESTIGATE,

International Considerations 

One of the main observations of the report on International Law Enforcement Cooperation is the standard complaint that the Mutual Legal Assistance treaties are too slow, and that faster methods of international law enforcement cooperation, such as the "24-7 Network" often do not have a standard way of sharing requests regarding Virtual Asset Service Providers. (VASPs). 

Next, while the western-friendly nations of the world have largely standardized cybercrime laws under the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, the way in which the nations of the world define, regulate, and enforce actions against VASPs are varied and inconsistent.  Under the concept of Dual Criminality, where one nation may only ask another to enforce laws which are similar in both countries, much of crypto-crime enforcement lacks such standards. 


While the Cybercrime laws may not have caught up, the International body that deals with Anti-Money Laundering, FATF or the Financial Action Task Force, are clear thought leaders on the Virtual Assets guidelines. (We wrote about FATF in 2019, please see: Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing: What is FATF? ) Unfortunately, as of July 2021, only 35 participating nations had implemented the FATF suggestions regarding virtual assets and VASPs into their national laws. 

My favorite part of the "Strengthening International Law Enforcement" report is Annex B: "Examples of Successful Cross-Border Collaboration on Digital Asset Investigations." 

Liberty Reserve
BTC-e
Helix 
Silk Road 
Operation Bayonet (AlphaBay and Hansa)
Dream Market
Wall Street Market 
DeepDotWeb
Welcome To Video 
Operation DisrupTOR
Hydra Market 
Twitter hack 
Sodinokibi/REvil Ransomware 
NetWalker Ransomware 
BitConnect 

For each example above, details are shared about which international law enforcement agencies partnered with which US agencies in order to reach the successful resolution.  Inspiring reading! 

Monday, September 12, 2022

Chidozie Collins Obasi - COVID Fraud & Work at Home Scams


On September 9, 2022, the FBI's Philadelphia office asked for help locating Chidozie Collins Obasi.  OBASI is charged with being part of a conspiracy to steal more than $30 Million related to COVID Fraud out of New York.  How did the scam work? Much of it goes back to a typical model = a fake job offer and a counterfeit check.  But in this case, there was much more!

During the COVID-19 crisis, the New York State Department of Health was responsible for buying and allocating ventilators to hospitals in the State of New York.  Two of their hospitals will be relevant in this case. Guthrie, a non-profit health care system based in Sayre, Pennsylvania, but operating two hospitals in New York, and Northwell Health, another non-profit healthcare network at that time the largest provider of rehab and nursing facilities also providing urgent care, hospice care, and home health services. 

Part of the scam conducted by OBASI was to offer for sale three ventilator products sold by the German company Draeger, Inc, with a U.S. headquarters in Telford, Pennsylvania.  Their three most popular ventilators for sale in the US were the Evita 300 ($15,000), the Savina 300 ($17,000) and the Evita V500 ($21,000).  

A few websites were used as part of this scam.  Tawada Healthcare in Indonesia (tawadahealthcare.com), MedWOW Ltd. Global, of Cyprus (medwow.com), Zhejiang Tiansong Medical Instrument Company (zj-tiansong.com). 

Members of OBASI's conspiracy opened bank accounts at foreign banks in China, United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia. They then registered look-alike domain names that appeared to be the domains for Tawada Healthcare, MedWOW, and Tiansong Medical. OBASI and team then made false identities and claimed to be employees in the spoofed companies, including Luiz Alfredo, Marc Alfredo, and others. 

OBASI used a spam-sending service based in the Ukraine (snov.io) and VOIP accounts created via TextMe and TextNow to allow them to use French and US-based virtual telephone numbers that would route to their real devices. 

WORK FROM HOME SCAM 

OBASI then sent thousands of emails to job seekers in the United States offering them employment at one of the spoofed companies. They explained that because their companies were overseas and had no US bank presence, they needed to hire them to accept payments on behalf of their North American customers. The new "employees" were thus duped into acting as money mules for the scammers, opening up bank accounts or allowing their own accounts to be used to receive funds, for which they would receive a commission in addition to their "salaries." 

The new employees would received counterfeit checks being sent from a co-conspirator in Canada and were instructed to deposit the checks into their personal accounts. The checks were delivered via companies such as DHL and FedEx. The funds from these checks, which the employees believed were payments for ventilator sales, were then instructed to be wired to the international bank accounts OBASI and others maintained overseas.  The employees received more than $11 million in such checks although only $1,005,227 was forwarded to OBASI's crew. The work-from-home scam aspect ran from approximately September 2018 through March 2020.

VENTILATOR SALES 

Beginning in March 2020, OBASI's crew noticed the shortage of ventilators and determined that they might make more money by claiming to have a large supply of Draeger ventilators for sale to US companies.  Their next round of work-from-home scams were to recruit medical sales professionals to act as their agents to sell the ventilators, which this class of employees believed were held in large numbers by Tawada Healthcare. OBASI took the role of researching how such ventilators were normally sold, using false identities to reach out to Draeger asking questions about their ventilators. He then created price quotes and sales contracts, along with letters of guarantee, claiming that Tawada Healthcare (who he represented as "Marc Alfredo") had the ventilators in stock and were ready to sell them. 

The French TextNow telephone number was listed as a reference account of a happy French customer who had worked with Marc Alfredo and had been pleased with the ventilators he had purchased. American customers purchased the ventilators from OBASI's "work-from-home" sales crew who received payments and then wired the money forward, less their commission, to OBASI's bank accounts in Hong Kong. 

Between March 2020 and April 2020, they prepared offer letters for $286,800,000 worth of Draeger ventilators!  $30,689,560 were actually sent to OBASI and his crew, solely by the State of New York!

SBA's COVID-19 EID Loan Program 

The third phase of OBASI's crimes was to steal the identities of American citizens, which they had in abundance because of all of the "job applications" that they had received.  Using this information, OBASI's crew then applied for money from the US Small Business Administration's EID Loan Program. The loan processor, based in Des Moines, Iowa, sent the funds to the "employee's" bank accounts, however the employees believed that these were also payments for Draeger ventilators being purchased from Tawada Healthcare, who they believed was their employer.  These funds were then forwarded to bank accounts operated by OBASI and others via Western Union or wire transfer to a bank account in Tangerang, Indonesia. 

55 fraudulent SBA COVID-19 EID Loan applications were paid out, each to a different stolen identity, totalling an additional $455,300 in fraud, of which $277,400 was successfully transferred to Indonesia. 

Domains used: 

mailzj-tainsong[.]com - used to spoof Tiansong Medican 

mailmedwowglobal[.]com = used to spoof MedWOW
alfredoluiz@mailmedwowglobal.com = (the Luiz Alfredo account) 

emailthc[.]com = used to spoof Tawada Healthcare 

863-855-3342 = a TextMe VOIP number (the "Alfredo Phone") 
marcalfredo@emailthc[.]com = the fake Marc Alfredo's email 
marca@emailthc[.]com = another fake Marc Alfredo email 

al694218933@gmail.com = spam accounts used to hire and interact with employees
mc00674709@gmail.com 
al4436621@gmail.com 
luizalfredo434@gmail.com
372221lzfre@gmail.com 
847273lzfre@gmail.com 
mlf02314141@gmail.com 
319marcdo@gmail.com 

abraham@cartufinanceservice.com = a fake account of "Bill Cartu" posing as a MedWOW customer 

Albert@bdicmail.com = a fake company "Albert Scott Breese / Black Diamond Investment Company of Santa Monica, CA" 

info@accdepartment.org = John Albin was an alias used by the Canadian Co-conspirator to communicate with "Marc Alfredo" regarding where checks should be sent.

fbi-fieldofficeny.com = used to fraudulently imitate the FBI

More Technical Details 


An example of the use of Snov[.]io was an email on 15MAR2020 sent to 162 US persons from 319marcdo@gmail.com asking "Hi, I'm wondering if you're getting my email regarding a contract position." 

If they replied, they would then received emails from "marcalfredo@emailthc[.]com" explaining more about the job at Tawada Helathcare, offering a 5% commission on any sales, and their role in receiving payments from North American customers. 

In order for the quotes being sent to look realistic, OBASI interacted with the real Tawada Healthcare, claiming to be "Dr. Collins" from the University of Rochester and asking for an Urgent quote for Evita 300 and Savina 300 ventilators. 

OBASI also contacted Draeger to get quote information, using the name "Collins Obasi" in the quote request and claiming to be an employee of Northwell Hospital.  In response to questions received from potential customers, he asked several more technical questions in future correspondence, 

Using these quotes as a template, OBASI crafted false quotes for among other things: 

20 ventilators to GUTHRIE for $340,000 
70 ventilators to GUTHRIE for $1,190,000 
35 ventilators to GUTHRIE for $595,000 
100 ventilators to NORTHWELL for $1,600,000 
500 ventilators to State of New York for $19,000,000 

KeyBank was one that challenged an outbound wire to the Bank of China HK LTD that was going to "Hong Kong Murphy Trading Co Limited." 

They received a reply stating: 

"I Surya Darma, accounts officer for Tawada Healthcare lakarta, Indonesia authorize that we did request funding of $12,637,660.00 to be wired to the Bank of China HK LTD for a beneficiary named Hong Kong Murphy Trading Co Limited. These funds are for a purchase order for ventilators by New York State Department of Health as delivery is of the utmost important due to the Covidl9 crisis. Please kindly expedite the wire urgently."

and .... they sent the money. (April 1, 2020) 

That same day "marcalfredo@emailthc[.]com" emailed an employee of the State of New York a signed purchase order for 2,000 Draeger ventilators from Tawada Healthcare for $38,004,000 and asked for a 50% deposit to be sent from the State of New York's KeyBank account (ending in 0026) to an "employee" account at KeyBank ending in 4326. 

A wire was sent by that employee on 02APR2020 to Bank of China HK LTD for $18,051,900 - the $19,002,000 requested minus the "employee's" 5% commission. 

Things get really crazy then when OBASI has one of his team make up an FBI Special Agent named Terrence Andrews, of the "International Funds Transfer Monitoring" department of the Albany Field Office asking him to call him back on OBASI's TextOne number to discuss "recent transactions and dealings with a foreign company.  That email came from "tandrews@fbi-fieldofficeny.com" 

Another co-conspirator then became "FBI Special Agent S.N. of Philadelphia" and instructed that they should only discuss the charges by reaching him at 267-792-1272 using passcode "Operation Covid19" and that they should not speak to anyone else at the FBI except him. 

SUMMARY OF CHARGES












Thursday, August 11, 2022

Three UK-based Nigerian BEC Scammers Used Construction Intelligence Service to Target Victims

 On 10AUG2022 three Nigerians were extradited from the UK to the US to face charges related to their roles in conducting Business Email Compromise (BEC) attacks against a number of US-based businesses.

43-year old Oludayo Kolawole John Adeagbo, 40-year old Donald Ikenna Echeazu, and 42-year old Olabanji Egbinola were brought to North Carolina to face their charges, although some of their crimes were also charged in Texas and their victims are across the United States and the world. 

The three were linked together by exchanging data related to construction companies who were involved in multi-million dollar building projects, and whose emails they were able to acquire through phishing attacks against targets they had purchased from a commercial intelligence service intended to be used by potential sub-contractors. 

BEC's through Look-alike Domains

Victim A notified the FBI that someone was spoofing Victim B, by sending emails from the address "accounts@lucasconstruct.com." (The real company, Lucas Construction, in League City, Texas, uses the domain "lucasconst.com".)  In one email, a victim received an appropriate form that their company used for updating banking information.  The email sender was clearly familiar with their processes, as the email said: 

Please find attached our completed ACH form and a copy of a voided check as requested. Kindly let us know once updated. 

After processing the change of banking information, Victim A sent the next construction payment of $525,282.39 to a SunTrust bank account rather than to Lucas Construction!

Victim C, a community college in the Houston, Texas area, had a similar experience, resulting in sending $1,995,168.64 to a PNC Bank account controlled by criminals after receiving a similar request to update their records from "accounts@tellepsengroup.com."  The real domain (Victim D) should have been tellepsen.com, a four generation family owned construction and concrete company in Houston.  

Victim E, a county government in Texas, sent $888,009.40 to a JPMorgan Chase account after being asked to update the banking records via an email from "accounts@dwcontractorsgroup.com." 

All three of those domains were registered by NameCheap by "Daniel Roberts" who used three different email addresses for the domains.  danielroberts604@mail.com, danielroberts605@mail.com, and danielroberts606@mail.com.  Additional domains, including TellepsenGroup.com, D1construct.com, and SouthWoodBuilding.com were also created by the criminal -- close imitations of the real domains, tellepsen.com, d1construction.com, and southwoodbuilders.com. These domains were used to target additional victims with BEC attempts via bank record "update" requests.

The Texas FBI investigators learned that danielroberts604 was also linked to an investigation being led by FBI Charlotte, North Carolina, where he had used the domain rodgersbuildersinc.com to do a similar scam, as well as another Texas scam using the domain leelewisusa.com to steal funds from a school system in Dallas, Texas. 

North Carolina was able to add another victim to the case - Appalachian State University, from which ADEAGBO and ECHEAZU were able to steal $1,959,925.02 using a similar methodology.  The two recruited a money mule in Los Angeles, California, Ho Shin Lee, who agreed to register a company "Royce Hub Trading" and open a JPMorgan Chase bank account in the same name. Funds stolen by imitating North Carolina based "Rodgers Builders" were stolen after sending emails from "accounts@rodgersbuildersinc.com" to change the banking information.  (The real company uses the domain rodgersbuilders.com.) 

Construction Market Data

The scammers had subscribed to a service operated by Construction Market Data (CMD), which provided contact information related to "hundreds of thousands" of commercial and civil construction projects. 

CMDGroup.com 

CMD allows a contractor to request a list of new projects being built in their area and provides contact details for decision makers who may want to hire various specialty sub-contractors and who have recently been awarded large contracts.  Although it is not specified in the court documents, it is likely that the scammers sent phishing emails to construction companies listed as being involved in multi-million dollar projects and then created look-alike domains for those targets where they were able to begin monitoring the victim's email messages for opportunities to introduce themselves into a mail stream from one of their "look-alike domains."  This may be accomplished by planting malware, but is often accomplished through adding "email forwarding rules" to the victim's account which sends financially relevant emails back to the criminal.

CMD provided data to the FBI, indicating that the relevant records had been requested by one John Edwards who listed both a US and UK address: 

  • 1270 Hasen Hurst Drive, Apt 12, West Hollywood, CA 90046
  • 14 College Gardens, London, GB e47ALG

and who used the email JohnEdwards79@yahoo.co.uk.  The associated telephone number +44 797.335.9482 belonged to ADEAGBO.  JohnEdwards79 was actually an alias to the email account OludayoAdeagbo@yahoo.co.uk. 

Adeagbo was found to possess three passports, a Nigerian and British passport in his true name, listing the birthday 06APR1979, and a second UK passport in the name "John Edwards" b. Nigeria on 06APR1979. 

Prior to his involvement in BEC, the BBC reported that ADEAGBO was part of a car-theft ring that used stolen identities to allow them to drive off in Jaguars, Mercedes, BMW's and Porsches. Calling themselves "the iPod Crew" Adeagbo's car theft ring stole 70 luxury automobiles worth $1.8 million over a ten month period in 2001.  Adeagbo told the BBC in 2004 that he served a 2.5 year prison sentence during which he "found God" and that he was "trading crime for Christianity." 

JohnEdwards and DanielRoberts were both found to have used the same IP addresses to access a variety of online accounts which all provided IP history to the FBI, including Apple, Yahoo, LocalBitcoins.com, and Namecheap. OludayoAdeagbo@yahoo.co.uk also had bank statements in true name for his Santander bank accounts. 

The CoinBase account for JohnEdwards79, was actually confirmed to a different person!  Donald Echeazu, who used the email diecheazu@yahoo.co.uk and phone 7837887959.  Although Coinbase had two photos on file for JohnEdwards which were consistent with Adeagbo, the third photo matched the UK Passport of ECHEAZU. 

Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) learned more when they searched the phone of another co-conspirator as he entered the country.  In that phone, he chatted with ADEAGBO's known UK telephone number, labeled "John Dayo" in his contacts, about bank accounts which he was providing. ADEAGBO instructed him to open up a JPMorgan Chase account in order to receive funds.  They discussed a bank transfer where they had expected to received 12 Million (currency unspecified) but were only able to take 8 million.   

Photos that were shared in the account, showing ADEAGBO in a Porsche, were found to match a car that he was driving when he was ticketed in London (a black Porsche.) 

Another chat in the phone showed a Bank of America account (#32508061285) in the name "Oludayo Kolawole John Adeagdo" using the address 1270 Havenhurst dr Apt 12, West Hollywood, CA 90046. 

The Bank of America account had been used to pay $4,510 in several payments in order to receive business information for individuals in North American construction companies from the aforementioned CMD. 

Olabanji Egbinola

The final party in the group of extradited scammers, Olabanji Oladotun Egbinola, was tripped up in exactly the same way.  Having likely received construction data from the same source (CMD), Olabanji used the email address "accounts@kjellstromleegroup.com" to imitate the real Richmond, Virginia-based company Kjellstrom and Lee.  Using the name "Rachel Moore" Olabanji interacted with the University's Treasury department acting as if a payment was missed and then providing new bank details to fix the problem.  As a result they wired the next construction payment of $469,819.49 to the new bank account at the Bank of Hope. 

The bogus domain was registered at NameCheap by "bridgetclark" who also registered more than 50 other domains with namecheap, each "deceptively similar to the Internet domain names associated with legitimate construction companies." Because "bridgetclark" was using a TOR-based cryptocurrency wallet to obscure his true location, the FBI pursued a Rule 41(b)(6)(A) search warrant.  Rule 41(b) allows a search warrant to be issued from any US jurisdiction if the location of the target has been obscured using technology and to use technology to seize data from such a targeted computer.   In the FBI's case, this is referred to as a NIT, or a Network Investigative Technique. After receiving the court's authority, the FBI sent a NIT-laden email message to accounts@kjellstromleegroup.com, which was used to determine the account was being operate from a computer at the IP address 86.191.189.88, a British Telecom IP in the UK. BT was then able to provide UK law enforcement with the subscriber identification of that IP address and it was found that subscriber Samiat Egbinola in Essex shared the residence with OLABANJI OLADOTUN EGBINOLA. 

Egbinola had been previously arrested in 2008 for money laundering in the UK and had previously traveled to Los Angeles, California, when he used the email address aegbinola@gmail.com for his point of contact going through customs. A review of the email account, which had been active since 2008, showed that he was in regular communications with the scammers listed above on their yahoo.co.uk addresses.