Showing posts with label Money Mule Spam. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Money Mule Spam. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 12, 2018

Operation Wire Wire: The South Florida Cases, Part 1

Yesterday we started a series of posts about Operation Wire Wire, where the Department of Justice announced charges against 74 people for Business Email Compromise and related scams.

The South Florida cases are so huge, we're actually going to break them into three parts as well.  In part one, we'll look at the case against Cynthia Rodriguez, Destiny Asjee Rowland, and Lourdes Washington.


Defendant #1: Cynthia Rodriguez:
18:1349.F Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud
18:1956-3300.F Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering
18:1956-3300.F Money Laundering and Forfeiture Count

Defendant #2: Destiny Asjee Rowland
18:1343 Wire Fraud
18:1349 Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud
18:1956(h) Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering
18:1956 Money Laundering
18:1956(a)(1)(B)(i) Money Laundering

Defendant #3: Lourdes Washington
18:1349 Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud
18:1956(h) Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering
18:1956(a)(1)(B)(i) Money Laundering

According to the indictment against Destiny Asjee Rowland, Rowland incorporated "Asjee Luxury Inc" in July 2017 and claimed to be a furniture merchant wholesaler at 3688 NW 83rd Lane in Sunrise, Florida.  The victim companies in her case were a company in Eau Claire, Wisconsin, a lumber company in Illinois, and an escrow company in Roseville, California that was selling property for two people called "KW" and "TW" in the indictment.

Asjee Luxury opened accounts at TD Bank and SunTrust Bank.  Using other people's names and email addresses, she convinced companies to transfer money to her account, including by falsely claiming to be the lumber company, where she sent "urgent audit" notices to the Wisconsin company demanding immediate wire transfers of payments owed to the lumber company.  That email came from an IP address in Nigeria on July 27, 2017.  By July 28th, a Bank of America account in Wisconsin had sent $1,651,699 to her TD Bank account in Florida.

 She also caused the escrow company to redirect payments intended for their clients KW and TW to accounts she controlled, receiving $451,759 from a City National Bank account in California into her SunTrust Bank account in Florida on July 31, 2017.

Cynthia Rodriguez and Loudes Washington have a ten page criminal complaint written by a US Secret Service agent to describe their case.  Washington created a new business, LW Nationwide Inc, at 9561 Fountainebleau Blvd, Apartment 402, Miami, Florida 33172, which coincidentally is also his driver's license address.  Then he opened a Bank of America account in that name.

A Real Estate attorney, BD, was handling the closing on several pieces of property.  On Feb 14, 2017, he receives an email from ***@themarstongroup.com informing him that he would receive a check for $37,225 via registered mail, along with a 1099 tax form.  The next day, an email from the same name ***@gmx.us said that he was leaving town unexpectedly and needed the funds sent via wire transfer instead.  Those funds were then directed to the BofA account of LW Nationwide.  Those funds were immediately RE-wired to a bank account in Zhejiang, China.  The same day, Washington withdrew funds from an ATM in Hialeah, Florida.  Three minutes later, at the same ATM machine, Cynthia Rodriguez withdrew funds from the LW Nationwide account, using the same debit card as Washington.   Bank of America's logs reveal that an IP address, 50.143.68.4 was used to access the account.  That IP address was Rodriguez's home Comcast Cable account at 2914 Funston Street, in Hollywood, Florida.  Rodriguez made additional withdrawals from the account, including from a drivethrough ATM whose cameras captured the license plate of her Nissan Quest, 520-TML, registered to Rodriguez.

Washington was later arrested (December 2017) as a result of an open warrant in Kentucky, and testified to opening the accounts, making the wire transfers, and doing the cash withdrawals "at the behest of her recruiter/manager" who she did not identify.

Meanwhile, the Eu Claire, Wisconsin business contacted the US Secret Service about the scam involving the fake invoices from the lumber company.   Records from the state of Florida revealed that Asjee Luxury only had one officer, and one signatory on their bank accounts. What seems to be a cooperating witness (Individual 1) in that case revealed that Rodriguez had recruited them to open several sham business accounts, including the TD Bank account belonging to Asjee Luxury!  Shortly after the California real estate company wired money into that account, ATM video footage showed Individual 1 withdrawing $8,000 cash from the account.  Individual 1 would then give half of the money to Rodriguez and keep the other half.  Individual 1 also opened a shell company called Wide Assure Trades Inc and a corresponding Bank of America account.

On October 27, 2017, Rodriguez notified Individual 1 that Wide Assure Trades was going to receive some money.  That account was logged into the same day from 76.18.27.6, the IP address that Comcast listed for Rodriguez's home address at 2914 Funston Street, Hollywood Florida at that time.  (DHCP addresses change from time to time.)

Later an additional document, not an indictment, but rather "Superseding Information" was filed



The Superseding Information reveals that Cynthia Rodriguez had incorporated "CR Elegant Trades" in September 2014 from her home address in Hialeah, Florida.  We already spoke of Washington's company, LW Nationwide, and Rowland's company, Asjee Luxury.  The superseding information speaks of (but does not give many details) an ongoing conspiracy from 2014 until 2018 that involved the creation of many shell companies and many fraudulent wire transfers. 

"It was the purpose of the conspiracy for the defendants and their co-conspirators to unlawfully enrich themselves by obtaining and misappropriating money from victims, by making materially false and fraudulent representations, and by the concealment of material facts, concerning, among other things, the true identify of the defendants and their co-conspirators and the purported need for victims to make payments to the defendants and their co-conspirators."

Lourdes Washington entered a plea agreement that included the fact that she may face 20 years in prison, 3 years supervised release, and a fine of $250,000 or double the pecuniary gain, as well as restitution, and acknowledging that they may be "denaturalized and removed" as a result of their crimes.  In other words, Washington had a public defender, as the only funds they tie to her are $37,225.  (It will be interesting to see what actually happens at sentencing on July 9, 2018.)

Cynthia Rodriguez also plead guilty, but in her case, she named her recruiter.  In the plea agreement, she agrees that she and her co-conspirators opened shell corporations and bank accounts for the purpose of receiving proceeds of wire fraud scams in exchange for a percentage of profits.  But then she says she was recruited to the scam by Roda TAHER.  Taher, AKA Res, AKA Rezi, AKA Ressi, recruited Rodriguez initially as a money mule, but advanced her to being a sub-recruiter, working to hire and manage additional money mules in the South Florida area. Rodriguez was responsible for providing corporate documents for her mules' shell companies, driving the money mules to banks, or ordering them to open certain accounts at certain banks, and accompanying them to withdraw funds.  She also provided directions to money mules on how to hide their schemes from banks, law enforcement and other individuals.

Rodriguez's plea agreement states that she knew the money was coming from wire fraud, and that she knew that business email compromise and spear phishing scams were used, including email account takeovers and "spoofed" email accounts making the victims believe they were making wire transfers to trusted partners, but instead depositing the funds into the accounts of the fraudsters.  Rodriguez says that she used the phone application "WhatsApp" to exchange encrypted messages with co-conspirators, including Taher, in order to evade detection by law enforcement.  Her plea confesses to laundering at least $4,760,669.80 between herself and the mules she recruited.

Like Washington, Rodriguez's plea states that she may do 20 years plus 3 supervised, and pay a fine of $250,000 or double the pecuniary gain, plus restitution, and that she may face denaturalization and removal.

Base Offense level for Washington was 8.  Increased by 18 levls due to the amount of laundered funds being between $3.5M and $9.5M.  +3 because she was a manager or supervisor in a scheme involving 5 of more participants.  +2 because of 18USC1956, and +2 because of the "sophisticated nature" of the laundering.  So, a level 33 offense.  They only decreased her 3 levels for "demonstrating acceptance of responsibility and assisting authorities in the investigation".  So she is still facing a level 30 offense.

"Furthermore, the Defendant stipulates that she owes restitution in the amount of $4,760,669.80!"

The plea agreement was signed May 23, 2018.  Rodriguez will be sentenced on July 11, 2018.

In Operation Wire Wire: The South Florida Cases Part 2, we'll look at 18-CR-20170, with defendants Eliot Pereira, Natalie Armona, Bryant Ortega, Melissa Rios, Angelo Santa Cruz, Alexis Fernandez Cruz, Roberto Carlos Gracia, Jose E. Rivera, Angeles De Jesus Angulo, Jennifer Ruiz, Yirielkys Pacheco Fernandez, and Sebastian Loyaza.

Wednesday, November 30, 2016

NoMoreRansom aka Troldesh Ransomware Delivered by Kelihos

My favorite guest blogger Arsh Arora, a malware analyst and Ph.D. researcher at UAB,  is back with new and interesting facts about Kelihos, a botnet family that he has been tracking for a year and half and providing some great intel about to the community and law enforcement. Today, he noticed that it is delivering URLs leading to Troldesh ransomware. Take it from here, Arsh ...

Kelihos botnet delivering Troldesh Ransomware impersonating Bank of America

No_More_Ransom, aka Troldesh encryption ransomware, is being delivered by Kelihos in the form of embedded URLs within the email messages. The delivery mechanism is similar to previous cases of ransomware spammed by Kelihos. In early July, Kelihos introduce itself to the world of ransomware by spamming links to Wildfire ransomware followed by CryptFIle2 ransomware in August. Then, it shifted its focus towards different banking trojans such as Panda Zeus, Nymain and Kronos. Now, it took a complete circle and struck back with Troldesh encryption ransomware. The funny thing is that the ransomware encrypted the files with the extension ".no_more_ransom". Moreover, the URLs spammed were redirected to download a JavaScript file and a Microsoft Word document. This is the first time that Kelihos malware has used JavaScript to infect users.

Another interesting observation was that this spam campaign was specifically geo-targeting Australian email addresses ending with ".au".  ".pl" email users were getting dating spam, while ".us" extension emails were being invited to sign up as Money Mules.  All other email TLDs were getting the traditional pharmaceutical spam.

NoMoreRansom aka Troldesh Ransomware

While doing the daily run of malware, one of my fellow researchers at UAB, Max Gannon, noticed a different behavior in the Kelihos botnet. It was sending embedded links using the Credit Debt theme. The most important fact is that some of the URLs were redirected to download a .zip file containing a JavaScript file, while other links download a Microsoft Word document. When writing this blog, most of the URLs were still live. 

Subject: Please Settle Credit Arrears Shortly

Dear Client!

Our Credit Department has done research on your payment record for last year and learned that payments had not been made for last 3 months. We are now working on the issue pertaining to ways to help you with fulfilling liabilities and settling these arrears.

At the same time, we realize you may have had excellent reasons for such payment breakdown. That is exactly why we are contacting you now. Notwithstanding, if you are not proceeding your debt settlement, we will have to engage our enforcement units in commencing the law-suit case against you. This is the compulsory measure, so unfortunately, we may not help you.

Please process at least the very first payment at the earliest possible time. Else, charges may apply, and then the trial may be run.

We have made the full report of your situation. It contains the payment history, the total debt amount effective today, and further recommendations on arranging the issue. Please open and be guided with instructions as soon as possible.

The file can be found here: 
hxxp://greatwesternco[dot]com/wp-content/themes/twentyten/redirect[dot]php

Sincerely Yours,
Bank of America
Customer Relations Department
.

The following are the different subject lines that were spammed:
URLs that downloaded a .zip file containing JavaScript

Subject - Credit Department Discovered Your Debt - 
hxxp://eileenparker[dot]com/wp-content/themes/twentyten/redirect[dot]php

Subject - Pay for Credit Debt when Possible - 
hxxp://thehousepartnership[dot]co[dot]uk/wp-content/themes/twentyten/redirect[dot]php

Subject - Please Settle Credit Arrears Shortly - 
hxxp://chris-smith-web[dot]com/wp-content/themes/twentyten/redirect[dot]php

Subject - You Have a 3-Month Credit Debt - 
hxxp://infopro[dot]it/wp-content/themes/twentyeleven/redirect[dot]php

Fig. 1: Zip file downloaded with the embedded URL link

URLs that downloaded a Microsoft Word document

Subject - Please Settle Credit Arrears Shortly - 
hxxp://greatwesternco[dot]com/wp-content/themes/twentyten/redirect[dot]php

Subject - You Have a 3-Month Credit Debt - 
hxxp://greatwesternco[dot]com/wp-content/themes/twentyten/redirect[dot]php

URL that were unreachable

Subject - Pay for Credit Debt when Possible - 
hxxp://starsounds[dot]net/wp-content/themes/twentyeleven/redirect[dot]php - Down

Infection by JavaScript has not been an associated behavior with Kelihos. Hence, it can be considered a noticeable change and well-thought out strategy by the bot operators.

Hashes of the JavaScript and Word document are:

    1d57eba1cb761b99ffcf6bc8e1273e9c  instructions.doc
711881576383fbfeaaf90b1d6c24fce0  instructions.js

On the other hand, embedded URLs for Microsoft Word documents have been seen before. The document performed in a similar fashion requesting to enable the macros by clicking "Enable Content" aka "Encrypt Me" button. After this process it downloads a payload from the following link:

hxxp://95[.]163[.]127[.]179/777[.]exe
MD5 - 8441efe3901a0ec7f18c6ef5159877cc

Virus Total Link - 777.exe VT

After the file is downloaded, it encrypts the system with the Troldesh encryption ransomware and adds the "no_more_ransom" extension at the end of each file on the system. The ransom note on the desktop was displayed in Russian as well as English.

Fig. 2: Desktop screen after encryption

Fig. 3: Ransom Note found in text ReadMe.txt

All the important files on your computer were encrypted.
To decrypt the files you should send the following code:
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
to e-mail address 2Lynness.Taftfera1990@gmail[dot]com .
Then you will receive all necessary instructions.
All the attempts of decryption by yourself will result only in irrevocable loss of your data.
If you still want to try to decrypt them by yourself please make a backup at first because
the decryption will become impossible in case of any changes inside the files.
If you did not receive the answer from the aforecited email for more than 48 hours (and only in this case!),
use the feedback form. You can do it by two ways:
1) Download Tor Browser from here:
https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html.en
Install it and type the following address into the address bar:
http://cryptsen7fo43rr6.onion/
Press Enter and then the page with feedback form will be loaded.
2) Go to the one of the following addresses in any browser:
http://cryptsen7fo43rr6.onion.to/
http://cryptsen7fo43rr6.onion.cab/

The above is a plain text version of the ransom note. As it can be seen, a Gmail address is being use, which is one of its kind behavior.

Troldesh did not stop trolling the victim there, it downloads the PONY malware and contacts its command and control center at this location:

 hxxp://ipieceofcake[dot]com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/gate[dot]php

When I visited the link it was down, but thanks to our Malware expert Neera Desai who works for PhishMe and is pursuing her Masters in Computer Forensics at UAB, we were able to visit the panel page of the Pony malware.

Fig. 4: Pony malware panel page

This was really fascinating as Kelihos spammed URLs for Troldesh encryption ransomware with redirects to a malicious Microsoft Word document and a zip file containing JavaScript. The files eventually encrypt the system but it also downloads the Pony malware to steal all the information from the victim's computer. Hence, causing a double blow to the victim.

Money Mule Spam 

Kelihos botnet was not in a mood to stop. It also sent Money Mule spam geo-targeting users with the ".us" United States email address. It impersonated a company from 'China looking for employees'. 

Text of the email is as follows:

Subject: China company is looking for employees

We are the greatest transport company in China involved in 
transportation of high-dimension goods across the globe. At present, 
we are aimed at expanding by opening offices across the globe for 
deliveries of small consignments. We are looking for employees to 
open offices and ensure services (deployment and supervision of 
packages). All costs for the office establishment are undertaken by 
the organization. During the first month of your job, you and our 
employees are to be engaged in searching for the storage structure. 
You will be also required to appoint some amount of orders to your 
home address (not more than 10kg parcels a day) in order to check 
them for flaws and ship forward with pre-paid labels. We have a 
certain flow of parcels to date, and the work is already jogging on; 
if you are ready to start your operation right away, we are ready to 
pay 2800$ a month. In due course your salary will increase up to 
3500$ if you agree to work in the future office.

You have the following options of working with us:
1. You are working at home for the first month, receiving packages 
and shipping them forward; starting looking for an office place in 
your town (all the instructions you will receive from our managers)
2. You continue to work from home and get 2900$ every month, plus 
bonuses for fast shipped package
3. If something doesn't fit you and you decide to stop the job with 
us, we will pay you monthly salary and be waiting for you again in 
our team in the future!

If you have any questions please contact us at: kia01915@aol[dot]com

All costs for establishment the office are taken by the company, 
shipping is made with prepaid labels, this job does not require any 
financial investment from you. You can also combine this work with 
another one if you decide to work in the office in the future.
The convenient control panel of a corporate website will help you to 
track parcels, bonuses you are to get for a shipped package, and your 
personal information for salary and further job instructions.

The company ensures the following advantages:
1. Health benefits
2. Paid vacations and sick leaves
3. Paid flight tickets, gasoline

This is a temporary offer, as soon as we have a team of employees in 
your staff the vacancy will be closed.

Please contact our HR manager for further details: kia01915@aol[dot]com
.
Other subject lines that were spammed in the same theme are mentioned below with their corresponding reply-to email address.

Subject - China company is looking for employees - kia01915@aol[dot]com
Subject - We are hiring new employees to our office - kia01915@aol[dot]com
Subject - We are hiring new employees to our office - bree10682@aol[dot]com

Subject - Job opportunity - marquerite23894@aol[dot]com
Subject - Open vacancy - marquerite23894@aol[dot]com

The other thing to note is that all of the email addresses use AOL domains, which is a unique thing in itself.


To conclude, Kelihos has been surprising the researchers quite often and it has become necessary to keep track of different activities of the botnet. The ransomware inclusion brings interesting twists from the research as well as law enforcement. Another thing that I found while searching for NoMoreRansom was a group established by key leaders in the community to fight against the rise of ransomware. 

So is the extension of NoMoreRansom a challenge to the people fighting it? Who knows? 
FYI: Things are about to get interesting!

Wednesday, November 09, 2016

Kronos Banking Trojan and Geo-Targeting from Kelihos

Kronos Banking Trojan and Geo-targeted attacks to Australia, Italy, United Kingdom and United States by Kelihos

I'm happy to welcome back guest-blogger Arsh Arora for another blog about the Kelihos botnet. This research is being conducted in our malware research lab at UAB by Arsh (PhD student) and Max Gannon, a malware researcher at UAB, who is about to graduate at the end of this semester and is looking for a job (hint to employers!)

Let’s start the story of the things happening with Kelihos botnet over the past couple of days. After laying low for past couple of weeks, it strikes back with authority. As observed previously http://garwarner.blogspot.com/2016/08/kelihos-botnet-sending-geo-targeted.html, Kelihos continue to geo-target different locations. First and foremost, it started by sending Money Mule spam to users in Italy, Australia, and the United Kingdom, if their email addresses ended with .it, .au, or .uk.  Second, it targeted users in the United States to download a social media management tool “Kuku.io.”  Because this was based on country-code targeted of ".us" it is more likely to impact people in education and local government, who are the main users of .us email addresses.  As all these things were happening, it sneaked a malicious word document from a website and uploaded it on the desktop without any indication to the user of the download. The malicious document eventually delivers Kronos malware which is considered to be same as Zeus malware which was sent by Kelihos in August http://garwarner.blogspot.com/2016/08/kelihos-botnet-sending-panda-zeus-to.html. This behavior was bizarre and never observed before this event.



Money Mule Spam

A brief report of the various geo-targeted spam is provided below.

1. Australia - Spam for email addresses ending with ".au" 

Email text is as follows:
Subject: Available Position
Hi,

The Successful Company is hiring full/part-time employee for an Administrative Assistant position
(Customer Care Team) who can take a part oversee development projects in AU and NZ. This
opportunity is smart for everybody who ready to work as little as a several hours per weekday,
however you will apply for a full time position as well. Competent training programs are accessible
for the applicants. Work experience isn't required at all.
Please send your confirmation to this email cargoinvestmentmiltonlogistics@gmail[dot]com to get more
details concerning a vacancy.
Best Regards

cargoinvestmentmiltonlogistics@gmail[dot]com
.


An interesting thing to observe in the body of the text is the special reference to development projects in AU and NZ. To infer, the email body and addresses are not random, but specifically targeted towards the Australian users.

Some of the email subjects being used include:

Subject:  Available Position
Subject: Employment
Subject: Job Offer
Subject: Open Vacancy

2. Italy - Spam for email addresses ending with ".it"

<== Italian Money Mule spam || Google Translate ==>
Original text of the email being spammed is as follows:

Subject: Assunzione al lavoro

Cari Saluti,
Impresa europeo specializzata nella mezzi di trasporto merci per estensione proprio organico
sta ricercando le persone per i nuovi ruoli nella vostra provincia! Stipendio e' da 3002 Euro
al mese piu' bonus. Formazione e' a carico della azienda!
Se hai bisogno di fondi in piu', se sei onesto e coscienzioso dipendente che ha 22 anni
compiuti, ti invitiamo ad inviare il vostro curriculum nel nostro ufficio personale
hr@acigl[dot]net

Distinti saluti
Sandra Trevor,
Responsabile del personale
hr@acigl[dot]net


Some of the email subjects being used include

Subject: Assunzione - collocamento al lavoro
Subject: Assunzione al lavoro
Subject: Cerchiamo collaboratori in vostra area
Subject: Cerchiamo collaboratori in vostra citta
Subject: Cerchiamo collaboratori in vostra provincia
Subject: Cerchiamo collaboratori in vostra regione
Subject: Lavoro part-time
Subject: Ricerchiamo collaboratori in gruppo operante a livello globale

3. UK - Spam for email addresses ending with".uk"

Subject: Wow amazing girl..Read that article

Hey, what's up? Actually, for that long time we haven't been reaching each other, I've discovered a brilliant 
reading stuff. By now, 5 days I am stuck to it have already brought about 2,350 pound for me! I am talking about 
the soft trading market - it doesn't require any specific skills at it, all is automated.
Flick the article through and write me something as you are in. By the way, get a chance to know how the stuff 
works with a demo!
Take the best out of it!
P.s. The article itself: hxxp://newsdep3-telegraph[dot]co/

.

Interesting observation here is the fake url for The Telegraph newspaper. The spammers are trying to trick the user to visit the following link in disguise of telegraph newspaper.

Following Domain name is hosted on 162[.]255[.]119[.]249 and has been dominantly hosting various phishing websites https://www.virustotal.com/en/ip-address/162.255.119.249/information/. Information found on Domain Tools is mentioned below.

Information from Domain Tools
Information about the registrant.

Domain Name:                              NEWSDEP3-TELEGRAPH.CO
Domain ID:                                   D153329223-CO
Sponsoring Registrar:                   NAMECHEAP, INC.
Sponsoring Registrar IANA ID:   1068
Registrar URL (registration services):  http://www.namecheap.com
Domain Status:                             clientTransferProhibited
Registrant ID:                               70G0X0PHDOIUNYLZ
Registrant Name:                          WhoisGuard Protected
Registrant Organization:               WhoisGuard, Inc.
Registrant Address1:                     P.O. Box 0823-03411
Registrant City:                             Panama
Registrant State/Province:             Panama
Registrant Postal Code:                 0
Registrant Country:                       Panama
Registrant Country Code:              PA
Registrant Phone Number:            +507.8365503
Registrant Facsimile Number:       +51.17057182
Registrant Email:                           76fb43b32d694e49a7cf070f148b6aae.protect@whoisguard.com

Some of the email subjects being used include

Subject - Look what i found
Subject - Why work for your money when your money can work for you?
Subject - Wow amazing girl.. Read that article

When visited the URL it redirected to
hxxp://www[dot]talegraph[dot]co[dot]uk/investor/ideas/from-zero-to-hero-mom-vanessa-makes-8000-per-month
As it can be observed it redirects to talegraph[dot]co[dot]uk, not telegraph, which is hosted in Netherlands.

Whois & Quick Stats
Dates Created on 2016-09-27 - Expires on 2017-09-27 - Updated on 2016-09-27  
IP Address 185.110.173.76 is hosted on a dedicated server  
IP Location Netherlands - Zuid-holland - Papendrecht - It-ernity Internet Services Bv
ASN         Netherlands AS21155 ASN-PROSERVE Amsterdam,, NL (registered Sep 11, 2001)
Whois History 4 records have been archived since 2016-10-01  
Whois Server whois.nic.uk


Webpage of talegraph

As it can be viewed, following is a fake website portraying telegraph newspaper.






Social Media Management Tool


Kuku.io It is well-known that people of United States are crazy about social media and get super excited whenever a new app or a tool gets launched. Recently, everyone went crazy after the launch of Pokemon Go. This reaction forced the threat actors to change their way of attacks by focusing on the social media market. There were different malware being developed to exploit this weakness of the users. in a recent blog post, I mentioned how scammers were fooling people to buy cheat codes that never existed http://garwarner.blogspot.com/2016/07/pokemon-go-invitation-to-spammers.html. In continuation to these attacks, the Kelihos spammers are now inviting users to download Kuku.io, a social media management tool. The following spam is explicitly targeting email addresses ending with ".us," because of the popularity and use of social media in the United States.

Email being spammed is as follows:
Subject: Need your opinion

Hi,
I'm with Kuku.io, it's a social media management tool the key characteristic of which is to schedule and create
content on various networks at the same time. What's more you also encourage your clients to share, like and
follow your posts.
Since we are connected in LinkedIn I thought it would be a good idea if I asked for your views on our product.
Check us out at: hxxps://kuku[dot]io/a/ms
I appreciate your time. I'm looking forward to receiving any of your comments!

Regards,
Michael
hello@kuku.company
.

Some of the email subjects being used include:

Subject: Need your opinion
Subject: Need your feeback
Subject: Please let me know if this is of any interest

When visited the webpage mentioned.
Webpage of Kuku[.]io

Kronos Banking Trojan

Now let's get to the sneaky part performed by Kelihos, which is dropping a malicious word document on the desktop. While doing his daily chores of running Kelihos malware and collecting the spam sent, Max  found that a document named 'oldversion' was placed on the desktop. It was strange and we have never seen this behavior previously.
Pictorial view of the document icon on the Desktop

On further scrutiny, we found that during the capture, Kelihos did a GET request to download the document.

hxxp://topswingusa[dot]top/qivi/oldversion[dot]doc - Get request https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/e6071f9205ed8540df9612d3f1a001f497931fc76dee43fee1e77750d00df256/analysis/


IP address of topwingsusa[dot]top - 167.88.160.146 https://www.virustotal.com/en/ip-address/167.88.160.146/information/
 
Virus total result of topswingusa[dot]top https://www.virustotal.com/en/url/56f79838c296ac58ab81cd6571187bc1abcb33f6cb395bcebfd9db966224d4dc/analysis/



An interesting string found in the process hacker was "  UPLD save to: C:\Users\malware\Desktop\oldversion.doc"

Out of curiosity and to do more in-depth research, I decided to click the document. The document did not disappoint and asked for two of my favorite things when viewing a word document.


Enable Editing
 The document was opened in Protected view and after clicking 'Enable Editing,' it asked to "Enable Content.

Enable Content
After clicking 'Enable Content,' It spawns a child process with the name '24580.exe' and then another child process was launched with the name of "svchost.exe". The process killed itself and did not run properly.

Hence, I have to put it into OLLYDBG to get the malware working. On further observations in the debugger, I found that it was checking for virtual machine. Hence, it was vmware aware and killed itself instantaneously. But before it killed itself, I found the following string in the "svchost.exe" in the debugger, which mentioned the malware to be Kronos.




Hence, it can inferred that the following malware is Kronos. In order to be double sure, I repeated the process by downloading the malicious document and running it again.

This time I was able to gather more information, once the document is activated by 'Enable Content,' it grabs the downloader from the following url:
hxxp://topswingusa[dot]top/qivi/mswords2k8[dot]exe, 
which is hosted on the same IP 167[.]88[.]160[.]146. Once the file "mswords2k8[dot]exe was obtained, it spawned a third process named as "MSOSQM", which was Kronos malware. 

On further scrutiny, I found that both the downloaders "24580.exe" and "mswords2k8[dot]exe" have the same MD5 hash, 547890EA5FD8374383E0663223B5A26F.

Downloader and Kronos malware

 Another interesting observation found in the debugger is presence of a string named "BOTID"

BOTID found in OLLYDBG



Researchers are still working on trying to find more about the significance of BOTID. Hopefully, everyone will be updated soon with the findings.