Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts

Thursday, January 09, 2020

Iranian APT Group Overview

Today the Birmingham InfraGard Chapter and the Alabama ISSA held a joint meeting featuring a presentation from the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, part of DHS that was formerly known as the NPPD.  I learned of a ton of offerings from CISA.gov at the meeting, so I want to start by sharing a link to their CISA Insights Page, where they released earlier this week some guidelines for updating your company's Risk Assessment regarding potential cyber or physical threats from Iranian actors in light of our current political situation, and the tendency of the Iranian regime to lash out with Cyber attacks when they can't accomplish what they want with the limited reach of their military.  That Insight was called Increased Geopolitical Tensions and Threats and features ten readiness steps for making sure your org is not a soft target for cyber attacks from Iran. Most of these are things you should be doing anyway, but hey, an Iran threat is possibly a good time to go check those out!  One way of thinking about covering your cyber bases that I really like is actually from the Australian Government, who recommends their "Essential 8" Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents.  Start with making sure you have your Essentials covered, but then move on to "Very Good" and "Excellent" steps as your org matures your security practices.

However, we all know that Iran has many Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) Groups, and that there is much more to watching for such activity then patching your systems and telling your users to be aware.  A large org will want to know more about the behaviors of documented Iranian APT Groups. Often these insights include known malware families used by the actor, or what sectors or countries this threat group historically has attacked.

I've seen several documents that share a woefully incomplete list of APT groups from Iran, so I've tried to pull together some helpful links to the main groups below.  In each case, if their is a "MITRE Group #" after the main title, you will find a very robust list of TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) about the group and links to many more reports and resources about the group than I have provided below.  However, I DO like the reports I've listed and think you might want to read them as part of "basic understanding" before following a dozen reports about the same group.  One slight complaint about the MITRE data, and APT Group Naming in general, is there is a great deal of disagreement about which group names are aliases for the same groups, and which may be entirely different groups that just share some tools with one another.  Hey, I'm doing the best I can here, and so is MITRE.  It's tricky!  If you feel I've really got something screwed up, leave a comment!  Let's chat!

Most every vendor it seems likes to put their own personal spin on APT Groups.  I have to confess to being a sucker for the CrowdStrike naming conventions (Hi Adam! Hi Dmitri! Hi Shawn!).  They use a different Animal to label each APT Group based on the name of the country where the group is hosted.  Their name for Iran is "Kitten" (as in "Persian Kitten", get it?)

While there are several excellent APT Disambiguation efforts, my favorite for ease of use is the one run by Florian Roth (Twitter @Cyb3rops ) - APT Groups and Operations.  Go to the Iran tab. There are columns for malware sets and links related to each group as well.

If you prefer a much more detailed read of APT Groups, the ThaiCERT has an amazing Threat Actor Encyclopedia! A 275 page omnibus of APT!  However, it is really tricky to pull out, for example, JUST the Iran stuff from it.

For now, I'll organize this by the CrowdStrike Kitten Names. Their set includes at least:

but there are many other companies naming other Iranian APT Groups that may or may not link up with the Kittens.  FireEye is the main user of the numbered APT Groups.  Many of these now have a "Kitten" name as you see above ... APT33, 34, 35, and 39 are all Iranian.  There are several "less well labeled" actors who either don't really behave like traditional APT, or haven't been as widely linked as those above, but are still serious.  A few of those below:
  • Cyber Fighters of Izz Ad-Din Al Qassam - the bank DDOS guys.  
  • DarkHydrus (AKA Lazy Meerkat) - some say is actually also Slayer Kitten, others disagree
  • Gold Iowell (AKA Boss Spider) - these are the SamSam Ransomware guys 

If it would be helpful to just have the MITRE links all in one place, here you go!

Thursday, November 29, 2018

Two Iranian Hackers charged with $6 Million in SamSam Ransomware Attacks

Today the Department of Justice announced an indictment against two Iranian men: Faramarz Shahi Savandi and Mohammad Mehdi Shah Mansouri for their roles in stealing more than $6 Million in Ransom payments from a 34 month long ransomware campaign known as SamSam.

They were charged with:

18 U.S.C. § 371 - Conspiracy to Defraud the United States

18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) - knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer;

18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(7)(C) - demand or request for money or other thing of value in relation to damage to a protected computer, where such damage was caused to facilitate the extortion

18 U.S.C. § 1349 - Conspiracy

Victims were found in nearly every state:

Victim Locations from: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1114736/download


Piecing together the case involved gaining cooperation from two European VPN services, and apparently at least one search engine.   The indictment refers, for example, to the defendants using Bitcoin to pay for access to a European VPS, and then searching on May 15, 2016, for "kansasheart.com".  The same day, they accessed the public website of Kansas Heart Hospital, and on May 18th, encrypted many key computers on the network and sent their ransom note.

Another key part of the investigation was gaining the cooperation of a Bitcoin Exchanger, which was able to demonstrate that on July 21, 2016, the defendants cashed out at least some of their ransomed Bitcoin into Iranian Rials and deposited it into bank accounts controlled by MANSOURI and SAVANDI.

Chat logs were also available to the investigators, as the indictment mentions contents of chat consistently throughout their timeline.  Using the combination of events, some of the key dates were:

  • December 14, 2015 - Defendants chatting about the development and functionality of SamSam.
  • Jan 11, 2016 - Attack on Mercer County Business in New Jersey 
  • Feb 5, 2016 - Attack on Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center 
  • March 27, 2016 - Attack on MedStar Health 
  • May 15, 2016 - Attack on Kansas Heart Hospital 
  • May 27, 2016 - Attack on University of Calgary 
  • July 27, 2016 - Attack on Nebraska Orthopedic Hospital 
  • April 25, 2017 - Attack on City of Newark, New Jersey 
  • January 18, 2018 - Attack on Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc. 
  • February 19, 2018 - Attack on Colorado Department of Transportation 
  • March 22, 2018 - Attack on City of Atlanta, Georgia 
  • July 14, 2018 - Attack on LabCorp 
  • September 25, 2018 - Attack on the Port of San Diego 
FBI Wanted Poster from: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1114746/download

Tuesday, February 13, 2018

On the Anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, 30 Iranian News sites hacked to show death of Ayatollah Khamenei

February 11th marked the 39th aniversary of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the day when the Shah was overthrown and the government replaced by the Ayatollah Khomeini, called "The Supreme Leader" of Iran.  February 10th marked something quite different -- the day when hackers gained administrative control of more than 30 Iranian news websites and used stolen credentials to login to their Content Management Systems (CMS) and share a fake news article -- the death of Ayatollah Khamenei.

The Iranian Ministry of Communications and Information Technology shared the results of their investigation via the Iranian CERT (certcc.ir) which has announced the details of the hack in this PDF report.  All of the websites in question, which most famously included ArmanDaily.ir, were hosted on the same platform, a Microsoft IIS webserver running ASP.net.

Most of the thirty hacked websites were insignificant as far as global traffic is concerned.  But several are quite popular.  We evaluated each site listed by CERTCC.ir by looking up its Alexa ranking.  Alexa tracks the popularity of all websites on the Internet.  Three of the sites are among the 100,000 most popular websites on the Internet.


NewsSiteAlexa Ranking
SharghDaily.ir33,153
NoavaranOnline.ir43,737
GhanoonDaily.ir79,955
Armandaily.ir104,175
BankVarzesh.com146,103
EtemadNewspaper.ir148,450
BaharDaily.ir410,358
KaroonDaily.ir691,550
TafahomNews.com1,380,579
VareshDaily.ir1,435,862
NimnegahShiraz.ir2,395,969
TWeekly.ir2,993,755
NishKhat.ir3,134,287
neyrizanfars.ir3,475,281
Asreneyriz.ir7,820,850
Ecobition.ir8,819,111
saraFrazanNews.ir9,489,254
DavatOnline.ir9,612,775

These rankings would put the online leadership for the top news sites listed as similar to a mid-sized American newspaper.  For example, the Fort Worth Star-Telegram ranks 31,375, while the Springfield, Illinois State Journal-Register is 84,882.  (For more examples, the Boston Globe is 4,656, while the New York Times is #111.)

Hacked Sites not listed by Alexa among the top ten million sites on the Internet included: Aminehamee.ir, armanmeli.ir, Baharesalamat.ir, bighanooonline.ir, hadafeconomic.ir, kaenta.ir, naghshdaily.ir, niloofareabi.ir, sayehnews.com, setarezobh.ir, shahresabzeneyriz.ir.

CERTCC.ir's report notes that the primary explanation of the attack is that all of the attacked news sites have "the default user name and password of the backup company" and a "high-level" gmail.com email account with the same username and password had permissions to all sites.

Although the official Islamic Republic News Agency says the source of the attack was "the United Kingdom and the United States", that accusation is not entirely clear after reviewing the report from the CERT.  The IP address 93.155.130.14 is listed by the Iranian CERT as being a UK based company using AS47453.  Several sources, including Iranian site fa.alalam.ir, point out that this is actually a Bulgarian IP address.  AS47453 belongs to "itservice.gb-net" with support details listed in Pleven, Bulgaria.

93.155.130.14 - mislabeled in the original CERTCC.ir report
This error of IP address does seem to have been human error, rather than deception, and the CERT has released an updated version of the Iranian news site hacking report which can be found here, showing the corrected information.

The Corrected version of the report ... (created Feb 12 0408AM)

The CERT report is rather uncomplimentary of the hackers, mentioning that there seem to be several clumsy failed reports to dump a list of userids and passwords from the Content Management System database via SQL Injection attacks, as well as several other automated attacks.  In the end, however, the measure of a hacker is in many ways SUCCESS, and it does seem that the objective, shaming the Ayatollah by declaring his death on the eve of the Islamic Revolution holiday, was achieved.

While a source IP address cannot serve exclusively to provide attack attribution, Newsweek reports that on the day the attack began (Thursday, February 8, 2018), that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei gave a speech to commanders of the Iranian Air Force in which he claimed that the United States had created the Islamic State militant group and that the USA is responsible for all the death and destruction ISIS has caused.  That could certainly serve as a motive for certain actors, although the holiday itself, called by American politicians "Death to America Day" included as usual occasional American, Israeli, and British flags burning, as well as several instances of Donald Trump efigees being burned, overall the protests seemed more timid than in the past.

from: http://www.newsweek.com/iran-says-us-even-worse-isis-bombing-supreme-leader-allies-syria-802257 





Sunday, April 25, 2010

Iranian "Sun-Army" attacks NASA and JDA

What does NASA, the US space agency, have in common with the Jerusalem Development Authority of the Israeli government? They've both been attacked this week by the new Iranian hacking group, "Sun-Army".

The Defacement authority, Zone-H.org reports that this group did their first reported hacks on February 17th, one more on February 27th, and then on February 23rd defaced:

maorm.larc.nasa.gov
pic.larc.nasa.gov
fabrication.larc.nasa.gov
ohcm.larc.nasa.gov
sw-eng.larc.nasa.gov
cmar.larc.nasa.gov
careertalk.larc.nasa.gov
oea.larc.nasa.gov
technologygateway.nasa.gov

www.zhemgang.gov.bt
www.jda.gov.il



Their earlier defacements accuse "traitors to the Islamic Republic of Iran" and quotes from the Quran - "Sura Araf verse 179"

That verse says, "And in the law of retaliation there is saving of life for you, O' people of understanding, so that you may guard yourselves against evil."

(These verse were teachings to prevent "tribal feuds" - prior to the Quran, when someone was killed, his family would seek vengeance by killing all of the murderers tribe that they could. This passage of the Quran teaches that retaliation should be one for one. The accused can seek limited vengeance, but once retaliation has been achieved, there should be no on-going feud. Lives are saved by limiting the retaliation.)

Here is their defacement of the Jerusalem Development Authority:



The current NASA defacement contained this English language text:

In The Name Of God

The Nasa organization which is funded by Usa and plays an important role not only in the most of scientific fields but also in many other projects like "Star Wars" which was aimed to weeken the former soviet union , now has come down to its knees toward
the scientific level of young iranians and iran , the birth place of Cyrus the great, who formed the biggest empire the world has ever seen.

the scientific apartaide which is imposed by Usa and it alies can never prevent us from progressing in international scene , special peaceful nuclear energy.

We Congratulate You On The Occasion Of Worlds Astronomical Day


The same message is repeated in Persian, with the following line added at the end:

که ایران و ایران زمین زنده باد /// سر افراز و جاوید و پاینده باد

I can't seem to translate that well with Google Translate it is rendered as:

Iran and the Iranian Live Earth / / / partition and the eternal and lasting head wind

(If you can provide a better translation, please let me know! gar at uab dot edu)



The more recent defacement points to the Sun-Army.com website, shown here:



The Sun-Army says on their website that they were created by inviting the leaders of many influential hacking groups to join forces under the new name to support Iran's security and the Quran. They claim the group was created on February 26, 2010.

Mehdy007 is a fairly regular visitor to the Iranian hacking site, Ashiyane Digital Security. One of his posts, from August 2009, shows him uploading links to a set of 55 hacking videos on a wide-range of hacking topics. On February 24th of this year he was sharing SQL Injection attack techniques with the group, one of which he demonstrated by hacking "sciencescotland.org"

Nitrojen26 also is a member at Ashiyane, and has in the past used the Yahoo email address "Nitrojen26@yahoo.com"

The.Mo3tafA, Nitrojen26, and BodyGuard all regularly show up on pages defaced under the name "Ashiyane Digital Security Team" along with Behrooz_Ice and Q7x, with this trademark logo:



MagicCoder is the relative newcomer to the group, though he has done some solo-hacking according to his Zone-H stats, and has his own logo as well:



He's a gmail user = magicc0d3r@gmail.com

PLUS is an unknown for me. Great hacker name, since its basically impossible to Google-search. He's been involved as a named party on a number of "team defacements" for Ashiyane, including ones that left this fairly recent tag:



On defacements that use that image, the message in Persian and English is:

Our belligerence is religious and does not own any borders, thus we are here as long as atheism and blasphemy exist. We do know that effrontery of blasphemy to Imam Khomeini is what that only you can do. This is just a warning to your governmental sites!


The list of members on those hacks is:
Behrooz_Ice -Q7x -Sha2ow -Virangar -Nitrojen26 -BodyGuard -tHe.Mo3tafA MagicCoder -0261 -Ali_Eagle -PLUS -Jok3r -System.Fehler
We Love Iran
Ashiyane Digital Security Team




The WHOIS registration information for Sun-Army.com lists the same email address as their defacements -- sun.army@asia.com -- as well as this address:

Sun Army
Sun Army (sun.army@asia.com)
Iranian Apartment. Azadi Sq. Tehran
Tehran
Zanjan,12365
IR
Tel. +009.2122532689

Domain servers in listed order:
ns4.mihanblog.com
ns3.mihanblog.com


The domain was registered by PublicDomainRegistry.com (DirectI Internet Solutions)

Those nameservers serve more than 700 other domains . . . mostly Iranian TLDs, ".ir"

Many of those domains are listed as attack pages, sucvh as "karrar.ir," which is described by Google SafeBrowsing as:

What happened when Google visited this site?

Of the 871 pages we tested on the site over the past 90 days, 37 page(s) resulted in malicious software being downloaded and installed without user consent. The last time Google visited this site was on 2010-04-25, and the last time suspicious content was found on this site was on 2010-04-22.

Malicious software includes 987 scripting exploit(s).

Malicious software is hosted on 4 domain(s), including link313m.persiangig.com/, link313m.blogfa.com/, bidel.ir.googlepages.com/.

2 domain(s) appear to be functioning as intermediaries for distributing malware to visitors of this site, including link313m.blogfa.com/, boxeshia-sonni.mihanblog.com/.

This site was hosted on 1 network(s) including AS30176 (PRIORITYCOLO).


Following the links from that SafeBrowsing page find warning of malware, including malware being distributed via "sarzaminnews.mihanblog.com", "karrar.mihanblog.com", and "karrar.ir".

Tuesday, January 12, 2010

Iranian Cyber Army returns - target: Baidu.com

Many Americans are not familiar with Baidu, but in China its the word people say when we would say Google. Baidu is a Chinese search engine that commands a powerful 60% of the marketplace. And this morning, their website looked liked this:



The white line of Persian text on the website is a statement that reads:

« ارتش سایبری ایران در اعتراض به دخالت های سايتهاي بيگانه و صهیونیستی در امور داخلی کشورمان و پخش اخبار دروغ و تفرقه برانگیز راه اندازي شده است


Google Translate tells us that that says:

Army of cyber-sites has been established to protest intervention in the internal affairs of our country and broadcast of false and divisive news by Foreigners and Israel.


(with a little word-re-ordering to preserve meaning)


We first heard of the Iranian Cyber Army on December 18th when they attacked Twitter with an almost identical attack. We documented the attack here in our story Who Is the Iranian Cyber Army?.

In today's attack, the nameservers for Baidu were redirected to a small network that caters to "warez" and various piracy and pornography servers. The computer 188.95.49.6 became the address for ns1.baidu.com, ns2.baidu.com, and ns3.baidu.com, and these new "unofficial" nameservers did a wild-card resolution for everything at baidu, pointing it to the same IP address 188.95.49.6.

Later in the morning, that IP address shifted to 188.95.49.19, which is the address which is currently live as of this writing.

Click the image below to see the full unedited version of the original graphic that was posted on the server:


(the original file was named "-1-2.jpg")
(The EXIF data indicates that the file was saved using Adobe Photoshop CS4 Windows on December 27, 2009 at 1:41:44 PM.)

There were also two VERY interesting email addresses on the page:

Soldier@CyberArmyOfIran.com
and
Soldier@IRCArmy.com

The website "cyberarmyofiran.com" is hosted on the Canadian IP address 70.35.29.162, which belongs to "Netfirms Inc".

Registrant:
Domain Privacy Group, Inc.
c/o cyberarmyofiran.com,
7030 Woodbine Ave. Suite 800
Markham, ON L3R 6G2
CA

Domain name: cyberarmyofiran.com

Administrative Contact:
Domain Privacy Group, Inc. privacy635948@domainprivacygroup.com
c/o cyberarmyofiran.com,
7030 Woodbine Ave. Suite 800
Markham, ON L3R 6G2
CA
Fax:

Technical Contact:
Domain Privacy Group, Inc. privacy635948@domainprivacygroup.com
c/o cyberarmyofiran.com,
7030 Woodbine Ave. Suite 800
Markham, ON L3R 6G2
CA
Fax:

Registrar of Record: Netfirms Inc.
Record expires on 2010-12-31.
Record created on 2009-12-31.
Database last updated on 2010-01-12 06:51:32.

The website "ircarmy.com" is hosted on US IP address 98.136.50.138, which belongs to Yahoo! (and is currently using a Yahoo! Nameserver)

Domain Name.......... ircarmy.com
Creation Date........ 2009-12-31
Registration Date.... 2009-12-31
Expiry Date.......... 2010-12-31
Organisation Name.... Iranian Army
Organisation Address. PO Box 61359
Organisation Address.
Organisation Address. Sunnyvale
Organisation Address. 94088
Organisation Address. CA
Organisation Address. US

Admin Name........... Admin PrivateRegContact
Admin Address........ PO Box 61359
Admin Address........
Admin Address........ Sunnyvale
Admin Address........ 94088
Admin Address........ CA
Admin Address........ US
Admin Email.......... contact@myprivateregistration.com
Admin Phone.......... +1.5105952002
Admin Fax............

That first IP address for today's redirect, 188.95.49.6, resolved such names as:

www.baidu.com
proxy.baidu.com
news.baidu.com
passport.baidu.com
post.baidu.com
utility.baidu.com
video.baidu.com
cpro.baidu.com
map.baidu.com
spaces.baidu.com
zhidao.baidu.com

well, actually, EVERYTHING.baidu.com resolved temporarily to this IP address.

What is that IP address normally used for? When I try a reverse resolution on that IP it tells me the server's name is "pink2.warez-host.com"

The site normally hosts such webservers as:

wamboload.org
greateamwarez.pl
xtrem-360.com
shugalclub.com
xtreme-load.com
thewarezlife.com
ddlhentai.com
ewddl.com
warezdream.com
dxdforum.com
warez-host.com
blue.warez-host.com
linkpex.com
housebeats.in
scriptzsector.ws
pirate-club.net
wawa-mania.eu
demon-board.eu
iklotz.ru
0daymusic.biz

So what do we know about WarezHost? Here's what their website says about themselves:



Warez-Host is a privately-owned organization located in Dubai, UAE. At Warez-Host, we understand that our customers' web sites are important and they require reliable services to ensure that service is not interrupted. We have established a solid foundation to offer a reliable, easy to use and low cost web hosting solution for small-to-large sized businesses and helping thousands of customers get their web sites online.

Our goal is to provide a low-cost web hosting solution that is easy-to-use, and is customer service oriented. At Warez-Host, we value our customers and recognize their need for quality service and outstanding customer service.

Warez-Host web hosting is the perfect choice for all of your web hosting needs, our datacenters located in Netherlands, IRAN and Germany.




The Dedicated Server pages for each data center explain what types of content you can host on their servers. For example, its ok to host stolen software and movies ("warez") in all three locations, but the Iranian Data Center list (shown below) makes it clear you can't host pornography in Iran - although you can in their German and Netherlands based data centers.



So, if someone wants to get to the bottom of who hacked Baidu, all they have to do is slap a subpoena on the UAE-based company's Iranian data center manager to see who owns this dedicated server and get logs from it.

Yeah. Good luck with that.

More badness from "warez-host.com" servers:

0daymusic.biz
3rabwarez.com
70sshowonline.com
A1source.us
Alibablog.com
Allokamas.com
Allo-kamas.net
Alternatedown.com
Appfuzion.com
Aspecialtimetoremember.com
Bdwarez.info
Bestindo.us
Blogfigo.com
Bloodordie.com
Brif.net
Cumsafaci.com
Darkantiviruses.org
Ddlfree.com
Ddlhentai.com
Demon-board.eu
Devilstreaming.com
Diplomworld.com
Diplomworld.ru
Dll-404.com
D-moviez.com
Downloaderz.net
Dragon91.com
Dreadfulappz.com
Dxdforum.com
Dzson.com
Endees.com
Enjoywarez.org
Enz.ir
Ewddl.com
Extreme-load.com
Fbghana.com
Figyelo.net
Firstwarez.pl
Freefile.ir
Freemoviewizard.com
Ftaonline.org
Futurewarez.com
Gamehaxerz.com
Geejee.us
Geewee.eu
Get-connection.info
Gormiz.com
Gp-studios.info
Gstonerz.com
Hdppv.net
Hotfilmvn.net
Hot-uploads.com
Housebeats.in
Iklotz.com
Iklotz.ru
Indianddl.info
Insidernet.com
Italywarez.net
Linkbucks.in
Linkpex.com
Linkxpic.com
Live-desi.com
Magazinesbay.com
Marvisatechnology.com
Mastworld.net
Mediaanime.info
Megauploadparadise.com
Mexicowarez.com
Minitech.ws
Mobile1.ir
Montamela.net
Morehtamilsangam.com
Movie-at-home.com
Neopetstuff.com
Neopetstuff.net
Netspond.com
New-connection.info
No2pc.com
Nop-licite.us
Now-connection.info
Operationwolf.net
Parsikade.ir
Pejaforum.net
Persianmember.com
Persianmember.ir
Pirate-club.net
Piratemonster.com
Porn-down.com
Projectannihilation.org
Qpv8.ir
Rapid4all.org
Resell-host.biz
Rivea.org
Sataplu.com
Scriptzsector.ws
Search-ddl.com
Secured-webhosting.com
Seekwarez.com
Seheri-bb.com
Seo-shop.info
Sharing-rapidshare.com
Sharing-rapidshares.com
Shugalclub.com
Simoali.com
Sonicviewbrasil.net
Sportzkrieg.com
Streamdvd.net
Superpartage.com
Tagmite.com
Tamilsangammoreh.com
Tehwarez.com
Tensaibux.com
Tensaidownloader.com
Theentertainmentcore.com
Theforcestrikes.com
Thewarezlife.com
Tsontakias.org
Ultimate-porn.us
Ultrafull.com
Untiempopararecordar.com
Upload4u.ir
Uptaze.com
Wamboload.org
Warez.ir
Warez-design.com
Warezdream.com
Warezground.org
Warez-help.org
Warez-host.com
Warez-host.net
Warezisland.com
Warezlegacy.com
Warez-life.com
Warezmarket.net
Warezs.net
Warez-share.net
Warez-zz.com
Warwealth.com
Watch-free-episodes-online.org
Wawa-mania.eu
Whatsupearl.com
Woodbumgfx.com
Xfresh.us
Xtreme-load.com
You-down.com
Zojesalem.com

Friday, December 18, 2009

Who is the "Iranian Cyber Army"? Twitter DNS Redirect

(Update: 12JAN10 - Iranian Cyber Army Returns -- Target: Baidu.com )

#1 Search on Google in the past hour: "Iranian Cyber Army"
#2 Search on Google in the past hour: "Twitter hacked"

What do these things have to do with each other?

A formerly unknown group, the Iranian Cyber Army, was able to redirect the DNS for Twitter, causing all visitors to be temporarily redirected to another IP address, not belonging to Twitter, and sharing the message from the Iranian Cyber Army that they are cooler hackers than you.

Since we do actually track website defacers at UAB, and since we've never heard of the Iranian Cyber Army, we thought we would take a quick peek in our favorite Iranian hacker rooms to see who was boasting of their conquest.

First we found "vhdmsm" sharing details of the attack in the Iranian Hacker Forum, Ashiyane Digital Security.

They quote the defacement:

========================

Iranian Cyber Army

THIS SITE HAS BEEN HACKED BY IRANIAN CYBER ARMY

iRANiAN.CYBER.ARMY@GMAIL.COM

U.S.A. Think They Controlling And Managing Internet By Their Access, But THey Don't, We Control And Manage Internet By Our Power, So Do Not Try To Stimulation Iranian Peoples To....

NOW WHICH COUNTRY IN EMBARGO LIST? IRAN? USA?

WE PUSH THEM IN EMBARGO LIST

Take Care

=====================
and post links to the Twitter Blog entry about the attack, and a CNET news story.

But there is no indication they were themselves involved.

We're going to need some more evidence. Perhaps someone should be talking to the folks at BlueHost this morning.

See for yourself?


A little twiddling with various DNS Caching systems, and we were able to find the IP address to which traffic had been redirected:

66.147.244.182

There are some interesting domains there, including:

http://mowjcamp.net/

That site is interesting, because its on Bluehost, in the United States.

which currently shows content made from these graphic files (I've moved them to a more permanent location...just in case):










In my opinion, it looks like that server was compromised via WordPress vulnerabilities, but that is just an educated guess based on content at this time. So, it looks like the hacker first hacked one of the sites on the Bluehost box, other mowjcamp.org, wpcrowd.com, or coventryri.com, then redirected all the twitter traffic to that IP by changing the Nameserver entries for Twitter to point away from their normal Google-provided IP addresses to 66.147.242.88 instead.

Tuesday, June 16, 2009

Armchair CyberWarriors: Twitter and #IranElection

Our friends over at ThreatChaos let us know about the newest "CyberWar" in their blog this morning, so we went over to Twitter (yeah, follow /garwarner) and decided to check things out for ourselves.

Apparently the Moral Compass of the Internet is currently indicating that CyberWar is a harmless feel good activity that Americans should be involved in. Let me quickly go on the record to say: ALL DDOS ACTIVITY IS A CRIME AND SHOULD NOT BE ENCOURAGED OR CONDONED IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCE

First, let's get the legal part out of the way. In the United States, the relevant code is Title 18 Part I Chapter 47 § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i), which says that anyone who:

(i) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer;

is in violation of the law and can be fined and imprisoned for up to one year (unless their intrusion causes medical or physical harm, or unless they are already a convicted felon, or unless they seek monetary gain, in which cause the penalties go up).

So, is the president of Iran's website a protected computer? No, probably not. But any computer engaged in Interstate commerce is a protected computer. For example, all of the computers belonging to your ISP, which you are placing load on by your criminal activity. If it turns out you were collaborating with others in order to cause this activity to occur, say for instance, all of your buddies on Twitter, then you could also be said to be part of a Conspiracy, but we won't get into that here.

Before we spend any more time on the wisdom of deciding as a private citizen to declare war on a foreign power, let's see what's actually going on in Twitter-space with regards to this DDOS:

Esko Reinikainen of Wales is offering this #iranelection cyberwar guide for beginners, which includes some Ghandi type actions, such as identifying yourself as an Iranian blogger with a time zone of GMT +3.30, on the theory, I suppose, that Iranian security forces will get confused as they seek out the real Iranian bloggers, and book a flight to Wales or the United States to stop the blogger. His point #6 is:


6. Denial of Service attacks. If you don't know what you are doing, stay out of this game. Oly target those sites the legitimate Iranian bloggers are designating. Be aware that these attacks can have detrimental effects to the network the protesters are relying on. Keep monitoring their traffic to note when you should turn the taps on or off.


Of course you can tell the "legitimate" Iranian bloggers, because they use the tags "#iranelection" or "#gr88" in their posts.

Many of those calling for DDOS attacks are harmless voices that suggest things like:

/nzmrmn - #DDOS this http://isna.ir/ISNA/Default.aspx?Lang=E 1. Load page in browser 2. Hit refresh a million times. 3. ??? 4. Profit!

Others call for DDOS but offer no guidance whatsoever:

/vwkess - ...keep DDOS attacks.

While others promise that the DDOS is having a great affect, such as:

/FREETHEFUTURE: RT UNCONF: News from Inside Tehran #DDOS affecting police communications, not able to track protestors PLZ RT!!

which is being heavily retweeted:
/djd1414, /FreePersians, /ian_lcv, /momsprissy, /Chromedaffodils, /z3bbster, TheBarRag, etc., etc.

Given the high tech crowd on Twitter though, it was certain that someone would come along and build a better mousetrap. Many Twitter folks discussed using "PageReboot.com" early in the DDOS. Giving this site a URL is an easy way for the site to be constantly reloaded. While historically the site has received little traffic, and almost all of it from China (88%), the MediaTemple hosted site is now showing that 25% of its traffic originates from Tehran.

/ElizabethFinn God/Allah bless everyone fighting in Iran. Set your browsers to http://www.pagereboot.com/?url=http://www.khamenei.ir/&Refresh=1 Goodnight.

/Tigrael http://www.pagereboot.com/?url=http://www.farhang.gov.ir/&refresh=1

/protactinium84 Hurt websites. http://www.pagereboot.com Set to 1. http://www.khamenei.ir/ http://www.presstv.ir/ www.President.ir http://www.irna.ir

/kamaleddin RT Lets take this down everybody CopyPasteKeepOpen http://www.pagereboot.com/...www.bornanews.ir&refresh=1 Let EVERYONE know.

The site was taken down, however, as the Twitter's reported:

/iran88 - pagereboot.com used for DDOS attacks in Iran is purposely DOWN.

One popular tweet offering a replacement for the original "PageReboot" is suggesting that people visit the site "whereismyvote.info". At the moment 9 of the 16 targeted pages are unreachable.

The site actually loads a webframe from "www.my-persia.com/ie", which in turn loads 16 frames named "Frame1.html" through "Frame16.html".

Each of these frames is using a service called "PageReboot" which causes the frame to reload itself once per second, so that visiting the single webpage will cause each of 16 "targeted" sites to be visited every second by each person viewing the page. The pages currently targeted by My-Persia are:

1. www.irna.ir = a search string is used to maximize the load on the server.
2. farsnews.com
3. www.rajanews.com = a search string is also used here to maximize the load on the server.
4. www.ahmadinejad.ir
5. www.leader.ir = a search for "khamenei" is used
6. www.president.ir = this site is actually still online despite being the most targeted of the campaign. Located on 80.191.69.40
7. www.irib.ir
8. www.iribnews.ir
9. www.kayhannews.ir = this site is the second one responding as live in my current visit.
10. farsi.khamenei.ir = actually sends a message back, saying that "Your IP, location, and other information has been recorded! Security Defence Team!"
11. www.entekhab10.net
12. www.isna.ir = also live, hosted at 64.130.220.65, which means DDOSing this box is an attack against a computer in Ontario Canada.
13. presstv.com = also live, hosted at 217.218.67.228
14. www.moi.ir = also live, hosted at 80.191.0.78
15. english.iribnews.ir = also live, hosted at 62.220.121.23
16. www.leader.ir = using a search

Other sites also are being put out to do "refreshes" automatically, such as:

/uberguru - who points us to "refreshthing.com" currently being used to DDOS isna.ir

/iran88 - Use refreshthing.com instead of pagereboot if it is down

/ironcamel - provides a pointer to a list of Iranian embassies around the world and suggests those as better DDOS targets: http://www.embassyworld.com/Iran/

/Spooky_Fox - providing a list of proxies to use to perform your DDOS on the site "iran.whyweprotest.net" -- people logging in there are posting offers for proxies to allow "anonymized" twitter posting. Of course following the general theme of paranoia that this whole site is based upon, one has to ask how we know those aren't Iranian security forces offering the proxies??


Others are asking people to STOP the DDOS, such as:

/iron_riots - "RT: Pls stop DDOS on iran's website they slow down the entire countries internet"

/B2020 - (same thing)

/OrangeCorner - offers a link on Daily Kos on why NOT to DDOS Iran. I agree with the general argument ( http://www.dailykos.com/story/2009/6/15/742591/-Do-NOT-DDOS-Iranian-websites ), but please don't tell my Fox News mother-in-law I agreed with something on Daily Kos, or she won't cook me dinner tonight!

/danteimprimis - Iranians reporting that the DDOS attacks on gov't sites are hurting overall bandwidth. May be satisfying, but we should stop.

/danielsandberg - To #IranElection protestors: DO NOT DDOS Iranian gov websites: